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Co wyrażają predykaty relacyjne? Jan od św. Tomasza oraz Bartłomiej Mastri i Bonawentura Belluto o czterech typach realności relacji

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Głowala M.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2012
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vol. 7
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issue 1
57-70
FR
Following John of St. Thomas’ Cursus philosophicus thomisticus and Mastri’s and Belluto’s scotistic Cursus philosophicus I sketch four different types of relations, or, more precisely, four ways in which relational predicates indicate (in the sense introduced by Anscombe in Three Philosophers (Blackwell 1961), p. 23) some entities: (i) relationes secundum dici (e.g. having coiffure like Ella Fitzgerald, that is, this kind of coiffure): these are non-relational entities given by a description involving some comparison; (ii) relationes transcendentales (e.g. in case of an emotion of anger — being directed towards some person): relations which are not distinct entities themselves, but rather the inner traits of some entities (like emotions), displayed in their identity criteria and in the logical properties of the relevant predicates (like „is angry”); (iii) relationes rationis (e.g. being someone’s most favourite picture): relations which are not positive entities in the subjects they are said to inhere; (iv) relationes praedicamentales (like being someone’s son) — distinct relative entities constituting a category of relation. For (iv) I discuss in some detail the question of identity criteria of such entities.
2
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Umysł i definicja życia: przyczynek arystotelesowski

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Głowala M.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2017
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vol. 12
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issue 4
39-53
EN
In the paper I do three things: (i) I argue for the claim I call “Aristotelian Anti-Biologism”. This claim is that mental phenomena, and the activity of the power of reason in particular, are as such essential for life in the way in which, for example, metabolism or reproduction are essential for it; so I reject the claim (which I call “The Biologism of Life”) that only biological phenomena (as opposed to mental ones) are essential for life. The main line of argument is that if mental phenomena were not essential for life, they were not essential for death; but, pace “The Biologism of Death” (the claim that death consists in some pure biological phenomena), mental phenomena are essential for death; I discuss “The Biologism of Death” in some detail and I offer some arguments against it, focusing mainly on the analysis of the voluntary movement of the body (the rejection of “The Biologism of Death” does not amount to rejection of the immortality of the human soul). Then (ii) I focus in this context on Aristotle’s suggestion that the definition of life is similar to an inductive definition (it does not focus on common traits of living beings, but instead grasps the principle of succession in an ordered series of kinds of living beings). Here I offer some analogies between life and some de­tails of von Neumann’s set-theoretical definition of natural numbers. Finally (iii) I focus on the issue of the multiple realizability of life.
3
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Wiedza przedziwna. Akwinata o niezmienności i wieczności wiedzy Boskiej

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Głowala M.
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 4(19)
157-174
EN
The general concept of knowledge is a kind of concept closely akin to transcendentals: its use is not restricted to a certain kind of being, and it does not itself designate a kind of entity. Such concepts may be applied to God not as metaphors: when we grasp (through the analysis of cases of finite knowledge) some general traits of knowledge as such, we can show that God has knowledge, and his knowledge, as opposed to ours, is infinitely perfect. We have no insight into this realization of knowledge as opposed to ours, but as far as we know what general traits of knowledge are, it is important to know that God has infinitely perfect knowledge. To grasp the general traits of knowledge, I focus on the topic of mutability and immutability of knowledge analyzed systematically by Aquinas, and thus on the topic of identity criteria specific for knowledge in general: the question of when knowledge that p and knowledge that q are (in a certain knower) one and the same knowledge; the criteria of identity of knowledge vary according to natures of knowers. I think that the problem of the criteria of identity of knowledge is rather neglected in omniscience-immutability discussions. I analyze Aquinas’ arguments for the thesis that human knowledge is mutable, and God’s knowledge is absolutely immutable (they concern the role of tense). The analysis sheds light on some general traits of knowledge: it is always something formulated by the knower which manifests some truth to him, and in general the way it is formulated corresponds to (i) the way it manifests some truth, (ii) its identity criteria, (iii) the way it is propositional, (iv) the way it is related to tense, and finally (v) the nature of the knower. Focusing on the criteria of the identity of knowledge shows that God’s knowledge is absolutely immutable, and that time and change in its objects are nevertheless undoubtedly real.
4
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Significatum propositionis i dojście do wniosku u Grzegorza z Rimini

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Głowala M.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
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2006
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vol. 1
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issue 1
101-114
EN
The paper focuses on the discussion of significata propositionum, the proper semantic correlates of sentences, as the alleged objects of mental act of arriving to a conclusion, as developed in Gregory of Rimini’s Prologue to his commentary to the Sentences. After a brief account of arriving to a conclusion presented by Gregory as some kind of mental act, I present his arguments for the thesis that neither the actual thing the conclusion is about, nor the actually formulated conclusion itself as some actuality in the mind, are direct objects of that mental act (I). Then I present Gregory's account of what kind of entities are the significata propositionum: that no kind of actuality (neither in thought, nor in extramental reality) can be ascribed to them, and so they have to considered as entities in some special sense (II). In (III) I show that: (1) this sense needs further elucidation; (2) it is possible to demonstrate the way this sense is connected with the actuality in mind and actuality of a thing the conclusion is about; and (3) the activity of arriving to a conclusion needs to be investigated. A possible line of investigation is demonstrated by showing why Gregory’s arguments in (I) are invalid.
5
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Tomasz z Akwinu i widmo ukrytego nominalizmu

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Głowala M.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2022
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vol. 70
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issue 3
325-346
EN
In the paper, I discuss the interpretation of the Thomistic theory of universals put forward in Paweł Rojek’s book Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne [Tropes and Universals: Ontological Investigations] in the context of the issue of hidden nominalism. My aims are threefold. (i) I suggest a more precise definition of a universal that enables a defence of basic claims by Rojek concerning hidden nominalism; (ii) I show that the interpretation of Aquinas put forward by Rojek does in fact collapse into hidden nominalism; (iii) I offer another interpretation of the Thomistic theory of universals based on the theory of triplex status naturae that seems free from the trap of hidden nominalism.
PL
W artykule dyskutuję z interpretacją tomistycznej teorii uniwersaliów w książce Pawła Rojka Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne w kontekście problematyki „ukrytego nominalizmu”. Stawiam sobie w nim trzy cele. (i) Proponuję uściślenie definicji powszechnika, pozwalające bronić zasadniczych tez Pawła Rojka dotyczących ukrytego nominalizmu; (ii) pokazuję, że zaproponowana przez Pawła Rojka interpretacja Akwinaty sama popada w ukryty nominalizm; (iii) proponuję, w oparciu o teorię triplex status naturae Awicenny, inne odczytanie tomistycznej teorii uniwersaliów, które wydaje mi się unikać pułapki ukrytego nominalizmu.
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