The article looks at critical thinking in philosophical counselling and the concepts upon which it is based. In conceptions that place critical thinking as the basis of philosophical counselling, an important role is played by the Socratic approach to philosophising. The Socratic method in thinking allocates a fundamental role to conversation, and thus to intersubjectivity, and is therefore an alternative to individual ways of thinking. Conversation as philosophical reflection corresponds to the Socratic intersubjective understanding of truth. The author adopts the view of German philosopher H. Schnädelbach who distinguishes between dialogic and doctrinal approaches. The dialogic approach is found in the Socratic-Platonic tradition, while the doctrinal approach is found in Aristotelean approaches. Doctrinal philosophising is premised in the ideal of intersubjectivity which can be achieved by anyone (subjective thought is internalised subjectivity). Philosophical thought as reflection is always implicitly dialogic at the very least. The article considers definitions of critical thinking and provides examples of critical thinking based philosophical counselling from the thinking of Tim LeBon and Elliot D. Cohen, which link both philosophical and psychological approaches. In conclusion it is critical of an excessive focus on rationality in counselling.
Various approaches and methods are used in philosophical counselling. Two main trends can be observed: the first is the use of contemplative methods and the second constitutes approaches based on dialogical critical thinking. The author defends the idea that developing philosophical counselling on the basis of critical thinking presupposes that it is possible for counsellor and client to hold a philosophical dialogue where the relationship is one of expert/lay person. J. Šulavík has described this relationship in greater detail. In the Socratic model, the philosopher and the lay person hold a dialogue whereby they ascertain opinions via inductive comparison and by defining things, creating a shared concept. While the Platonic and Enlightenment models were grounded in the authority of the expert philosopher, in the Socratic and postmodern models, the expert philosopher loses the power to manipulate those who know “less”. Lay people are not passive consumers of a particular “optimal” philosophy but through their own “philosophising” create philosophy and tailor it for themselves. While philosophising, therefore, the philosopher does not take on the role of “producer” of philosophy but of “adviser” (consultant). It is therefore supposed that people have a general need for philosophy and that ultimately they should create and reflect upon their own philosophy.
The article poses three questions relating to the self-definition of philosophical counselling: 1. Is it an alternative to psychological and psychotherapeutic approaches? 2. What is the therapeutic nature of philosophical counselling? 3. Is it contemplation or critical reasoning? The first part introduces some examples of the concepts that sharply distinguish philosophical counselling from psychological and psychotherapeutic approaches. It also considers those that mix these different approaches. The second part deals with the question of whether or not philosophical counselling can be considered to be a therapy. Some philosophical counsellors work on the belief that there is a synchrony between modern philosophical counselling and the classical conception of philosophy as therapy. Many, however, are of the opinion that it is not possible to speak of it in terms of therapy. The third part gives examples of the way in which philosophical counselling is understood to be contemplation and on the other hand of those who employ approaches based on critical thinking in philosophical counselling.
This article explores various interpretations of philosophical counselling. These interpretations are determined by the nature and status of the key concepts from which they are derived. The first is “critical thinking”, which a number of authors have based their conceptions on; just two examples are mentioned in the article-Elliot D. Cohen and Tim LeBon. Many philosophical practitioners, especially those whose philosophizing is influenced by Socrates, use critical thinking, and indeed believe that it is what philosophical practice is all about. Pierre Grimes is another example of someone who has been influenced by Socrates. Eckart Ruschmann and Ran Lahav believe that interpreting world beliefs is the basis of philosophical counselling. Others think philosophical counselling stems from interpretations of the concept of “wisdom”. The article also discusses Ran Lahav’s more recent views and those of Gerald Rochelle. The concept of “virtues” is discussed in relation to the work of Arto Tukiainen, Lydia B. Amir and Jess Fleming.
The author focuses on the issue of the "good life" in relation to a strong ideal of flexibility that operates in contemporary western culture. The era we live in may be called a "continuous stream of innovations" and can be characterized by a fundamental requirement "to adapt flexibly and cope with the new". The need for such flexibility is mentally and physically demanding; the demands also mark the approach to values, the ideas of the good life and the project of the paths in life. Contemporary people in western civilization are exposed to the pressure of modern culture that has caused problems in the past decades as a result of the incompatibility of its fragmentary value systems. People today apply their abilities in a never-ending whirl of activities and effort where there is no more space available for becoming aware of and for perceiving the deeper meaning of and formulating their specific ideal of the good life.
In recent years (since the 1980s) we have witnessed growth in the practical application of philosophy. Some authors talk about a so-called “shift in philosophical counselling” or “philosophical practice” taking place chiefly in western countries. Some Slovak authors also discuss the application of philosophy in practice but this issue is only in its infancy here. The author of this paper seeks to establish the boundaries of understanding the possibilities philosophy has to offer in practical life and to formulate an opinion on the competency of philosophy in this area. The author believes that it is the “good life” that is central to the agenda of philosophical practice. The aim of philosophical counselling is to advise people through their personal life philosophy. It is a conversational process that controls dialectic thinking and reflects the fears and questions that arise in everyday life as well as questions about the meaning of life as a whole. The author understands philosophical dialogue as a space for seeking a good life, identity and critical thinking.