This article discusses the impact the 1972 Liability Convention exerted upon the further discussion on state responsibility and liability rules within the UN International Law Commission. The question it seeks to answer is the issue of how, and to what extent, its provisions influenced the development of international law on the responsibility of states and international organizations and the institution of international liability of states. Most notably, the present article demonstrates how the Liability Convention served as a reference point for the International Law Commission’s works struggling to codify the general rules of states’ liability. It also examines the factors that, from the mid- 1990s onward, have steadily diminished its role in the ongoing debate and how it finally informed the final shape of the 2006 Draft principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm arising from hazardous activities. Furthermore, it analyses the 2001 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) and the 2011 Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO). With this in mind, it is put forward that the differences mandate strict differentiation between international responsibility and international liability at the theoretical level. Nonetheless, the Liability Convention could furnish patterns based on which, notably, the institution of joint and several responsibility of states and international organizations, respectively, have been modelled. Therefore, it is concluded that the lex specialis and the self-contained character of the regime established under this Convention effectively limit its impact on the development of international regimes of responsibility and liability of states and international organizations. However, they do not eliminate them altogether. Ironically, in practical terms, the Convention marked the 2001 ARSIWA and, indirectly, the 2011 ARIO more decisively than the 2006 Draft Principles, even though the Convention – similar to the DP 2006 – addresses states’ liability, not their responsibility.
This article seeks to answer the question of how international criminal law (ICL), the 1971 Montreal Convention, and international humanitarian law (IHL) influenced the proceedings in the MH-17 case, with particular emphasis on the Dutch Prosecutors’ line of reasoning in proceedings before the District Court in The Hague (DCiTH), as well as on the judgments that the DCiTH delivered on 17 November 2022. Notably, the analysis below aims to establish whether, by refusing to grant combatant status to the defendants, the District Court acted within the limits permissible under international law, even though this Court admitted that at the moment of the MH-17’s downing, the nature of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine was an international, not a non-international, one. In conclusion, the article argues that, firstly, even though the DCiTH’s interpretation of the IHL is not free of certain flaws, the Court’s line of reasoning and the sentences it delivered are a pragmatic attempt to bridge the gap between the proper administration of justice and the efficiency of criminal proceedings in a case where an airplane downing takes place during an international armed conflict. Secondly, although most recently the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) took note of the MH-17 judgments, for the reasons explained in this article the scope of their potential impact on the further development of international and domestic jurisprudence is uncertain, and remains to be seen.