Tadeusz Kotarbiński never formulates explicitly the project of an intellectual ethics, but we can reconstruct his answer from his Traktat o dobrej robocie (1955; Eng. transl.: Praxiology: An introduction to the Sciences of Efficient Action, 1965) and his ethical writings. Kotarbiński does not formulate an explicit meta-ethics of values, and seems to develop a purely functionalist conception according to which there is nothing more in intellectual ethics than a conception of efficient action. However, he has a theory of practical values and skills that can be applied to the aims and norms of the epistemic domain. But can he secure a genuine conception of intellectual values if these are merely immanent to “efficient work”?
The authors analyze some kinds of soritical, modal and temporal paradoxes and examine differnt ways of solving them. They reject the assumption that it is the essence of object that may cause paradox due to its vagueness; we shall not abandon classical logic as well. The explanations and solutions for paradoxes can be found in vagueness of modal logic rather or in usual (and vague) way we use our language.