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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 5
311 – 324
EN
The paper attempts to respond to some possible objections that could be raised by Skow’s theory of explanation against the two standard examples of non-causal explanation given by Hempel. If these objections would prevail the two standard non-causal examples could be reconstructed as causal explanations. In this paper it is argued that this kind of reconstruction is not possible. The article starts with a detailed analysis of Skow’s theory of causal explanation. Subsequently it tries to show that each of Hempel’s examples put up against the potential objections that could be given in terms of Skow’s theory is ultimately resistant to these objections. Finally, the paper’s conclusion is that Skow’s theory although an interesting approach for reconstructing causal explanations fails as an adequate framework for reconstructing Hempel’s standard examples of non-causal explanation.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 10
752 – 765
EN
This paper not only summarizes Hempel`s analysis of the D-N model that shows how it is possible for the covering-law model to provide both a causal account of particular facts and a non-casual one, but also offers four prominent examples of non-causal explanation. Subsequently a detailed analysis of the examples shows that there is a common denominator between these examples: the presence of a law that describes an empirical system in its atemporal state. But the paper also shows what differences are there in the applicability of the laws in the given explanations. Finally, it reviews the evolution of the conception of non-causal explanation with respect to the discussed examples.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 7
531 – 544
EN
In this article I will focus on the analysis of a scientific explanation of an empirical event that has at least three different incompatible interpretations / reconstructions. This example in philosophical and scientific literature is known as Euler's explanation. However, this work will only follow the differences between Reutlinger’s and Lange’s and Woodwardʼs reconstruction. The paper attempts to show that Euler’s explanation can only by reconstructed as an asymmetric non-causal explanation. It does so with the help of Lange’s and Woodward’s main key ideas of their theories of explanation. Subsequently these ideas are put up against Reutlinger’s conclusion that Euler’s explanation constitutes a symmetric non-causal explanation. In the end the paper argues that ultimately this is a wrong conclusion because Reutlinger’s account omitted certain aspects of Euler’s explanation.
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