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PL
An envoy (legatus, orator) was a person sent to a community or to a ruler by his community or his state. It was not only an individual who undertook the mission to foreign territories or came from them to Rome, but the delegate to or from provincial assemblies, municipium or civitas as well. The complete inviolability of envoys seems to be warranted in Rome of the principate era by the univerasally respected norm of ius gentium. According to it, envoys were regarded as sacred (sancti habentur legati). Therefore, they were secured against violance and safe from human trespass or assault. The priviledge was enjoyed by both ambassadors of the senate or the princeps and legates arriving to Rome from abroad, from provincial assemblies, from municipia or civitates. The word sanctum comes from the sagmina - the bunches of herbs. The legates customarily carried them as it was believed that the sagmina provide them with gods’ support, ward off outrages and protect them from human mischief. According to lex Iulia de vi publica, an attack, a battery or any other violation of the personal immunity of envoys or of accompaning individuals was punished by aquae et ignis interdictio. An assault made upon an enemy envoy was considered the aggraviated form of the offence. According to the Quintus Mucius Scaevola’s responsum from D .50.7.18, the person, who committed such crime, was punished by deditio: he was handed over to the enemy, who had sent the struck legates. The procedures of envoys’ nomination differred and depended on particular habits and laws of certain territories and communities. However according to Roman law, a person sent as a legate enjoyed complete inviolability by the time from when he was selected, not by that when he began his mission. In case of disagreement whether or not he was a legate, the pretor at Rome took the cognizance of the issue. Consequently, a person not recognized by the Roman official did not enjoy the envoy’s priviledge. The inviolability did not depend on the legate’s subjective conviction that he had the immunity. As a result, the status of a captive envoy did not change. Accordingly, the delegating community was unable to resign from the priviledge. Therefore the envoy’s inviolability - the public law immunity seems to be absolute in the Roman principate.
PL
Mandatum incertum occurs when the terms of this consensual contract are left imprecise by the mandator. The article focuses on the essential determination of the object for the validity of the mandate, therefore the main question is whether mandatum incertum was not unknown to the classical jurists, as there is no doubt it was not void in the Byzantine era. The problem was broadly discussed by several authors, i.e., V. Arangino-Ruiz, G. Donatuti, G. Longo, A. Watson and N. Scapini, though no general agreement among modem jurists was achieved. It seems that terms of mandate are not the same as fines mandati. Fines mandati are not only the intrinsic restrictions given by the mandator, but the purpose to be achived as well. Yes, this purpose could be express or implied, then egressio mandati takes place only when the express boundaries are transgressed. The thorough analysis of relevant classical sources in the full context of the institution allows to state that there is no reason to allege that mandatum incertum was considered invalid in the classical period of Roman law. The strong evidence has been shown that classical jurists recognized mandates with terms left to the discretion of the mandatary. However, the mandatary should execute a commission in favour of the mandator’s interesse and this conduct is estimated according to the boni viri arbitratus.
PL
Remarks on the Methodology of Private Law Studies: The Use of Latin Maxims as Exemplified by nemo plus iuris The use of principles in the legal practice, which are quite often expressed in Latin, is associated with various intentions. What is important is that they should be used, both in research and in the professional practice, in full awareness of their origin and context. The Latin maxims, legal maxims or rules emphasize the Roman origin of the European private law. One of such maxims is nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet. Its original context was associated with inheritance law. The Justinian’s compilers endowed it with the value of a universal rule. The adage is associated above all with private law, although it was also made use of in the sphere of public law. It occurred in many different variations; in order to find its original wording, one has to consult the 17th Title in the 50th Book of Justinian’s Digest. In order to make good use of the maxims one has to take into consideration their wider context – the legal system at the time of Ulpian differed considerably from the one used during the Justinian’s era. Nemo plus iuris had also played a significant role in the law of obligations. In classical Roman law and in the times of empreror Justinian, the maxim was a rule of law and as such it allowed of no exceptions. For the correct interpretation and use of maxims it was also necessary to take under consideration the related maxims. In the case of nemo plus iuris such a maxim was nemo sibi ipsum causam possessionis mutare potest. The Latin legal maxim is often used in Polish legal discourse, although it is not directly expressed in statutory law.
EN
The use of principles in the legal practice, which are quite often expressed in Latin, is associated with various intentions. What is important is that they should be used, both in research and in the professional practice, in full awareness of their origin and context. The Latin maxims, legal maxims or rules emphasize the Roman origin of the European private law. One of such maxims is nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet. Its original context was associated with inheritance law. The Justinian’s compilers endowed it with the value of a universal rule. The adage is associated above all with private law, although it was also made use of in the sphere of public law. It occurred in many different variations; in order to find its original wording, one has to consult the 17th Title in the 50th Book of Justinian’s Digest. In order to make good use of the maxims one has to take into consideration their wider context – the legal system at the time of Ulpian differed considerably from the one used during the Justinian’s era. Nemo plus iuris had also played a significant role in the law of obligations. In classical Roman law and in the times of empreror Justinian, the maxim was a rule of law and as such it allowed of no exceptions. For the correct interpretation and use of maxims it was also necessary to take under consideration the related maxims. In the case of nemo plus iuris such a maxim was nemo sibi ipsum causam possessionis mutare potest. The Latin legal maxim is often used in Polish legal discourse, although it is not directly expressed in statutory law.
EN
Does religion represent a threat to public life and freedom of individuals or perhaps an opportunity for integral development that stems from care for the state as the common good? Christianity does not regard faith as a private matter. It must enjoy freedom in the public sphere. Therefore, assuming that state regulations have no concealed or overtly anti-religious bias, they are certain to entail endeavours to set the barely definable boundaries of the permissible and the impermissible. Richard John Neuhaus proved that the naked square is an illusion, an imposture rather than an opportunity or a decent objective. Public life, as any other kind of existence, abhors vacuum. The calls for confining religion to the private sphere are always to be a failure for the health of the public life. The freedom of religion, as any other freedom, is a challenge that requires defense and price to be paid by nations and individuals. The specific and true cases demonstrate that the numerous antireligious metaphors are not matched by the actual experience. The US Supreme Court decision in Zubik v. Burwell is thoroughly discussed below to give a clear and the most recent example of complexity of both the issue and possible ways of resolving controversies on various aspects of religious freedom.
EN
. In a paper published in 2001 Wiesław Mossakowski claimed that Nicolaus Copernicus was an expert in Roman civil law. He was convinced he was right. Discoveries and findings made in the last decade have shed new light on the search for Copernicus’ activities as a lawyer. In fact, he was a typical in-house counsel, in the service of the cathedral chapter to which he belonged in the Duchy of Warmia. Much of Mossakowski’s paper has dated, but some of his intuitions have been confirmed. With his paper he was risking a lot, even ridicule but eventually turned out to be a visionary.
PL
„Mikołaj Kopernik był znawcą rzymskiego prawa cywilnego” – pisał w 2001 r. Wiesław Mossakowski. Bardzo chciał w to wierzyć. Odkrycia i ustalenia ostatniej dekady rzuciły nowe światło na poszukiwania w zakresie działalności Kopernika jako prawnika. Był on bowiem typowym in-house counsel – prawnikiem praktykiem w służbie kapituły katedralnej, do której należał w Księstwie Warmińskim. Artykuł W. Mossakowskiego w znacznej mierze się zdezaktualizował, ale niektóre jego intuicje zostały potwierdzone. Publikując go, niemało ryzykował. Nawet śmieszność. Okazał się wizjonerem.
EN
By merging three different historical examples, this article shows that legal mentality influences the management of similar public goods, the composition of institutional change in the urban sphere and finally the character of legal regulations best fitted in a given circumstances for arriving at desired outcome. The authors proved that the inclinations for ex ante and ex post models are dependent on the concept of public administration and most particularly of administrative law. In a way, in the mixed public administration presented in the Roman law example, where both centralized and polycentric governance were applied, much depends on the narrative and values which accompany the institutional change in urban settings.
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