Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 8

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Epistemic Functions of Intuition in Descartes

100%
Walczak M.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
|
2020
|
vol. 68
|
issue 2
43-61
EN
The topic of the paper is the notion of intuition in Descartes’ philosophy and its epistemic functions. Descartes introduces his notion of intuition in the context of a description of his method and process of knowing and doing science. Intuition is a significant component of this process. I intend to show that the main epistemic functions of intuition in Descartes’ philosophy are differentiated. Intuition is essential not only in the context of justification (the Cartesian synthetic method of proof) but also and especially in the context of discovery (the Cartesian analytic method of discovery). It plays not only a role in the foundation of the cogito but also on different stages of constructing the system of knowledge. Intuition has important functions in grasping simple natures, forming primary concepts, comprehending complex natures, forming primary propositions (including primary principles), and capturing relationships between them and building deductive reasoning (the role of intuition in deduction). Hence, intuition is the foundation for all primary stages of producing knowledge. It is active and important element of pure thinking (a priori) in human knowledge, and science. It fulfils these functions due to its specific epistemic properties. I also argue that intuition is not an autonomous and complete type of knowledge. Nor is it an intuitive thesis, but rather the basis of a justification for theses (including the cogito).
PL
Epistemiczne funkcje intuicji u Kartezjusza Przedmiotem artykułu jest pojęcie intuicji w filozofii Kartezjusza i jej epistemiczne funkcje. Kartezjusz wprowadza pojęcie intuicji w kontekście charakterystyki metody i procesu poznania oraz uprawiania nauki. Intuicja jest istotnym składnikiem tego procesu. Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, że główne epistemiczne funkcje intuicji w filozofii Kartezjusza są zróżnicowane. Jest ona niezbędna nie tylko w kontekście uzasadnienia (kartezjańska syntetyczna metoda dowodowa), ale przede wszystkim w kontekście odkrycia (kartezjańska analityczna metoda odkrycia). Odgrywa rolę nie tylko w fundowaniu cogito, lecz także na różnych etapach budowania systemu wiedzy. Intuicja pełni ważne funkcje w ujmowaniu prostych natur, tworzeniu pierwotnych pojęć, ujmowaniu złożonych natur, formułowaniu pierwotnych sądów (w tym pierwszych zasad), ujmowaniu relacji między nimi i przeprowadzaniu dedukcyjnych rozumowań (rola intuicji w dedukcji). Stąd intuicja jest fundamentem wszystkich podstawowych etapów tworzenia wiedzy. Stanowi czynny i ważny element czystego myślenia (a priori) w tworzeniu wiedzy ludzkiej i w nauce. Spełnia te funkcje dzięki specyficznym epistemicznym własnościom. W tekście argumentuję również, że intuicja nie jest autonomicznym i kompletnym typem poznania. Nie należy jej rozumieć jako twierdzenia intuicyjnego, ale raczej jako podstawę do uzasadniania tez (włącznie z cogito).
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Stanisława Kamińskiego poglądy na cel nauki

100%
Walczak M.
Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa
|
2011
|
vol. 47
|
issue 3(189)
391-407
EN
This paper presents views on the aim of science worked out by Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986), supplemented with applications added by his followers from the methodological school at KUL. On the one hand, Kamiński offers general and convenient categories enabling grasping the problems of the philosophy of science using the category of the aim of science. On the other, he adopts his own, carefully balanced, stand on the aim of science. He prefers theoretical aims to practical ones, but he considers them as complementary. Similarly, he prefers explanation to description, but he maintains that they complement each other. His position is derivative of his broad and pluralistic notion of science, not limited to mathematical or natural sciences but including also (as antinaturalists do) the human sciences, philosophy and theology as kinds of valuable knowledge. The paper does not discuss particular positions on the aim (aims) of science, but reports on the basic categories used to distinguish particular ways to understand aim of science. They can help in the thoroughgoing analysis of the aim of science problems and they can be applied to characterize science in general, particular types of sciences, and studies that pass the limit of one discipline or one type of knowledge: interdisciplinary, trans-disciplinary or multi-disciplinary studies.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Między dyscypliną a badaniami interdyscyplinarnymi: uwagi o metodologicznym statusie kulturoznawstwa

100%
Walczak M.
Roczniki Kulturoznawcze
|
2010
|
vol. 1
7-41
PL
The paper addresses the methodological status of Polish cultural studies. It consists of two parts: the first is factual and the second theoretical and methodological, reflecting on theses held by culture scholars on their own area with the use of general methodological knowledge. In the first part I give an account of the different names (nomenclature) for cultural studies and of the traditions they refer to. I point out disciplines that are included in cultural studies, giving examples of selected Polish cultural studies centers. In the second part, on the basis of methodology, I explicate the meaning of the methodological categories that culture scholars themselves consider adequate to a description and an explanation (an understanding) of the methodological status of cultural studies (such as notions of “scientific discipline”, “interdisciplinary studies”, “integration”, etc.). I note the incompatibility between the institutional status of cultural studies and their methodological status, and I point out some sources of the incompatibility and its consequences. Indeed, cultural studies were created as an academic discipline in Poland, but from the methodological point of view they are interdisciplinary rather than a separate discipline. The reasons for this can be found in the methodological criteria cultural studies fulfills and fails to fulfill and in the methodological self-consciousness of culture scholars themselves. I note that the emergence of cultural studies is an expression of the unifying tendencies in science. Therefore, the methodological self-knowledge of cultural studies should be developed by realizing how rich in aspects and dimensions the integration of the sciences phenomenon is, and consequently, how many types of interdisciplinary studies there are.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Interdyscyplinarny charakter kulturoznawczego pojęcia kultury

100%
Walczak M.
Człowiek i Społeczeństwo
|
2015
|
vol. 39
135-152
EN
Two tendencies determine the use of the concept of culture within Polish cultural studies: the tendency to understand culture in a generalized, comprehensive way and the tendency to narrow it down, to particularize it. The former tendency is visible, among other things, in the concept of culture adopted by the main founding traditions of Polish cultural studies: the Wrocław tradition established by Stanisław Pietraszko and the Poznań tradition introduced by Jerzy Kmita. The latter tendency is inherent in these conceptions of cultural studies that take as their object different fragments of culture for example contemporary culture, or artistic culture. The problem of interdisciplinarity presented in the paper is asked in the context of the notion of culture specific for cultural studies. The paper investigates, whether and in what sense the concept of culture is interdisciplinary. Do cultural studies researchers employ a specific notion of culture shared by them and suitable therefore to perform the function of integrating cultural studies as the domain of interdisciplinary studies? Which notionof culture – the general or the particular one – can serve the purpose better?
5
Content available remote

Instytucjonalizacja stosunków transatlantyckich

100%
Walczak M.
Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs
|
2011
|
issue 1
41-62
EN
The article presents the institutionalization process of the transatlantic relationship at an intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational levels. Part one of the paper covers the years from the end of World War II up to the Soviet Union collapse at the end of the 1980s. During this period the partnership between the European Union and the United States was mainly inspired by the Cold War and common security interests. Part two analyses their relations in the 1990s as they were affected by radical structural changes to the international economic and political orders. Although the EU and the U.S. established diplomatic relations in early 1950s, cooperation between them was formalised for the first time in 1990 with the Transatlantic Declaration. Subsequently, the New Atlantic Agenda was launched in 1996 and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership in 1998. These transatlantic agreements focus on economic and political ties. They provide an institutionalised framework for official EU-US interactions: regular meetings at the Presidential, Ministerial and working levels. Each agreement created a new sphere of activity in transatlantic relations by adding principles and goals for cooperation and by establishing institutions to manage policy coordination. Nowadays transatlantic relations are an example of a partnership that ranks among the most significant and solid ones to be found in the global political and economic system. They are based upon strong roots and common values such as democracy founded on human rights and rules of law, innovative economies and sustainable growth. Moreover, this strong cooperation, rather than focusing just on bilateral matters, also extends onto many international forums, like WTO. There is no doubt that an additional value, as the positive side effect of EU-US cooperation, has brought enormous contribution to the multi-sphere global development.
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Intuition and insight. The analysis of their selected features with reference to Bernard Lonergan position

100%
Walczak M.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2016
|
vol. 34
29-44
EN
The paper discusses notions of intuition and insight. The most typical features attributed to intuition in the history of philosophy – receptiveness, passivity, immediateness, directness, self-evidence, infallibility, and indubitability – are analyzed. A variability of the notion of intuition is shown, taking as its example the category of insight, central for the epistemology of Bernard J.F. Lonergan (1904–1984), the twentieth-century philosopher locating between phenomenology, Thomism and hermeneutics. Insight is still in some respects a kind of intuition although it is creative, active, mediated, indirect, fallible and open to revision.
7
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

(Nie)samodzielność epistemiczna wiedzy przez znajomość

100%
Walczak M.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2022
|
issue 4
237-254
EN
The article addresses the problem of properties and epistemic functions of Russellian ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ interpreted here as a variant of intuition. The epistemic functions of intuition can be performed in two ways: first, as propositional knowledge of direct and immediate kind (a foundational function), and secondly, as a non-‑propositional form of consciousness that provides a justifying basis for intuitive truths. The distinction between these two functions of intuition presupposes a differentiation – not explicitly articulated by Bertrand Russell – between acquaintance and knowledge by acquaintance. Acquaintance as a form of non‑propositional consciousness is not epistemically autonomous, which is to say that it is not a judgment and cannot be qualified as either true or false, so a separate epistemic problem arises here, one of the shift from acquaintance to knowledge by acquaintance. The author points out that the shift from acquaintance to knowledge by acquaintance is difficult to accomplish, and she offers the opinion that the epistemic function of acquaintance or, more generally, of various similar kinds of consciousness, should not be interpreted in terms of justification. They should be understood not as a justifying element or a justifying reason for propositions that underlie other propositions, but as a factor that is an indispensable genetic and simultaneously structural element of propositional content in the sense assumed in transcendental philosophy.
8
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Stanisława Kamińskiego opcje metodologiczne

63%
Bronk A., Walczak M.
Filozofia i Nauka
|
2018
|
vol. 6
199-230
EN
Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986) was a philosopher, philosopher of science and historian of science. His all academic carrier was pursuing at the Catholic University in Lublin (KUL). The main interests of Kamiński was the history of science and logic, general and special methodology, methodology of philosophy and (medieval) semiotics. He himself saw his main achievements in the domain of the theory of science and the methodology of classical philosophy, especially in the studies of the method and language of metaphysics. He gave a methodological description of general metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and studies on religion (religiology). He investigated the beginnings of the mathematical induction in the Middle Ages and in modern times, the modern history of the theory of definition, theory of argumentation (reasoning), the structure and the evolution of scientific theory, deductive method, the achievements of logic and philosophy in Poland. A characteristic feature of Kamiński's philosophical and methodological approach was a specific historicism, consisting of referring to the heritage of the past and at the same time to the latest achievements in logic and philosophy of science. He had a broad concept of knowledge and was a maximalist both in raising questions and in giving answers. In accordance with classical philosophy he saw the substance of person as ens rationale, a being realizing himself in a disinterested search for a theoretical truth, whose highest expression is philosophy. He stressed the epistemological and methodological plurality of knowledge, distinguished and investigated material and formal parts of knowledge. He also distinguished-besides commonsense knowledge-the scientific, philosophical and theological knowledge, nonreducible each to other. At the top he set sapiential knowledge which is much more than a simple generalization of all particular kinds of knowledge. Kamiński derived his understanding of science from contemporary as well as classical philosophy. He determined the nature of science from the point view of its subject matter, aims, methods, logical structure and genesis. The question of what science was for him a philosophical question, presupposing an appropriate understanding of the nature of the world. Kamiński opted for a pluralistic approach to the world: the principal object of science is the objective world, subjective states of man and products of his mind and language. The best diagnostic test of the scientific character of science is the scientific method. Kamiński assumes here pluralism: different subject matter and different goals of scientific cognition require different research strategies and types of cognitive procedures. He also accepts an antinaturalistic position in the humanities which he regards as methodologically autonomous in regard to natural sciences. The publications of S. Kamiński include over 350 positions. During his life three books have been published: Georgonne'a teoria definicji [Georgonne's Theory of Definition], Lublin 1958; Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], Lublin 1961, 19813; and (together with M. A. Krąpiec) Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics], Lublin 1962. After his death five volumes of Collected Papers have been published: vol. I: Jak filozofować? [How to Philosophize? Studies in Methodology of Classical Philosophy], edited by Tadeusz Szubka, Lublin 1989; vol. II: Filozofia i metoda. Studia z dziejów metod filozofowania [Philosophy and Method. Studies from the History of the Method of Philosophizing], edited by Józef Herbut, Lublin 1993; vol. III: Metoda i język. Studia z semiotyki i metodologii nauk [Method and Language. Studies in Semiotics and Philosophy of Science], edited by Urszula Żegleń, Lublin 1994; vol. IV: Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [Science and Method. Concept of Science and Classification of Sciences], edited by Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1992); vol. V: Światopogląd – Religia – Teologia [Worldview – Religion – Theology], edited by Monika Walczak and Andrzej Bronk, Lublin 1998.
PL
Stanisław Kamiński (1919–1986) był filozofem, filozofem nauki i historykiem nauki. Całe jego życie zawodowe od 1949 roku związane było z Wydziałem Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Do głównych dziedzin zainteresowań Kamińskiego należały ogólna i szczegółowa metodologia nauk, metodologia filozofii, historia nauki i logiki oraz semiotyka m. in. średniowieczna. Podkreślając specyfikę klasycznego sposobu uprawiania filozofii jako poznania autonomicznego w stosunku do nauk empirycznych i teologii, pewnego i najogólniejszego, badał zastosowania logiki do filozofii oraz podał metodologiczną charakterystykę niektórych dyscyplin filozoficznych (metafizyki ogólnej, antropologii filozoficznej, etyki, filozofii religii, filozofii dziejów). Charakterystyczny dla podejścia Kamińskiego był osobliwy historyzm (indukcja doksograficzna), polegający na nawiązywaniu do dziedzictwa przeszłości, by szukać w nim inspiracji i kontekstu rozumienia dla własnych problemów. Nawiązywał bezpośrednio do dwu głównie tradycji filozoficznych: klasycznej (arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej) oraz analitycznej, zarówno w wydaniu scholastyki, jak i szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej. Pierwszej – realistycznej teorii bytu i poznania, ale także historii filozofii – zawdzięczał swe filozoficzne i historyczne, drugiej – logiczne i metodologiczne zainteresowania nauką. Przyjmował, że jednym z głównych zadań refleksji metodologicznej jest badanie (na ogół niejawnych) założeń filozoficznych i metodologicznych, na których opiera się metoda naukowa, oraz krytyka prób skrajnie ideologicznego wykorzystywania nauki do celów nienaukowych. Był przekonany o potrzebie i zasadności uprawiania różnych typów badań nad nauką. Sprzyja to rozumieniu znaczenia i miejsca nauki w kulturze, teoretycznemu wyjaśnieniu natury i podstaw wiedzy naukowej, poznawczych roszczeń nauki, pokazaniu integrującej roli refleksji metodologicznej dla unifikacji specjalistycznych dyscyplin i współpracy między naukowcami, jak również podkreśleniu praktycznej ważności świadomości metodologicznej dla poszczególnych nauk a także filozofii, dla której jest ona przeważnie jedynym narzędziem samokontroli. Podkreślał, że badanie natury nauki winno uwzględnić wszystkie jej aspekty: logiczno- metodologiczny, humanistyczny i filozoficzny. Główna jednak rola przypada podejściu filozoficznemu (epistemologicznemu). Kamiński odróżniał trzy podstawowe typy nauk o nauce: humanistyczne (historia, socjologia, psychologia, ekonomia i polityka nauki), filozoficzne (ontologia, epistemologia, wąsko pojęta filozofia nauki i filozofia kultury) oraz formalne (logika języka naukowego, logika formalna, teoria rozumowań stosowanych w nauce oraz metodologia nauki). Kamiński interesował się głównie naturą nauki (obejmującą przedmiot, cele, metodę, strukturę i genezę), tj. tym, co w dziejach nauki niezmienne. Pojmował naukę jako epistéme (średniowieczną scientiae) oraz utożsamiał racjonalność wiedzy naukowej z jej metodycznością i szeroko pojmowaną logicznością. Mimo dostrzegania wielu ograniczeń wiedzy racjonalnej, nauka pozostawała dla niego wzorem poznania racjonalnego. Był przekonany, iż celem szeroko pojętego poznania naukowego jest wiedza prawdziwa, a w filozofii - nadto konieczna. Uważał, że „cała logika współczesna stanowi dyscyplinę filozoficzną w szerokim tego ostatniego słowa znaczeniu” i to „ze względu na swój ogólny i spekulatywny (a wedle niektórych również apodyktyczny) charakter oraz stosunkowo maksymalne wykorzystanie jej rezultatów”.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.