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Investice do lidského kapitálu jako předpoklad úspěšnosti investic do sociálního kapitálu

100%
Wawrosz P., Heissler H.
Naše společnost (Our Society)
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2011
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vol. 9
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issue 1
3-12
EN
The article deals with relationships between human capital and social capital. Often is mentioned that presence of social capital is key condition of success investment in human capital. The article presents opposite view – investments in human capital are necessary condition investments in social capital (at least in individual social capital). The three main form of social capital (bonding, bridging and linking social capital) are described at it is shown when generating each form can generate individuals profit and utility – in each case individuals must also invest in their human capital. Investments in human capital can also respond to the situation when investments in social capital become obsolete or devalue.
2
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Vybrané bariéry investic do lidského kapitálu

100%
Wawrosz P., Heissler H.
Naše společnost (Our Society)
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2013
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vol. 11
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issue 1
36-46
EN
If investments into human capital (HC) are as convenient as theory says why some people do not invest in the development of their HC and why other people with resources do not stimulate people without HC to invest including lending money for such investments? The paper tries to answer the question by identifying selected barriers causing lenders do not give money (resources) to the investments and potential borrowers are not willing to borrow them. From our point of view statistical discrimination and phenomena described as “acting-white” in the case of Afro-American community belong among the most important barriers, although they are not mentioned so often. The paper deals with both of the barriers and suggests how to solve them.
3

ANALÝZA VÝVOJE INTENZITY HRUBÉHO DOMÁCÍHO PRODUKTU ČESKÉ REPUBLIKY A SLOVENSKÉ REPUBLIKY

100%
Mihola J., Wawrosz P.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
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2015
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vol. 63
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issue 8
775 - 794
EN
The article presents an alternative method to growth accounting. It makes it possible to express the effect of change in the quantity of inputs as well as the effect of the productivity of inputs (i.e. technological changes) on the change of GDP for all possible typologies of input/output changes. Dynamic parameters of intensity and extensity could be delivered as the output of the method. The first one captured the effect of change in the summary productivity factors, while the latter captures changes in the input quantity. The dynamic parameters were calculated for the development of GDP of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic in the period 1990 – 2014.The results confirm more intensive Slovak development in the given period that is manifested in reaching of Czech value of GDP per capita expressed in purchasing power parity (PPS).
4

What is the Contribution of the Theory of Redistribution Systems to the Theory of Corruption?

81%
Otáhal T., Palát M., Wawrosz P.
Review of Economic Perspectives
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2013
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vol. 13
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issue 2
92-107
EN
Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems to account for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, and explain the importance of agents for survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent’s environment (system) and their significance for survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behaviour and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part - the theory of parallel redistribution games.
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