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  1. 2 Operations Research and Decisions

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  1. 2 HAUSKEN K.

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  1. 2 2020

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Game theoretic analysis of ideologically biased clickbait or fake news and real news

100%
HAUSKEN K.
Operations Research and Decisions
|
2020
|
vol. 30
|
issue 2
39-57
EN
A decision and game theoretic model is developed for how one and two news organisations strike balances between producing clickbait or fake news, and real news. Each news organisation seeks to attract gullible consumers who consume more clickbait or fake news than real news, and non-gullible consumers who conscientiously consume only real news. Increasing a news organisation budget results in obtaining both more clickbait or fake news, and more real news. More clickbait or fake news is produced if the news organisation’s unit cost of effort to produce real news, the production efficiency for clickbait or fake news, and the fraction of consumers consuming clickbait or fake news, increase. In contrast, less clickbait or fake news is produced if a news organisation’s unit cost of effort to produce clickbait or fake news, and the production efficiency for real news, increase, and the gullible consumers consume real news with a higher frequency. Lower unit effort costs and higher budget and production efficiencies cause higher utility for a news organisation and lower utility for the competing news or-ganisation. Higher weight assigned to the contest over clickbait or fake news induces both news organ-isations to exert higher effort to produce clickbait or fake news. When the gullible consumers of a news organisation consume a relatively large amount of real news in comparison to the consumers of another news organisation, then the first news organisation exerts higher effort to produce real news and obtains higher utility than the other news organisation
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Governmental combat of migration between competing terrorist organisations

100%
HAUSKEN K.
Operations Research and Decisions
|
2020
|
vol. 30
|
issue 3
21-46
EN
Each terrorist organisation is modelled with four coupled differential time equations for the evo-lution of ideologues, criminal mercenaries, captive participants, and capital sponsoring. Emigration of ideologues may cause unbounded growth of the organisation receiving ideologues. The organisation losing ideologues may reach a stationary state where ideologues are supported by capital sponsors and mercenaries. Emigration of mercenaries may cause the organisation losing mercenaries to experience growth. The organisation receiving mercenaries may lose capital sponsors permanently, allowing for the presence of mercenaries, or capital sponsors may rebound deterring mercenaries. Emigration of ideologues from one organisation to another requires more government intervention into the latter to ensure termination. Emigration of mercenaries from one organisation to another may require more gov-ernment intervention into the latter, since mercenaries support ideologues. Competing terrorist organi-sations may facilitate their mutual extinction. Various intervention strategies are considered: the most threatening organisation is eliminated first, aided by competition from the least threatening, after which the remaining organisation is eliminated. The government’s instantaneous and accumulated utilities are analysed through time and compared, depending on emigration, competition, and government interven-tion strategies.
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