Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help

  1. 5 Studia Iuridica

Authors help

  1. 5 Piotrowski R.

Years help

  1. 1 2021

  2. 2 2019

  3. 2 2016

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Remarks on the Dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland

100%
Piotrowski R.
Studia Iuridica
|
2016
|
vol. 68
279-292
EN
Where a system of constitutional judicial review is in place, the concept of democracy is understood as rejecting claims about an unlimited will of the sovereign as the source of state authority, and confining democracy to such manifestations of the majority will which enjoy Constitutional legitimacy – meaning that they are in compliance with the version of a human rights culture that has been inscribed in the Constitution and which is embraced by Constitutional judges when delivering their adjudication. Following the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, the political significance of the Constitutional Tribunal has increased enormously. Only the Constitutional Tribunal is capable of preventing the centre of political power (which governs over the legislative and executive branches) from pursuing its plans. According to parliamentary majority in order to change Poland and fulfil commitments to the electorate, the ruling party had to see to it that the Tribunal’s make-up is pluralistic. Otherwise, all their efforts would be exposed to destruction by the Constitutional Tribunal. This way of thinking, though, implies that the Constitutional Tribunal can be changed in an ordinary law in such a way as to render it incapable of opposing the ruling majority. Regarding the ongoing Constitutional crisis over the Constitutional Tribunal, a scenario involving the observance of the basic law does not appear to be a likely one – unless such scenario leads to the expectation, however mistaken, that political gains can thus be scored and that the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal will no longer pose a threat to plans of the parliamentary majority.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

New technologies or new human rights: the right to a government by humans and the right to one’s own thoughts?

100%
Piotrowski R.
Studia Iuridica
|
2018
|
vol. 76
283-296
EN
The rapid development of information and communication technology has made it imperative that new human rights be spelled out, to cope with an array of expected threats associated with this process. With artificial intelligence being increasingly put to practical uses, the prospect arises of Man’s becoming more and more AI-dependant in multiple walks of life. This necessitates that a constitutional and international dimension be imparted to a right that stipulates that key state-level decisions impacting human condition, life and freedom must be made by humans, not automated systems or other AI contraptions. But if artificial intelligence were to make decisions, then it should be properly equipped with value-based criteria. The culture of abdication of privacy protection may breed consent to the creation and practical use of technologies capable to penetrate an individual consciousness without his or her consent. Evidence based on such thought interference must be barred from court proceedings. Everyone’s right to intellectual identity and integrity, the right to one’s thoughts being free from technological interference, is as essential for the survival of the democratic system as the right to privacy – and it may well prove equally endangered.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Separation of Powers, Checks and Balances, and the Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Rethinking the Polish Experience

100%
Piotrowski R.
Studia Iuridica
|
2019
|
vol. 79
78-91
EN
The principle of checks and balances counts among the most fundamental constitutional values, as it is connected with the recognition and guaranteeing of human rights – in other words is the very essence of the Constitution, an act that limits the majority rule to allow for the rights and freedoms of the individual. Also of key importance is the connection of this precept with the essence of the democratic system, understood as one where the majority rule is constrained by human rights. The principle of checks and balances could function in full only in correspondence with culture of respect for human rights. The status of the sovereign needs legitimacy, which derives from the sovereign’s subordination to the Constitution. Being sovereign means being unsubordinated to anybody. It is thus fair to conclude that the attribute of sovereignty actually belongs to the values that have been shaped by culture and linked to the timeless moral rules and principles corresponding to humanity’s eternal dilemmas – the values that create the constitutional culture, i.e. a community’s set of values. The sovereign does not exercise the supreme authority over values, and the values are embodied in the Constitution, which is inseparably linked with the people and their sovereignty. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland reflects the precepts of liberal democracy, or such kind of democracy where the sources of human rights do not stem from the will of the majority. The model of governance adopted in the Constitution could be described as consensual democracy. Constitutional practice has taken a course where the system of consensual democracy – as laid down in the Constitution of Poland, with the power of the majority being constrained by rights of the minority – is turning into a system of a majority democracy, based not on a dialogue between the majority and the opposition, but on the power of a parliamentary majority who disregards the systemic role of the opposition.
4

Remarks on the Dispute over the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland

100%
Piotrowski R.
Studia Iuridica
|
2016
|
vol. 68
279-292
EN
Where a system of constitutional judicial review is in place, the concept of democracy is understood as rejecting claims about an unlimited will of the sovereign as the source of state authority, and confining democracy to such manifestations of the majority will which enjoy Constitutional legitimacy – meaning that they are in compliance with the version of a human rights culture that has been inscribed in the Constitution and which is embraced by Constitutional judges when delivering their adjudication. Following the recent parliamentary and presidential elections, the political significance of the Constitutional Tribunal has increased enormously. Only the Constitutional Tribunal is capable of preventing the centre of political power (which governs over the legislative and executive branches) from pursuing its plans. According to parliamentary majority in order to change Poland and fulfil commitments to the electorate, the ruling party had to see to it that the Tribunal’s make-up is pluralistic. Otherwise, all their efforts would be exposed to destruction by the Constitutional Tribunal. This way of thinking, though, implies that the Constitutional Tribunal can be changed in an ordinary law in such a way as to render it incapable of opposing the ruling majority. Regarding the ongoing Constitutional crisis over the Constitutional Tribunal, a scenario involving the observance of the basic law does not appear to be a likely one – unless such scenario leads to the expectation, however mistaken, that political gains can thus be scored and that the operation of the Constitutional Tribunal will no longer pose a threat to plans of the parliamentary majority.
5
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Uwagi o prawnym znaczeniu konstytucyjnego zakazu nadmiernego zadłużania państwa

100%
Piotrowski R.
Studia Iuridica
|
2020
|
vol. 86
227-240
PL
According to Article 216.5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland it shall be permissible neither to contract loans nor provide guarantees and financial sureties which would engender a national public debt exceeding three-fifths of the value of the annual gross domestic product. The method of calculating the value of the annual gross domestic product and national public debt shall be specified by statute. However, this provision co-establishing the principle of balance budget as constitutional value is not an absolute paradigm. It is limited by other constitutional values and principles, including the principle of common good, and should not be abused against the principle of diligence and efficiency in the work of state bodies.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.