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EN
According to the so-called Potsdam Convention, Poland was to receive reparations from a total granted to the Soviet Union; in return for a transference of the reparation payments, Moscow imposed upon Warsaw supplies of lower priced coal, and then, by suspending the reparations paid by the German Democratic Republic, it de facto left the Poles with no choice. Consequently, Poland was forced to follow the Soviet example, and in August 1953 issued a declaration in which, referring to the East German-Soviet protocol regulating the question of payments, she resigned from the remaining part of the reparations. The Polish authorities never treated the declaration of August 1953 as tantamount to a resignation from all payments, and counted on the fact that the whole reparation question would be ultimately regulated in a peace treaty to be signed with Germany. For this purpose, they collected material documenting assorted losses, and closely observed the individual reparations for citizens of other states. After the Polish authorities signed a Convention on the Foundations for the Normalisation of Relations (December 1970) they presented the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with reparation postulates, treated as a humanitarian issue and combined with a campaign intent on rejoining families. Reparations also became one of the prime topics discussed in bilateral talks. The RFG presented its legal stand, in accordance with which Poland had resigned from all reparations already in 1953, and in 1969, in accordance with domestic legislation, it ceased examining individual claims. In accordance with West German legislation, such claims could have been formulated only by citizens of the Federal Republic and those states with which Bonn maintained diplomatic relations. In other words, they excluded Polish citizens, since Poland and West Germany did not establish diplomatic relations until 1972. Aware of the fact that a suitable convention with Poland would have set into motion a veritable avalanche of claims, West Germany refused all reparations, the only exception being the victims of pseudo-medical experiments. Certain reparations for assorted victims of the Third Reich policy were obtained after 1989.
EN
The year 1968, universally treated as a 'caesura' in the political life of the People's Republic of Poland, is predominated by two episodes, i. e. the so-called March events together with their consequences, and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The impact of assorted occurrences upon Polish foreign policy should be considered within the context of the international situation of the period. The fact that Poland was a satellite country limited its political potential and rendered all other factors secondary. March 1968 did not exert prominent influence upon foreign policy, and the West regarded the transpiring developments predominantly as an inner struggle for power. The significance of March 1968 adversely affected the image not so much of the authorities as that of the country as a whole and its citizens. The author claims that the results of the personnel shifts within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not be exaggerated. Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia and active Polish participation in preparing it contributed to a deterioration of the image of Gomulka, who since 1957 had been consistently losing the approval of Western observers. The support expressed by Brezhnev for the Polish First Secretary denoted a stabilisation of power in Poland, and the resolution of certain doubts concerning political leadership affected Poland's political potential. Gomulka remained the only suitable partner. The Brezhnev doctrine clearly expressed the subconsciously held views of the observers and participants of political life, and reminded all those who still harboured doubts that Moscow remained the decisive member of the Soviet bloc. The events of August 1968 influenced the attitude of the West towards détente in West - East relations. Apparently, the Western states had become more willing to conduct direct talks with the Soviet Union and less so as regards the satellite countries, including all negotiations about the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The rank held by Warsaw had, therefore, declined. This holds true also for Polish - German relations.
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