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REMOVING AN INCONSISTENCY FROM JAGO’S THEORY OF TRUTH

100%
Davies N. W.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2023
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vol. 30
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issue 4
339 – 349
EN
I identify an inconsistency in Jago’s theory of truth. I show that Jago is committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A. I show that Jago is committed to the proposition that A being true because A if the proposition that A is true. I show that these two commitments, given the rest of Jago’s theory, entail a contradiction. I show that while the latter commitment follows from Jago’s theory of truth, even by Jago’s own lights he should not be committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A.
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