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1

Na czym polega upływ czasu?

100%

Gołosz J.

Diametros

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2012

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issue 34

2-21

PL

Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, skąd się biorą nasze trudności z wyjaśnieniem, na czym polega upływ czasu oraz przedstawienie pewnej propozycji rozwiązania tego problemu opartej na koncepcji dynamicznego istnienia rzeczy, a rozwijającej ideę absolutnego stawania się. Rozważania oparte są na założeniu, że nasze podstawowe teorie metafizyczne – podobnie jak te stosowane w naukach przyrodniczych – powinny spełniać warunek spójności, prostoty oraz bogatej zawartości.

EN

The aim of the paper is to show the difficulties with which we are faced when we try to explain what the flow of time consists of. The paper proposes a solution to this problem based on the notion of the dynamic existence of things and the developing the idea of absolute becoming. It is assumed that our fundamental metaphysical theories should satisfy conditions of coherence, simplicity and richness of content similar to those satisfied by theories in the empirical sciences.

2

Presentism, Eternalism, and the Triviality Problem

100%

Gołosz J.

Logic and Logical Philosophy

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2013

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vol. 22

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issue 1

45-61

EN

It is often claimed that the debate between presentism and eternalism is merely verbal, because when we use tensed, detensed or tenseless notions of existence, there is no difference in the accepted metaphysical statements between the adherents of both views. On the contrary, it is shown in this paper that when we express their positions making use, in accordance with intentions of the presentists and the eternalists, of the tensed notion of existence (in the case of the presentists) and the detensed or tenseless notion (in the case of the eternalists), the controversy remains deep and very important for us, because both ontological claims express a different attitude to the existence of the flow of time. It is shown that not only does the proposed approach to presentism and eternalism exactly express the intentions of the adherents of both views but it also offers a better understanding of them joining together seemingly different theses maintained by the presentists and the eternalists, and explaining at the same time the dynamism of the presentists’ ontology. The paper takes for granted that we should assess metaphysical theories in a similar way as we assess scientific theories, that is on the basis of their explanatory value.

3

„Thank Goodness That’s Over”

100%

Gołosz J.

Principia

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2011

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vol. 54

PL

Tytułowy argument, sformułowany przez Priora w 1959 r. i analizowany przez niego kilkakrotnie, jest jednym z nielicznych argumentów na rzecz poglądu, który jakkolwiek dla człowieka niefilozofującego wydaje się oczywisty i naturalny, od czasów Parmenidesa był przedmiotem krytyki filozofów, a mniej więcej od początku wieku XX stał się również obiektem ataku fizyków. Chodzi tu o pogląd uznający obiektywność (lub realność) upływu czasu i podstawowego dla nas rozróżnienia pomiędzy przeszłością, teraźniejszością i przyszłością. Jakkolwiek wśród zwolenników realności upływu czasu można znaleźć tak znane historyczne postacie, jak Heraklit, św. Augustyn czy Bergson, grupa współczesnych wyznawców tego poglądu jest bardzo nieliczna; oprócz wspomnianego już Priora na pewno warto jeszcze wymienić C. D. Broada, R. Chisholma a jeszcze bardziej współcześnie Q. Smitha, T. Merricksa i S. Savitta.

4

Some Arguments in Favor of Substantivalism

100%

Gołosz J.

Filozofia Nauki

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1997

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vol. 5

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issue 3

15-27

PL

In the article I subject to criticism Field's argument, according to which field theory takes space-time to be a substance, since it ascribes field properties to space-time points. The fundamental flaw of this argument, I suggest, is the incompatibility of Field's interpretation of field theory with the way this theory is understood and utilized by its users, namely scientists. My criticism is based on the assumption that one cannot propose an ontology of a given scientific theory and at the same time imposing on it an interpretation which clashes with the interpretation current among its users. I also suggest that in order to establish the ontology of a scientific theory one should take into account not only the way it functions but also the way it has been constructed. According to this criterion, field theory does indeed take space-time to be a substance.

5

On the So-Called Argument of the Hole

100%

Gołosz J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2000

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vol. 8

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issue 1

35-72

PL

Th author submits to a critical analysis the argument of the hole, which has been formulated by Einstein and later developed by Earman and Norton. The aim of the analysis is an evaluation of the assumption made in the argument and the possibility of avoiding its indeterministic consequences. It turns out that it is a particular form of substantivalism assumed by Earman and Norton which is responsible for the indeterministic consequences of the argument. It follows that those consequences can be avoided by rejecting either substantivalism as a whole or its particular form accepted by both authors. None of the non-substantivalist interpretations proposed can be accepted, including also the one that Earman himself has tried to develop. The presented forms of the structural substantivalism and the substantivalism rejecting the transworld identification of points are hardly aceptable, either. Hence, there are two alternatives left: either one of the versions of essentialism or else instrumentalism, i.e. giving up doing ontology. Since the author regards instrumentalism as cognitively fruitless, he prefers the first option.

6

Motion, Space, Time

100%

Gołosz J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2002

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vol. 10

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issue 1

7-31

PL

The paper discusses the properties of spacetime we recognize by analyzing the phenomenon of motion. Problems of special interest are the spacetime symmetries, the spacetime structures and the ontological status of spacetime. These problems are considered on the grounds of the classical theories of motion contained in Newtonian physics, special and general theory of relativity. The controversy between an absolute and a relational conception of motion and its ontological implications are also analyzed.

7

Is There a Flow of Time?

100%

Gołosz J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2010

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vol. 18

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issue 4

97-120

PL

The article explores the strategy of reconciliation of the idea of objective flow of time with science. In the first part of my paper, I analyze different conceptions of the passage of time and ponder on how we should understand it. The second part is de-voted to the problem whether there is the passage of time in science.

8

Reductionism, Scientific Realism and the Ontology of Space and Time. The Ontology of Zdzisław Augustynek

100%

Gołosz J.

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2006

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vol. 14

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issue 4

11-33

PL

The paper discusses the ontology of Zdzisław Augustynek, especially the part of this ontology that relates to space and time. This position is analyzed as an attempt to implement two methodological postulates, namely the postulates of reductionism and scientific realism.

9

The Flow of Time and the Theory of Relativity

100%

Gołosz J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2011

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vol. 19

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issue 1

95-131

PL

The paper, which is a continuation if my earlier paper devoted to the problem whether there is the flow of time in science, analyses the possibility of the reunion of the idea of passage of time and the theory of relativity.

10

How We Cannot Understand the Debate between Absolutism and Relationism

100%

Gołosz J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2013

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vol. 21

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issue 4

117-124

PL

In the context of the essay of Mariusz Grygianiec Persistence through time (Trwanie w czasie), the paper discusses the question of how we can, and how we should not, understand the classical controversy between absolute and relational theories of space and time in both versions: ontological and related to the problem of motion. We cannot understand the controversy in the ontological version as a controversy concerning the problem whether there are, or maybe there are not, empty regions of spacetime but rather as a disagreement over the problem whether spacetime and the material world exist in the same way (ontologically on a par). Additionally, we should distinguish two different metaphysical positions denying substantivalism (the view treating spacetime as a substance): the property view, according to which spacetime points should be interpreted as properties of location of objects, and relationism assuming that all spatiotemporal predications are relational. The debate between the absolute and relational conceptions of motion should be treated as a debate over the problem whether each motion of bodies is relative to other bodies or rather takes place relative to a spacetime structure which cannot be determined by the distribution of mass in the Universe.

11

Pitagorejczycy, albo pochwała metafizyki

100%

Gołosz J.

Filozofia i Nauka

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2021

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vol. 9

251-276

EN

This paper attempts to demonstrate that the conviction about the harmony and order of the world was a fundamental metaphysical principle of the Pythagoreans. This harmony and order were primarily sought in the structures of arithmetics, yet following the discovery of incommensurable magnitudes (irrational numbers, as we now call them), the Pythagoreans began to see geometrical structure as a fundamental part of the world. On the example of the Pythagoreans’ metaphysics and science, the paper shows the mutual relations between metaphysics and science. It demonstrates-on the one hand-the necessity of the first as a guide for the latter, and-on the other-how our scientific research can change its basic metaphysical principles when these are found to be inappropriate. The paper also tries to show the need for a realistic approach in our scientific research by means of the same example of the Pythagoreans, that is, the need to discern something which is below the surface appearance.

PL

Artykuł ten stara się pokazać, iż podstawową zasadą metafizyczną pitagorejczyków było przekonanie o harmonii i porządku świata, które miały się najpierw przejawiać w jego strukturze arytmetycznej, zastąpionej następnie po odkryciu wielkości niewspółmiernych (czyli liczb niewymiernych, jak je nazywamy obecnie) strukturą geometryczną. Na przykładzie metafizyki i nauki pitagorejskiej artykuł pokazuje wzajemne związki pomiędzy metafizyką i nauką. Dowodzi z jednej strony niezbędności tej pierwszej dla tej drugiej, dla której pełni rolę przewodnika, z drugiej zaś pokazuje, w jaki sposób poszukiwania naukowe mogą nas zmuszać do modyfikacji wyjściowej metafizyki wówczas, kiedy ta jest nietrafna i nie sprawdza się w badaniach naukowych. Artykuł ten stara się też wykazać na przykładzie pitagorejczyków niezbędność realistycznego podejścia do poznania, czyli konieczność wyjścia poza to, co jest dane w zjawiskach.

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Na czym polega upływ czasu?

Presentism, Eternalism, and the Triviality Problem

„Thank Goodness That’s Over”

Some Arguments in Favor of Substantivalism

On the So-Called Argument of the Hole

Motion, Space, Time

Is There a Flow of Time?

Reductionism, Scientific Realism and the Ontology of Space and Time. The Ontology of Zdzisław Augustynek

The Flow of Time and the Theory of Relativity

How We Cannot Understand the Debate between Absolutism and Relationism

Pitagorejczycy, albo pochwała metafizyki