The central area of David Kirsh’s interest is the various ways in which humans use elements of their environment as external components of computation processes or means enabling them to reduce the complexity of cognitive problems they face. in his research he performs field observations as well as laboratory experiments. Kirsh skillfully blends concepts developed in contemporary cognitive science, such as situated cognition or extended mind, with classic concepts including problem solving. A number of his theses seam to derive from „good, old fashioned” computationalism; however, this does not prevent him from demonstrating how cognitive „computations” assume not only reasonings, but also use of cognitive artifacts, bodies or the space itself. In the current issue of AVANT we present two texts authored by Kirsh.
As the sociology of scientific knowledge has revealed, research fields may frequently maintain or legitimize hypotheses independently or in the absence of experimental data or other empirical evidence constituting conclusive scientific proof in accordance with declared methodological standards. This essay aims to show certain of the mechanisms and social factors that allow scientific discourse to function as a self-referential system, i.e., in an autonomous manner in regards to the border conditions of empirical experience, as described by W. Quine. I particularly concentrate here on how the organization of scientific work in selected disciplines can result in the local findings of individual laboratories being quickly transformed into unrevisable facts (black boxes). The phenomenon of the self-reference of scientific discourse is well illustrated by the case of the debate on the cause of AIDS. This discourse was so configured that by referring to one another and by theoretical imputation researchers caused the hypothesis on the causal relation between HIV and AIDS to begin to be accepted as an indisputable fact, even though the corroborating evidence had not appeared in the meantime.
The paper focuses on the role of distributed mechanisms in cognitive processes. It discusses the results of research in economics, geography and organization theory on the spatial concentration of actors in innovative industries. Although geographic economics and other disciplines have demonstrated a relationship between geographic concentration and inventiveness and innovation, they have not offered explanation in terms of mechanisms. Employing the concept of distributed mechanisms, this article proposes a reinterpretation of concepts such as buzz and the knowledge spillover effect that geography and economics refer to. ----------------------------------------- Received: 25/08/2023. Reviewed: 29/03/2024. Accepted: 28/06/2024.
PL
Artykuł skupia się na roli mechanizmów rozproszonych w procesach poznawczych. Omawia wyniki badań z zakresu ekonomii, geografii i teorii organizacji, dotyczące przestrzennej koncentracji podmiotów z branż innowacyjnych. Jakkolwiek geografia ekonomiczna i inne dyscypliny wykazały związek między geograficznym koncentrowaniem się a inwencyjnością i innowacyjnością, to nie zaproponowały wyjaśnień w kategoriach mechanizmów. Sięgając do koncepcji mechanizmów rozproszonych, proponuję reinterpretację takich koncepcji, jak gwar czy efekt przelewania się wiedzy, do których odwołują się geografia i ekonomia. ----------------------------------------- Zgłoszono: 25/08/2023. Zrecenzowano: 29/03/2024. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 28/06/2024.
The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of distributed cognition (DCog) in the context of classic questions posed by mainstream cognitive science. We support our remarks by appealing to empirical evidence from the fields of cognitive science and ethnography. Particular attention is paid to the structure and functioning of a cognitive system, as well as its external representations. We analyze the problem of how far we can push the study of human cognition without taking into account what is underneath an individual’s skin. In light of our discussion, a distinction between DCog and the extended mind becomes important.
We propose new articulation of the differences between the natural sciences and the social sciences. Drawing on science and technology studies (STS) we reconstruct the organizational and cognitive mechanisms of a certain type of natural sciences, one which is referred as laboratory science or highconsensus, rapid discovery sciences. The key features of those sciences crucial for their cognitive and engineering success include: • experimental reproduction of the studied phenomena in the laboratory; • laboratory interventions and modifications of the phenomena thus evoked and broadly understood scientific ‘tinkering’; • attempts to transfer the artificial arrangements developed in laboratory to non-laboratory settings. The STS perspective not only helps us to explain the differences in status and effectiveness between the social sciences and the natural sciences. It also allows us to formulate certain general recommendations for the development of the social sciences. We attempt to show that sociologists are able to implement engineering projects in certain domains of social reality, projects involving the creation of closed sociotechnical systems-analogous to the ones which are generated by natural laboratory sciences. We refer to those systems as ‘social machines’ and the proposed research methodology is called ‘syntheticmethodology
The article focuses on a theme of re-emerging infectious diseases (R-EIDs) in film productions and television series. Our aim was to show interaction between the epidemics, public reactions and contents of popular culture. The analysis depicts how popular culture tends to present fears of epidemics, as well as describes two other threads important to R-EIDs-related narrative: fear of possible collapse of modernity and fear of technological progress.
Design thinking (DT) is emerging today in many contexts – from business to education to social innovation – as an attractive method for solving a broad range of problems. However, despite its popularity and the fact that the approach utilises concepts and research methods borrowed from sociology and other social sciences, it has received surprisingly little attention within sociological reflection. The purpose of this article is to fill this gap by discussing the main assumptions of the design thinking approach, and first and foremost by making a sociological critique of it and presenting possible options for how sociology as a discipline might react to its popularity. The article is discussion-based and inspired by research in science and technology studies (STS), the critical approach in sociology, and Pierre Bourdieu's concept of the institutional field. The results of the analysis presented here show in what sense design thinking can be attractive to sociology as a discipline - not just as a certain set of tools, but as a different and at the same time inspiring cognitive perspective (accepting provisionality and pragmatism), pursuing to some extent the agenda of synthetic sociology. At the same time, the article shows that the approach is susceptible to criticism for operating with simplistic assumptions, for being solutionist, and for its entanglement in socio-economic dependencies.
PL
Design thinking (DT, myślenie projektowe) pojawia się dziś w wielu kontekstach – od biznesu, przez edukację, po innowacje społeczne – jako atrakcyjna metoda rozwiązywania szerokiego zakresu problemów. Jednak mimo jego popularności oraz faktu, że podejście to wykorzystuje pojęcia i metody badawcze zapożyczone z socjologii i innych nauk społecznych, zaskakująco mało uwagi poświęca się mu w refleksji socjologicznej. Celem tego artykułu jest uzupełnienie tej luki nie tylko przez omówienie głównych założeń podejścia design thinking, ale przede wszystkim przez dokonanie jego socjologicznej krytyki oraz przedstawienie możliwych wariantów reakcji socjologii jako dyscypliny na popularność tego podejścia. Artykuł ma charakter dyskusyjny i jest inspirowany badaniami z zakresu studiów nad nauką i technologią (STS), podejściem krytycznym w socjologii oraz koncepcją pola instytucjonalnego Pierre’a Bourdieu. Wyniki przedstawionej analizy pokazują, w jakim sensie design thinking może być atrakcyjne dla socjologii jako dyscypliny – nie tylko jako pewien zbiór narzędzi, ale jako odmienna, a przy tym inspirująca perspektywa poznawcza (akceptująca prowizoryczność i pragmatyzm), realizująca w pewnym stopniu program socjologii syntetycznej. Jednocześnie artykuł pokazuje, że podejście to jest podatne na krytykę jako operujące uproszczonymi założeniami, solucjonistyczne i uwikłane w społeczno-ekonomiczne zależności.
Statements about the crisis of trust of citizens to science are common in the public and popular science discourse. Examples of anti-vaccination movements and climate change deniers are often used in reference to that statements. Nevertheless, there are strong indications that we don’t encounter an irrationality glut. Conspiracy theories and pseudoscience have long history, just as irrational attitudes. Our irrationality is not unpredictable. Difficulties in acquirement of scientific knowledge could be predicted and categorized. Traditional education and simple refuting conspiracy theories proved to be unfortunate. In return, we should pay attention to remarkable approaches which enable “smuggling” the scientific knowledge and increasing the interest of layman in science.
Actor-Network Theory has proven to be highly successful, fulfilling much of its early theoretical and methodological promise. Proponents of ANT have argued, among other things, that an acceptance of the specific (techno-)social ontology which assumes consistent relativity of beings and anti-essentialism will enable us to address the aporia that are haunting sociology. The authors argue that, sociological applications of ANT (at least as regards the dominant understanding of the theory) result in a lowbrow methodology leading to a radical cognitive limitation of the discipline. The text finishes with an attempt to sketch an alternative version of ANT, one with a positivistic inclination opening the path for synthetic sociology.
This article is an attempt to answer the question: how one selects a neighbourhood to develop an innovation district, using the case of Cracow. This article mainly refers to the issue of the shape of innovation districts, showing how much the morphology of such spaces and their functions can promote or limit the development of innovative enterprises from the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) industry. It also refers to our research carried out with quantitative and qualitative methods in Poland, using two locations in Cracow as a case study. In this paper, we focus on the significant restrictions which hinder the emergence and development of such districts. We also indicate the potential solutions to these difficulties such as the temporary spaces of events we mapped and which we called ‘totemic spaces’.
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