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EN
Ownership is considered, predominatly, to be a legal notion. But it has also some conotations in the frame of economics, philosophy and sociology. In the doctrine of law there were framed numerous and slightly different definitions of ownership. Most of them, however, emphasise the dominant role of the owner’s unlimited and exclusive power over a thing (or value) as well as his (her) dominat role to explore possibilities of legal and factual disposal. The Constitution of Poland of 1997 deals with the ownership (property) rights twice: in article 21 (within the basic constitutional regulations) and, even more detaily, in article 64 (1–3), in Chapter II of the Constitution, dealing with the civil fredoms and rights of entity. The central issue under the author’s consideration should be framed in a question: to which extend the limitations pointed in article 31(3) of the Constitution may define exploration of the owner’s rights and powers protected by the Constitution, in particular; by its provisions framed in its articles 21 and 64?
PL
Własność funkcjonuje jako pojęcie prawne. Posiada nadto określone konotacje w sferze ekonomii, w filozofii i socjologii. W doktrynie prawnej podjęto szereg prób definiowania własności. Wszystkie be mała ujęcia akcentują, obok zróżnicowań, wyłączność właściciela w korzystaniu z rzeczy lub wartości stanowiących przedmiot własności oraz dysponowania nimi. Konstytucja RP z 1997 r. odnosi się do własności w art. 21 (w grupie unormowań wyznaczających zasady ustroju państwa) oraz w art. 64 ust. 1–3 (w rozdziale II, odnoszącym się do wolności, praw i obowiązków człowieka i obywatela). Autor rozważa w pracy kwestię: czy i w jakim zakresie na możliwość korzystania r rzeczy (wartości niematerialnej) przez właściciela rzutują ograniczenia w korzystaniu z wolności i praw konstytucyjnych, przewidziane w art. 31 ust. 3 Konstytucji RP?
PL
Ukształtowanie relacji strukturalnych i funkcjonalnych pomiędzy instytucjami władzy publicznej należy do kluczowych właściwości każdego z systemów polityczno-ustrojowych i – w płaszczyźnie jurydycznej – konstytucyjnych. Wybór systemu podstawowych rozwiązań w tym zakresie określa sposób wykonywania władzy w państwie tj. system rządzenia; w innej wersji terminologicznej: system rządów. Z metodologicznego punktu oglądu można mówić, co najmniej, o dwóch płaszczyznach analizy mechanizmu sprawowania władzy (określanego jako „system rządów”), czyli o normatywnym (konstytucyjno-prawnym) i praktycznym (polityczno-behawioralnym) systemie rządów. W Polsce przy kształtowaniu konstytucyjnego „systemu rządów”, w toku prac nad projektami Konstytucji RP z 1997 r., istotnymi punktami odniesienia były: a) system rządów parlamentarno-gabinetowych (zwłaszcza w postaci „zracjonalizowanej”), b) system parlamentarno-prezydencki (zwany, aczkolwiek niejednoznacznie, „systemem pośrednim”) oraz – na dalszym planie – „system rządów prezydenckich” (system prezydencki).
EN
The shaping of structural and functional relations between bodies of state authority is one of the key characteristics of any political system and – at the juridical level – of any constitutional system. The choice of basic solutions in this regard determines the method of exercising authority in the state, i.e. its system of rule; also referred to as a system of government. From the methodological perspective, we may distinguish at least two levels of the analysis of the state power mechanism (referred to as the „system of government”), i.e. the normative (constitutional-legal) system of government and the practical (political-behavioural) one. In Poland, when developing the constitutional „system of government,” in the course of work on the drafts of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the relevant points of reference included: a) the parliamentary-cabinet system (particularly in the „rationalized” form), b) the parliamentary-presidential system (referred to as, quite ambiguously, an „indirect system”), and – to a lesser degree - the „system of presidential rule” (presidential system).
EN
The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 is one of the latest (apart from Albanian and Hungarian) constitutional acts adopted after the transformation of the 1990s. Its external inspirations were not uniform. As concerns the arrangement of regulations, it is modelled on the constitutions of: Italy of 1948, Greece of 1975, Portugal of 1976 and Spain of 1978. These solutions were also followed by the legislatures in other countries of the region. The following standard of arrangement was developed: general principles — freedoms and rights of the individual — central organs of the state — public fi nances — extraordinary measures — amending the constitution — transitional regulations. The regulations of individual freedom and rights were based (with some modifi cations) on the standards established in the Universal Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of December 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950. The constitutional legislator could also draw on the case law of the Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. Varied are the inspirations for adoption of the system of government. Given the party disintegration and the precariousness of preferences, it was imperative to stabilize the system. Regarding the election of the president of the Republic, the constitutional legislator copied the approach used in the Fifth Republic of France (after the 1962 amendment), that is the procedure of universal and direct elections, with extended term and exclusion of accountability to parliament. The solutions taken after the German Basic Law of 1949, such as (1) the parliamentary responsibility of the government limited to the collective one, (2) constructive vote of no confidence in place of an ordinary vote of no confi dence, (3) strong position of the head of government, contributed to ensuring the government stability. Some regulations deserve further consideration: the demarcation of roles in the dualistic executive, the dissonance between imposing performance targets on ministers by the prime minister and their individual responsibility, the defi nition of the Senate’s function and composition. The institution of revision of the constitution, known in Polish tradition, and not present in the Constitution of 1997, also deserves consideration.
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