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Framing the Performance and Its Documentation

100%
Havlík V.
Sztuka i Dokumentacja
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2023
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issue 29
147-159
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EVOLUČNÍ ARGUMENT A SPOR O REALISMUS

100%
Havlík V.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 1
44 – 63
EN
The Evolutionary Argument (EA) plays the central role in the realism-antirealism dispute. Proponents of this argument maintain that evolutionary theory provides a convincing evidence for the reliability of our cognitive capacities. The evolutionary function of these capacities is to inform us about the character of our environment; and, as evidenced by the survival of our species, we can surmise that our cognitive capacities tend to provide a true, rather than false, picture of the world (cf., e.g., Quine, Kornblith, Munz). However, opponents of this view argue that evolutionary processes are not exclusively adaptive or optimal; indeed, some processes may not be adaptive at all (cf., e.g., Putnam, van Fraassen, Stich, and Bradie). Some of these critics, e.g., Thomson, believe that evolutionary theory demonstrates that our knowledge is not true, and that our cognitive capacities are not only fallible but completely unreliable. They produce only one of the many possible pictures of the world. The author criticizes this type of argument by means of a non-adaptation interpretation of evolutionary theory (Wuketits), and he is seeking an evolutionary way out.
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Fyzikalismus a status zákonů speciálních věd

100%
Havlík V.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2019
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vol. 41
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issue 2
201-227
EN
Physicalism as a metaphysical or ontological concept has maintained a dominant position since the second half of the last century to the present day. Th e claim that everything is physically constituted oft en accompanies microphysical reductionism, which assumes the existence of fundamental laws to which everything is reducible. In this context, a question regarding the status and possible autonomy of the laws of special sciences arises. Th e article focuses on the basic philosophical discussions between the strong, weak, and non-reductive physicalism that treat the laws of special sciences in diff erent ways, but none of which can be considered suffi ciently convincing and successful. Th e article seeks to prove the existence of a universal mechanism that leads to the emergence of new and complex entities and regulations of their behaviour, thus justifying the autonomous status of special sciences and laws.
CS
Fyzikalismus jako metafyzická nebo ontologická koncepce si udržuje dominantní postavení od druhé poloviny minulého století až do současnosti. Tvrzení, že vše je fyzikálně konstituováno, je zároveň velmi těsně propojeno s mikrofyzikálním redukcionismem, který předpokládá existenci fundamentálních zákonů, na které je vše redukovatelné. V této souvislosti vzniká otázka statusu a možné autonomie zákonů speciálních věd. Stať se zaměřuje na základní fi losofi cké diskuse mezi silným, slabým a nereduktivním fyzikalismem, které se k autonomii zákonů speciálních věd staví odlišnými způsoby, z nichž však žádný nelze považovat za dostatečně přesvědčivý a úspěšný. Stať se snaží prokázat existenci univerzálního mechanismu emergence, jenž vede jak ke vzniku nových a komplexních entit, tak ke vzniku zákonitostí jejich chování, čímž je zdůvodněn autonomní status speciálních věd a speciálněvědních zákonů.
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Bezradnost metodologie kosmologie?

100%
Havlík V.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2015
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vol. 63
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issue 2
247-266
EN
This paper deals with the testing capabilities of the modern methodology of science in the specific problem area of cosmology. I propose to monitor the responses of selected competing methodologies (Kuhn, Lakatos) on two questions: 1) To what extent are modern methodologies able to cope with the problem area as a descriptive task? and 2) to what extent are modern methodologies able to cope with the problem area as a prescriptive task? In both cases it appears that the tested methodologies find themselves in a quandary when trying to submit answers. The conclusion of the article attempts to show that this quandary remains, in a certain form. However, this does not mean that methodology should give up its fundamental role, ie. the role of being a heuristics in achieving knowledge
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