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Scaffolded Minds And The Evolution Of Content In Signaling Pathways

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Korbak T.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2015
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vol. 41
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issue 1
89-103
EN
Hutto and Myin (2013) famously argue that basic minds are not contentful and content exists only as far as it is scaffolded with social and linguistic practices. This view, however, rests on a troublesome distinction between basic and scaffolded minds. Since Hutto and Myin have to account for language purely in terms of joint action guidance, there is no reason why simpler communication systems, such as cellular signaling pathways, should not give rise to scaffolded content as well. This conclusion remains valid even if one rejects the view of language as mediated through public symbols and embraces global antirepresentationalism. Content evolves spontaneously in complex regulatory systems, such as human, animal, and cellular communication.
2
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Radykalny enaktywizm a konserwatywna kognitywistyka

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Korbak T.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2015
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vol. 29
123-133
PL
Recenzja książki: Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin, Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press 2013.
3
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Dlaczego reprezentacje nie trzymają się modeli dynamicznych?

100%
Korbak T.
Rocznik Kognitywistyczny
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2014
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vol. 7
PL
Why representations don't stick with dynamic models?In this paper I investigate thesis, embraced by proponents of dynamicism in cognitive science, that mind is not representational and explanation of cognition can go without representations. This claim has received serious criticism from cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind, who accuse dynamical explanation of being satisfying only for a narrow class of simple cognitive phenomena. Thus, genuine, representation-free explanation of cognition will always be incomplete. I espouse another strategy and present two arguments saying that the language of pure dynamical systems theory is not rich enough to define any nontrivial notion of representation. If I am right, then at least these phenomena dynamical explanation deals well with are not representational and representation talk can in no way help us understand them
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