Artykuł stanowi porównanie dwóch strukturalnych teorii sądów logicznych: teorii Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza z lat sześćdziesiątych XX wieku oraz teorii Jeffreya Kinga z początku XXI wieku. Pierwsza część artykułu zawiera charakterystykę obu teorii. W części drugiej szczegółowo omówione zostają istotne podobieństwa pomiędzy stanowiskami. Następnie identyfikowane są różnice między nimi i przeprowadzona jest analiza mająca doprowadzić do uzyskania odpowiedzi na pytanie o to, czy różnice te są istotne, czy pozorne. Część trzecia dotyczy tego, czy możliwe jest uodpornienie omawianych teorii na tzw. problem Benacerrafa.
Meaning Holism and Contextualism are standardly acknowledged to be similar relativistic theories that often lead to similar troubles, in particular to issues concerning instability. On the other hand, the main rival of Contextualism, which is Minimalism, is taken to be resistant to these problems. In effect, it seems inevitable to see Meaning Holism and Minimalism as natural enemies. In my paper, I attempt to reject such a view. My argumentation consists of three main parts. First, I argue that Minimalism does not differ that much from Meaning Holism with respect to the instability issues as it also faces some of them (although in a slightly different way from the case of Holism of Contextualism). Second, I put forward several arguments to show that in fact Minimalism is not incompatible with the two versions of Meaning Holism I distinguish, namely Global Holism and Local Holism. I argue that a meaning holist has to accept some not uncontroversial principles to become an antiminimalist – and vice versa. Finally, I demonstrate that Minimalism and Meaning Holism can be reconciled. Such a possibility occurs when something I called ‘purely semantic processes’ is allowed. The role of these processes is, roughly speaking, to protect literal meanings from being affected by strong pragmatic factors.
In the paper I discuss the legacy of Donnellan’s famous theory of definite descriptions in which he distinguishes between attributive and referential uses of these expressions. On the one hand I sketch the philosophical context within which Donnellan developed his theory. I put emphasis on the innovatory aspect of the theory by comparing it to a slightly older account proposed by Strawson. On the other hand, I discuss one of the main debates that have their source in Donnellan’s work. Namely, the debate between so called semanticists, who claim that the distinction between two uses of descriptions is of semantic nature, and so called pragmaticists, who believe that two ways of using descriptions is a pragmatic phenomenon while the semantic properties of descriptions have been analysed correctly in Russsell’s theory of descriptions.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.