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1

IMPOSSIBILISTS’S PARADISE ON THE CHEAP?

100%
Vacek M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
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vol. 20
|
issue 3
283 – 301
EN
The aim of the paper is to discuss the ersatz theory of Lewis’s impossible worlds, point out its undeniable benefits and demonstrate its costs. Firstly, the author presents two approaches to Lewis’s impossible worlds taken as constructions out of possibilia. Secondly, he evaluates the proposals using the Lewisian criteria of success concerning the well-defined conception of analysis. Although appealing, he does not find the proposals fully persuasive. Thirdly, the author discusses the objection from an ad hoc distinction between possible and impossible worlds. He concludes that the objection does not present a special problem for the Lewisian theory. Finally, he motivates a theory of extended modal realism, to wit, modal realism enriched with concrete impossibilia.
2

CONCRETE IMPOSSIBLE WORLDS

100%
Vacek M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
|
vol. 68
|
issue 6
523 – 529
EN
The paper deals with such a modification of genuine modal realism as to accommodate impossible worlds into its ontology. First of all, the theory of modal realism is presented. Next, several motivations for the acceptance of impossible worlds are adduced. Further, Lewis’s argument against impossible worlds is presented. It is argued that the argument can be weakened by rejection of one of its premises. Finally, two objections against the proposal are countered. Although my strategy accounts for the Opinion concerning the impossible, it allegedly violates another Opinion which conceives the reality classical. It seems, however, that there is no no-question-begging reason to think that reality is classical. How can we know, after all, which logic describes reality? Without a definite answer to the question, the incredibility objection then simply collapses into a statement of a possibility dogma.
3

MODAL REALISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF ISLAND UNIVERSES

100%
Vacek M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
|
vol. 68
|
issue 10
868 – 876
EN
The paper outlines and immediately discusses the so-called ‘soft’ impossibility, i.e., non-logical impossibility generated by modal realism. It will be shown that although in a particular case genuine modal realism, straightforwardly applied, deems impossible a proposition that other philosophers have claimed to be (intuitively) possible, there are a variety of methodologically acceptable moves available in order to avoid the problem. The impossibility at issue is the existence of island universes. Given the Lewisian analysis there are three points at which we might try to square genuine modal realism with such a controversial and problematic claim of (im)possibility, namely: a) the contraction of our pre-theoretical opinions about possibility, b) the revision of some Lewisian definitions and/or c) the extension of our ontological commitments. The author shall look at each of these approaches applied to the problematic case.
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