The purpose of the article is to compare the republican rhetoric of the American anti‑federalists and the Polish noble (the szlachta’s) republicans from the turn of the 80’s and 90’s of the Eighteenth Century (the time of the Polish Four Years Seym in 1788‑1792 and the American constitutional debates in 1787‑1790). It turns out that both such wide apart groups, representing different social backgrounds and viewpoints could use surprisingly similar methods of political argumentation. To that end the author cites the voices of numerous American and Polish pamphleteers, such as – above all – “Centinel”, “Philadeplphiensis”, “Farmer”, “Cato”, Patrick Henry and Adam Rzewuski, Wojciech Turski, Seweryn Rzewuski, Leonard Olizar and Dyzma Bończa Tomaszewski. The main resemblance of reasoning may be found in the way they warned against monarchy or despotism. Revealing a typical republican obsession of losing liberty, they were prone to identify those threats in almost every effort to strengthen a central government. Interestingly, both American and Polish critics of the reforms refused to accept that such an “energetic” or “active” government is absolutely necessary in order to avoid anarchy and resist foreign invasions. In that respect they believed (in Poland being even inspired by Rousseau) that the true republic can be only built on the virtues of fellow‑citizens – the love of liberty, civic brotherhood and patriotism. To revive those ideals, they eagerly recalled the legends of the ancient republican heroes. Whereas, to oppose the constitutional values of the reformers they were often (mainly in America) setting the example of contemporary Switzerland. Due to the proposed comparison one can easily come to the conclusion that republicanism was a doctrine of a considerably wide range of application possibilities. It is not surprising that in spite of the fact that the American authors were generally democrats, sometimes even of the most radical provenience, whereas the Polish noble republicans were frequently the opponents of the social reforms (with some exceptions), both of them were truly convinced they are almost the last defenders of the republic, liberty and – symptomatically enough – civic equality.
The purpose of the article is to show that the constitutional values of the American presidential system, especially the tenets concerning the role of the President in the lawmaking process, do not serve the ideals of direct democracy. In particular, it is argued that the presidential veto was established in order to counterbalance just these tendencies which ultimately were ascribed to more direct forms of popular government. Avoiding oversimplifi cations, the author presents the stances of the leading framers of the Constitution, such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, and later controversies as well, considering both the presidency and means of direct democracy. However, all these findings suggest that the introduction of the latter on the federal level would undermine the principles of the decision-making process commonly attributed to the American system. Such a conclusion can be especially drawn from the comparison with the example of Switzerland
The aim of this article is to present the limitations of the possibilities of developing Italian federalism, resulting from both systemic and doctrinal conditions, as well as historical and socio-cultural ones. While the significant amendment of Title V of the Constitution of the Italian Republic in 2001 might indeed have heralded a further development in this direction, other relevant factors of Italian statehood did not favour it. Leaving aside the very issue of the limitations of the political system (understandable in the context of the historical and doctrinal choices of Italian statehood), which nevertheless ultimately deviates from federal solutions, it is necessary to mention above all the weaker – and less recognisable – position of the regions as potential components of federal-type sovereignty and the economic disparities between North and South, which are too large and too risky from a federalist perspective.
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