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The New Institutionalism: A tool for analysing defence and security institutions

100%
Bodnieks V.
Security and Defence Quarterly
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2020
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vol. 32
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issue 5
83-94
EN
The aim of this paper is to investigate new institutionalism, its trends and their application in the analysis of security and defence institutions. The research is based on an analysis of theoretical literature to explore a system of assumptions about new institutionalism. Different approaches have been examined, including historical, rational choice, and sociological approaches. Historical institutionalism can be applied to identify the usefulness of past decisions, policy choices, appropriate strategy choices, and specific acquisitions for future policymakers, whereas rational choice institutionalism allows us to determine the influence of security and defence institutions on actors and their choices, how actors use the institutional framework for their own benefit, and how actors’ choices influence the state policy. Finally, sociological institutionalism focuses on recognising actors’ cognitive scripts and the changes they undergo, as well as causes that influence and determine cognitive scripts. Defence institutions are based on a precise regulative and normative framework and cognitive scripts of the highest authorities. Therefore, the external framework and the particular political impact on the supranational level can cause changes on the national level. New institutionalism provides an important perspective on the specifics of security and defence policy, actors’ individual and collective goals, their strategies and interests as well as cognitive scripts.
2
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European Union common security and defence policy and Latvian involvement in EU battlegroups

100%
Bodnieks V.
Security and Defence Quarterly
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2019
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vol. 24
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issue 2
202-212
EN
In this article, the author analyses types of Europeanisation: top-down, bottom-up, horizontal, circular, and looks at Latvian involvement in the EU CSDP capability project - EU Battlegroups. Additionally, the author analyses the EU CSDP strategies in 2003 and 2016 with emphasis on key threats and key directions of action for the security of the EU. If it is necessary, EU Battlegroups can become involved to secure the EU. In the article, the author examines Latvian involvement in EU Battlegroups and changes in political planning documents and legal acts regarding EU Battlegroups. The author shows that for the future, it is necessary to involve an EU Battlegroup in real action in the area of operations, and that it is necessary to initiate discussions on a possible review and evaluation of the format of the EU Battlegroup.
3
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Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl nuclear power plants aspect in Russian warfare in Ukraine

100%
Bodnieks V.
Świat Idei i Polityki
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2023
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vol. 22
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issue 2
49-62
PL
W oczach demokratycznego świata Rosja jest państwem agresorem. Potwierdzają to wydarzenia dotyczące Ukrainy od 2014 r. Również z teoretycznego punktu widzenia świat można podzielić na dwa przeciwstawne bieguny, czyli skrzydło liberalne i realistyczne. Państwo agresor pokazało, że w działaniach wojennych najważniejsze jest zwycięstwo za wszelką cenę i wykorzystuje obiekty jądrowe do realizacji swoich celów. Wszystkie obiekty jądrowe są chronione na szczeblu międzynarodowym. Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza problematyki elektrowni jądrowych wykorzystywanych przez Rosję w ramach działań wojennych w Ukrainie w oparciu o założenia teoretyczne liberalizmu i realizmu. W artykule jako przykłady wykorzystano elektrownie jądrowe Zaporoże i Czarnobyl. Jakościowe metody badawcze zastosowane w artykule to analiza dokumentów oraz wywiady przeprowadzone z ekspertami.
EN
In the eyes of the democratic world, Russia is an aggressor state. This has been confirmed by the events concerning and surrounding Ukraine since 2014. From the theoretical point of view, the world can also be divided into two opposite poles, or, in other words, liberal and realist wings. The aggressor state has shown that the most important in hostilities is to win at any cost and that it uses nuclear sites to achieve their objectives. All nuclear sites are internationally protected. The goal of the present article is to analyze the issue of nuclear power plants that Russia uses in the framework of hostilities in Ukraine based on the theoretical assumptions of liberalism and realism. The article uses Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl nuclear power plants as examples. The qualitative research methods used in this article are document analysis, and interviews conducted with experts.
4
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Lessons learned and identified for the small states based on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine: analysis of the case of Latvia

100%
Bodnieks V.
Świat Idei i Polityki
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2024
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vol. 23
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issue 2
30-46
PL
Paradygmat historyczny pokazuje, że każde państwo musi samo bronić sprawy swojej niepodległości i bezpieczeństwa, a przetrwanie na arenie międzynarodowej jest szczególnie trudne dla mniejszych państw, sąsiadujących z tak agresywnym mocarstwem jak Rosja. Agresywnie wpływając na państwo cel, Rosja stosowała różne formy walki i wojny, tj. wojnę konwencjonalną, wojnę narracyjną, wojnę dezinformacyjną, wojnę o wpływy, operacje manipulacyjne i informacyjne, wojnę cybernetyczną i wojnę religijną. Wszystko to stanowi naruszenie i ignorowanie ram prawa międzynarodowego, powodując powszechne cierpienia Ukrainy i globalne negatywne konsekwencje. Niniejszy artykuł opiera się na analizach koncepcji małych państw. Bazując na przykładzie Łotwy, celem artykułu jest dokonanie analizy wniosków wyciągniętych i zidentyfikowanych dla Łotwy i innych małych państw na podstawie wojny na Ukrainie. W ramach bieżących badań wybrano okres od inwazji Rosji w 2022 r. do końca 2023 r., czyli prawie dwuletni okres od rozpoczęcia wojny na Ukrainie. W związku z wdrożeniem analizy dokumentów i treści jako metod badań empirycznych, przeanalizowano dokumenty dotyczące planowania polityki strategicznej na rzecz bezpieczeństwa i obrony Łotwy, a także przeprowadzono kilka wywiadów z ekspertami w tej dziedzinie.
EN
The history shows that each state must stand by and for itself for the cause of its independence and security and that it is especially complicated to survive on the international arena for the smaller states, nearing such an aggressive superpower like Russia. When aggressively influencing the target state, Russia utilized various forms of warfare and war, i.e., conventional warfare, narrative warfare, war of disinformation, war of influence, manipulation and information operations, cyberwarfare, and religious warfare. All these are in violation and ignoring the frame of international law, causing widespread suffering for Ukraine having global negative consequences. The current paper is based on the analyses of the concept of small states. Based on the case of Latvia, the goal of the paper is to analyze lessons learned and identified for Latvia and other small states based on the war in Ukraine. A period from Russia’s invasion in 2022 to late 2023, i.e., a nearly two-year period since the war in Ukraine began, is chosen to be examined within the scope of the current research. The research has been carried out with qualitative research methods – document analysis and semi-structured interviews. Interviews have been conducted with the experts in the field. The content analysis – a quantitative research method is also used in the work.
5
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COVID-19 as a prestige-promoting mechanism: PESCO framework as an opportunity for EU member states

63%
Bodnieks V., Broka S.
Security and Defence Quarterly
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2020
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vol. 32
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issue 5
55-68
EN
The goal of this study is to identify whether PESCO can be one of the tools for future projects in medicine and whether it can be used to strengthen the military medicine of the EU and, simultaneously, be in synergy with the civilian sector by providing support to the civilian field, and, finally, can EU member states increase their prestige through PESCO. The study, which is based on qualitative research methods, shows that based on Latvia’s case, strengthening the medical field by participating in PESCO can lead to countries promoting their prestige on the international stage, as well as strengthening civil-military cooperation to build much stronger policies within the EU member states. Firstly, the findings showed that from all 47 PESCO projects, only two are related to the field of medicine. Secondly, with the whole world being affected by COVID-19, PESCO can be used for new projects related to the field of medicine. Thirdly, different types of projects can be initiated under PESCO, for example, a new kind of transport for evacuation, new types of medical devices, the creation of new regional laboratories and research centres, development of new analytical and biotechnological equipment, improvement of logistic chains, the establishment of unique and specific training institutions for civilian and military medics, and the development and use of robotic technologies or drones. Finally, countries that engage in epidemiological security measures during COVID 19 are clearly enhancing their prestige by not only demonstrating their readiness to react to the current situation, but also by taking practical action.
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