Nothingness is a perennial subject of philosophical inquiry. From the logical point of view, the problem is that “nothing” is an ambiguous word: it can be used either as a negated existential quantifier or as a singular term. If it is used as a singular term, then it refers to nothing at all. In this paper, a number of recent formal treatments of nothingness are critically discussed. The author proposes some new logical approaches to nothingness, involving notions of generalized quantifiers, Meinongian objects, and aspectual objects.
Ramsey questions the distinction between subject and predicate in sentences. Since the distinction mirrors the ontological distinction object/property (particular/universal) he questions the latter distinction as well. There is a symmetry between the category of objects and the category of properties: an object can possess a number of properties and a property can be exemplified by a number of objects. Consequently, it may be claimed that the two categories are formally indiscernible. The paper develops Ramsey's thesis on the ground of logic. Different senses of indiscernibility are discussed and various systems of logic are examined with respect to these senses. Most systems do not distinguish objects from properties in at least one sense.
The paper discusses main issues concerning truthmakers: (1) what is the ontological status of truthmakers (are they ordinary objects, situations, tropes etc?), (2) what are deduvtive properties of truthmakers. A simple logic of truthmakers is developed. The logic consists of an axiomatic system and a possible world semantics.
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