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1

Negative Program of Experimental Philosophy and Appealing to Intuition in Philosophical Argumentation

100%

Komorowska-Mach J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2013

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vol. 21

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issue 3

157-165

PL

The aim of this paper is to undermine one of the main assumptions of the negative program of experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophers claim that it is possible to verify the validity of some classical philosophical arguments which appeal to intuitions by empirically testing whether those intuitions are in fact commonly shared. I argue that experimental philosophers wrongly identify the function that appealing to intuition plays in such arguments. By analyzing several classical philosophical arguments quoted by experimental philosophers, I show that declaring that something is intuitive does not play a role of a premise in an argument. My claim is that its purpose is rather to set common ground between the author of the argument and her audience. Therefore questioning the commonness of intuitions does not lead to the falsification of such arguments.

2

Emergence – a Textbook for Non-restive

100%

Komorowska-Mach J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2010

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vol. 18

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issue 4

135-142

PL

The review tries to summarize the main topics covered by the book "Między redukcją a emergencją" by Robert Poczobut and also to highlight certain points that might be controversial to the philosophically-oriented reader. In particular, Poczobut's methodological claims regarding the boundary between natural sciences and philosophy of mind are brought under scrutiny. While the book presents a broad range of views on matters regarding emergence and reduction, especially with respect to the psychophysical problem, it remains to be proven that the views presented by the author are in reality the most viable option that a philosopher of mind wishing to conform to scientific results has at her disposal.

3

Where do Concepts Come From?

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Komorowska-Mach J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2011

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vol. 19

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issue 4

139-145

PL

The review discusses the book The Origin of Concepts by Susan Carey, in which she presents three main theses - the innateness of some kind of conceptual representations, the presence of a qualitative change during conceptual development and the existence of a special learning mechanism that achieves that discontinuity called bootstrapping. The general reception of the work is positive. Minor doubts are presented regarding two claims: first, the speculation about the iconic format of core cognition representations, which seems to be underdeveloped and slightly unclear, second, the claim that core cognition representations are innate, which seems to be insufficiently supported by empirical data presented.

4

Introspection - One or More? Pluralism about Self-Knowledge

100%

Komorowska-Mach J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2019

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vol. 27

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issue 1

5-25

PL

The aim of this paper is to provide a metaphilosophical analysis of the debate between monistic and pluralistic approaches to self-knowledge. I start by presenting the background for the discussion, clarifying the terminology, and drawing a distinction between moderate and radical pluralism. I then discuss and evaluate arguments for monism that appeal to general methodological guidelines as well as those relying on specific assumptions about the objects and character of self-knowledge. I offer a separate analysis of Eric Schwitzgebel’s radical pluralism, which threatens to undermine both monism and moderate pluralism. I close by describing a way of looking at the problem of the homogeneity of self-knowledge that goes beyond the monism–pluralism dichotomy and arguing that the heterogeneity and multidimensionality of the problem of self-knowledge are more important than the plurality of the solutions.

5

Self-Ascribing Emotions - Expressing or Detecting? Detectivist Components in Neo-expressivism

100%

Komorowska-Mach J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2015

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vol. 23

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issue 4

41-54

PL

The main aim of this article is to explain why expressivist models of self-ascribing emotions should include a detectivist component of some kind. I argue that the transition from natural to verbal expression requires the ability to recognize and classify some states of the body. Under certain assumptions such an ability can be interpreted as the ability to detect our own emotions. Thus neo-expressivism should not entirely reject detectivism. On the contrary, in order to understand and explain the ability to self-ascribe emotions, we should combine both accounts.

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5 Filozofia Nauki

5 Komorowska-Mach J.

1 2019

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1 2013

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Negative Program of Experimental Philosophy and Appealing to Intuition in Philosophical Argumentation

Emergence – a Textbook for Non-restive

Where do Concepts Come From?

Introspection - One or More? Pluralism about Self-Knowledge

Self-Ascribing Emotions - Expressing or Detecting? Detectivist Components in Neo-expressivism