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Czy Kraków mógł zostać stolicą Galicji na początku XIX wieku?

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Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
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2009
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vol. 136
PL
Could Cracow Have Become the Capital of Galicia at the Beginning of the 19th Century?In the years 1796–1809 Cracow belonged to Austria. Up until the year 1803, it was the capital of the so called Western Galicia which in this very year became incorporated into the crown land of Galicia which up until then had included the Polish territories incorporated into Austria in 1772, with the capital in Lvov. The latter city which was bigger and better developed than Cracow, was however rather badly positioned lying on the north-easterly borderlands of the state. In this situation, in the year 1807 the military circles came forward with the conception of extending the institutions associated with the provincial administration in Cracow. This idea was subsequently taken up by a large section of Austrian officials who suggested that for political and propaganda reasons the capital of Galicia should be transferred from Lvov to Cracow, the old capital of Poland. The above conception was associated with a wider program of reforms of the Polish territories under Austrian domination; the main goal of these reforms was the winning over of the Polish public opinion and drawing away of the Polish nobility from cooperation with Napoleon and with the Duchy of Warsaw. Establishing the capital of Galicia in Cracow and the coronation of Austria’s emperor as the king of Galicia in the Cracow cathedral was to have been a gesture addressed to the conservative Polish nobility. Yet, the above plans had fallen flat due to the outbreak of the war with France in the year 1809, in the consequence of which Austria had lost Western Galicia to the Duchy of Warsaw.
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The disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian army in 1918

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Baczkowski M.
Folia Historica Cracoviensia
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2019
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vol. 25
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issue 2
123-143
PL
Rozpad armii austro-węgierskiej w końcowej fazie I wojny światowej wynikał ze splotu kilku czynników. Były to: kryzys aprowizacyjny dotykający nie tylko ludność cywilną, lecz także żołnierzy; brak wiary w zwycięstwo, spotęgowany klęską podczas ofensywy nad Piave na froncie włoskim (czerwiec 1918); powrót jeńców z niewoli rosyjskiej (marzec-październik 1918) w znacznej mierze zrewoltowanych i zanarchizowanych i wreszcie wzrost nastrojów partykularnych wśród różnych grup etnicznych. Przejawami rozkładu wojska były: masowe dezercje i samowolne przedłużanie urlopów, symulowanie chorób, odmowa wykonywania rozkazów, a w szczególności pełnienia służby frontowej, próby wszczęcia buntu o podłożu politycznym i socjalnym. Władze austro-węgierskie nie potrafiły przeciwstawić się tym tendencjom, licząc na dotrwanie państwa do chwili zawieszenia broni. Włoska ofensywa pod Vittoria Veneto (od 24.10.1918.) w połączeniu z równoczesnym załamaniem się cywilnych struktur władzy państwowej, doprowadziły do błyskawicznego rozkładu armii.
EN
The internal disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian army in 1918 was one of the chief causes of not only the defeat of the Habsburg monarchy in the First World War but also of the breakup of the dual state. That long-term process began in the winter of 1917/18 with the shortages in supplies for the soldiers. Its dynamic was strongly boosted by the return of prisoners of war from Russian captivity on the power of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March–October 1918), and the defeat by the Piave (July 1918). There were increasing instances of marauding and local rebellions in the rear ranks from the spring of 1918 resulting in the breakdown of discipline and a huge wave of desertions in the summer of that year. The response of the authorities was poor for fear of a civil revolution or a rebellion stimulated by the national context in the event of a brutal use of force. The weakened army limited its activity on the front, passively awaiting the signing of a peace. The last phase of the demise came in October 1918 and resulted from the lack of faith in a quick conclusion to the conflict combined with the hopes of rank-and-file soldiers for the establishment of national states on the wreckage of Austria-Hungary, which was to result in immediate termination of hostilities. In such circumstances, the beginning of the Italian offensive at Vittorio Veneto led to a series of rebellions of line troops. This caused the collapse of the front, the unauthorised return of entire corps to their homes, and the signing of the Armistice of Villa Giusti by the declining monarchy and capitulation to the conditions of the on Italians.
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Włosi w Legionach Dąbrowskiego w Italii

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Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
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2006
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vol. 133
PL
Italians in the Dąbrowski Legion in ItalyIn the agreement of 1797 signed between general Jan Henryk Dąbrowski and the government of Lombardy concerning the creation of the Polish Legion, there was no mention of the possibility of Italian citizens joining the Legion. In spite of this, in the years 1797–1807, 53 Italians obtained an officer status in the Legion; among them, there were 31 physicians, and military surgeons, 9 quartermasters, 9 junior officers, 4 chaplains, and 1 officer whose function had not been specified. A small group of Italians who were recruited mainly from among the dissolved Piedmont divisions, also served as non-commissioned officers and private soldiers. As regards the geographical origin of the Italians, the majority of the officers and army officials came from Milan and Lombardy, as well as from Piedmont and Bologna. The majority of the Italians obtained the above posts in the effect of being nominated by the authorities of the Republic of Lombardy which was subsequently transformed into a Cisalpine Republic and finally into the Italian Republic The above decisions were due to the lack of suitable specialists in the Polish Legions, as well as a lack of posts for Italian volunteers in the Cisalpine army.The most valuable group consisted of army physicians who were highly praised for their professional knowledge, intelligence as well as their dedication to the sick and wounded soldiers in their care. The Poles did not have an equally high opinion of the junior officers, as they considered them to be inferior with regard to training and moreover, they thought that the Italians blocked the possibility of promotion for the Polish soldiers. The group which had the worst opinion among the Poles, were the quartermasters, among whom there were many adventurers and careerists. The majority of them had left the Legions following a series of defeats in the II coalition war.4 Italian officers had remained in the Polish army after the liquidation of the legions and they participated in the next Napoleonic campaigns. In spite of the many years of common service in the Legions, no closer ties between the Poles and the Italians had been formed. This fact was largely due to the differences in the social standing of the officers representing the two nations (the Poles represented mainly the nobility, while the Italians chiefly the middle classes), as well as the linguistic and cultural differences, and last but not least different political aspirations. The idea of the common struggle for independence of the Poles and the Italians originated only in the thirties of the 19th century.
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Antoni Morbitzer jako prezes krakowskiej Rady Municypalnej (1812–1815)

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Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
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2013
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vol. 140
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issue 3
PL
Antoni Morbitzer as the President of the Krakow Municipal Council (1812–1815)The article is devoted to the activity of Antoni Morbitzer (1757–1824), a Krakow merchant, economic and political activist and president of the Krakow Municipal Council in the years 1812–1815, that is the final years of the existence of the Warsaw Duchy. Contrary to the letter of the existing law, while standing at the helm of the Municipal Council, Morbitzer, managed to transform this rather superfi cial institution into an authentic organ of municipal authority which co-governed the city of Krakow. Despite a diffi cult political and economic situation (Napoleon’s war with Russia in 1812, the two-year occupation of Krakow by the Russian army in the years 1813–1815), he tried to realize an investment program in the city (charting out new roads, paving the streets, laying down sewage pipes, demolishing derelict buildings); he supported Krakow’s activity as a trading center and opposed the city’s excessive supplies for the Polish and then the Russian armies which according to him ruined the city budget. Thanks to his own industriousness and cooperation with the city mayor and department prefect, as well as his ability to impose his own point of view on the Municipal Council, he contributed to a relatively effi cient functioning of the city and to continuing modernization work in this difficult period. Due to the different political system, (which operated in the city at the time of the Austrian rule and in the period of the Free City of Krakow), he was the only president of Krakow municipal self-government in the first half of the 19th c.
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Trzy okupacje Krakowa przez wojska rosyjskie w latach 1809–1831. Analiza porównawcza

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Baczkowski M.
Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy
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2022
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vol. XXIII (LXXIV)
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issue 4(282)
96-121
EN
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Cracow found itself under Russian military occupation three times: in 1809, when the city belonged to Austria, between 1813–1815, when it belonged to the Duchy of Warsaw, and in 1831, when it was the capital of the Free City of Cracow. Each period of Russian occupation had different aims and character. In 1809, the main (unrealised) goal was to prevent the Duchy of Warsaw from capturing the then Austrian city. The Russian offensive against the states of Napoleonic Europe, launched aft er Bonaparte’s defeat near Moscow in 1812, resulted in the second occupation between 1813–1815. In 1831, the city was occupied for a third time as punishment for the city’s strong support of the November Uprising. Each period of occupation resulted in economic perturbations and an increase in crime. For the occupying forces, the greatest threat turned out to be the mass morbidity of soldiers caused by venereal diseases attested to 1813–1815. The political importance of the three Russian occupations of Cracow was relatively minor. The cost of housing and maintaining the soldiers was considerable but did not deplete the city’s finances. The behaviour of the occupying forces, reprehensible in many cases, did not differ from the standards that prevailed during the first half of the nineteenth century.
DE
In der ersten Hälft e des neunzehntes Jahrhunderts befand sich Krakau dreimal unter russischer militärischer Besatzung: 1809, als es zu Österreich gehörte, 1813–1815, als es Teil des Herzogtums Warschau war, und 1831, als es die Hauptstadt der Republik Krakau war. Jede der russischen Besetzungen hatte andere Ziele und einen anderen Charakter. Im Jahr 1809 bestand das (nicht erreichte) Hauptziel darin, die Einnahme der Stadt durch das Herzogtum Warschau aus österreichischer Hand zu verhindern. Die Besetzung der Stadt zwischen 1813 und 1815 war die Folge der Niederlage Napoleons bei Moskau und der Offensive der russischen Armee auf die Länder des napoleonischen Europas. Im Jahr 1831 hatte die Besetzung den Charakter einer Strafexpedition aufgrund der Unterstützung des Novemberaufstandes durch die Krakauer Bevölkerung. Jeder Aufenthalt der russischen Armee in Krakau führte zu wirtschaft lichen Turbulenzen und einem Anstieg der Kriminalität. Die größte Bedrohung für die Besatzungsarmee stellte das massive Auft reten von Geschlechtskrankheiten unter den Soldaten dar, das am besten für die Jahre 1813–1815 belegt ist. Die politische Bedeutung der drei militärischen Besetzungen von Krakau durch die russische Armee war relativ gering. Die Kosten für den Unterhalt der Soldaten waren beträchtlich, ruinierten aber nicht die Finanzen der Stadt. Das Verhalten der Besatzungstruppen, das in vielen Fällen verwerfl ich war, wich jedoch nicht von den Standards der ersten Hälfte des neunzehntes Jahrhunderts ab.
PL
W pierwszej połowie XIX w. Kraków trzykrotnie znalazł się pod rosyjską okupacją wojskową: w 1809 r., gdy należał do Austrii, w latach 1813–1815, gdy należał do Księstwa Warszawskiego i w 1831 r., gdy był stolicą Wolnego Miasta Krakowa. Każda z okupacji rosyjskich miała inne cele i charakter. W 1809 r. głównym (niezrealizowanym) celem było niedopuszczenie do przejęcia miasta z rąk austriackich przez Księstwo Warszawskie. W latach 1813–1815 okupacja miasta była efektem przegranej Napoleona pod Moskwą i ofensywy wojsk rosyjskich na państwa napoleońskiej Europy. W 1831 r. okupacja miała charakter ekspedycji karnej za wspomaganie powstania listopadowego przez mieszkańców Krakowa. Każdorazowy pobyt wojsk rosyjskich w Krakowie wywoływał perturbacje gospodarcze i wzrost przestępczości. Dla załogi okupacyjnej największym zagrożeniem okazała się masowa zachorowalność żołnierzy na choroby weneryczne, najlepiej poświadczona dla lat 1813–1815. Polityczne znaczenie trzech okupacji wojskowych Krakowa przez wojsko rosyjskie było stosunkowo niewielkie. Koszty utrzymania żołnierzy były znaczne, ale nie doprowadziły do zrujnowania finansów miasta. Zachowanie się wojsk okupacyjnych, w wielu wypadkach naganne, nie odbiegało jednak od standardów pierwszej połowy XIX w.
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Przestępczość wojsk garnizonu krakowskiego na przełomie XVIII i XIX wieku

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Baczkowski M.
Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa
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2012
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vol. 5
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issue 2
PL
THE CRIME INCIDENCE AS DETECTABLE IN THE GARRISON OF CRACOW AT THE TURN OF THE 18TH CENTURY In 1796–1815 Cracow had a relatively large military garrison, composed at first (until 1809) by the Austrian, and later (until 1813) by the Polish army. The garrison was eventually (until 1815) made up of the Russian troops. The presence of the military units caused conflicts with the civilians mostly due to the assignment of living quarters, arbitrary seizure of apartments by the officers and due to drunkness. What was also reported were the robberies, batteries and, in single cases, the homicide. The largest incidence of offences as committed by the Austrian army was reported in 1809 during its war against the army of the Duchy of Warsaw while the largest number of offences commited by the Russian soldiers was observed at the time when they occupied the town (1814–1815). This shows that the scale of crime was bound with the current political situation and with the absence of supervision as exercised by the officers over the soldiers, the officers’ attitude toward the inhabitants of Cracow being, as a rule, hostile.
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Kraków jako ośrodek wspomagający Wielką Armię podczas wyprawy na Rosję w 1812 roku

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Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
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2013
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vol. 140
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issue 1
PL
Krakow as a center offering assistance to the Great Army during the Russian campaign of 1812 In the Napoleonic plans concerning the war with Russia in 1812, Kraków was not supposed to play any major role. The marches of Napoleonic army troops did not lead through the city nor were there plans of locating any major food storage places for the Great Army here. During the several drafts to the army of the Warsaw Duchy, conducted in 1812, 381 recruits were drafted from the city of Krakow; moreover the Krakow regiment of the National Guards, consisting of 160 soldiers, took part in the campaign. Shortly before the outbreak of the war, the soldiers of the 7th and 8th corps of the Great Army were supplied with food at the expense of the city. However the organization of food supplies was not carried out well; it was delayed and the city authorities were not able to collect the supplies and dispatch them on time. During the war, Krakow did not realize any major military orders; it was only in December 1812 that the government imposed on the city the obligation to gather a bigger food contingent which led to vehement protests of the city council. In the opinion of witnesses, Krakow and its surroundings came out of the war of 1812 relatively unscathed; the city itself had not suffered at the hands of the marauders of the Great Army and was able to play a decisive role in the reorganization of the Polish troops in 1813, as a logistic and supply center for the units of the Warsaw Duchy.
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Tożsamość narodowa żołnierzy armii austro-węgierskiej

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Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
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2017
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vol. 144
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issue 2
357-370
EN
In the Austrian army (Austro-Hungarian army) in the second half of the 19th century the question of the national identity of officers and soldiers belonged to the most important problems of the Habsburg monarchy. Officially proclaimed army transnational password (“imperial”), in which the officers and soldiers of different nationalities and different faiths were fully-fledged and united by the idea of a common state, which was the personification of the emperor. The privileged role of the German language in the army had technical, not ideological reasons. In fact, by the second half of the 19th and early 20th century a dispute was waged among the generals and politicians on whether the army was to be transnational, multinational, or German. In the context of transnational password Galician, the “imperial” army was popular especially among the peasant population. The “imperial” identification of the rural population was strengthened by the social conflict on the axis: noblemen (Polish) – peasants (“imperial”). Military service was associated with an increase in the standard of living by most of the recruits and with prestige in rural communities. These aspects further reinforced the “imperial” identity of the recruits. With the development of the modern sense of national consciousness in the late 19th century this identity was modified in the case of the Polish. During World War I the “imperial” identity of the Galician recruits was eventually weakened by failures at the front, the economic crisis and the collapse of state authority. In 1918 it was only a historical memory.
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Wojsko a ludność cywilna na przykładzie garnizonu krakowskiego w dobie napoleońskiej

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Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
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2018
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vol. 145
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issue 4
791-803
EN
Cracow played an important military role at the turn of the 19th century. Since 1796 an Austrian garrison was stationed there, in the years 1809–1813 a Polish one, and during 1813–1815 the town was occupied by the Russian army. Military barracks, warehouses and hospitals were established in the city. The military garrison counted several thousand soldiers. The maximum number of them was recorded in 1807–1809 (about 6,000). Relations between the army and the civilian population were difficult. The military drew various benefits from the city and levied taxes on it. The most difficult problem was the accommodation of soldiers in private apartments. It caused many misunderstandings and conflicts. Excessive exploitation of the city by the Polish army in 1809 led to a decrease in the number of inhabitants. The Russian army (1813–1815), however, treated the inhabitants as enemies which resulted in violence against the civilians. The demilitarization of Cracow in 1815 was welcomed by the inhabitants with great joy.
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Gospodarcze skutki okupacji Galicji przez wojsko rosyjskie w 1809 roku

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Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
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2020
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vol. 147
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issue 3
491-503
EN
The intervention of the Russian army in Galicia in June 1809, during the War of the Fifth Coalition, was formally the implementation of the alliance with Napoleon (the Treaty of Tilsit). In reality, Russia was concerned with preventing territorial expansion of the Duchy of Warsaw and hoping for a possible seizure of some Austrian lands. The costs of maintaining the Russian army had to be covered by the inhabitants of the part of Galicia they occupied. The value of food, forage supplies and taxes collected to supply Russian troops, as well as requisitions, amounted at least to 5.87 million florins. That was a serious sum, all the more so because taxes had already been collected from Galicia and the supplies were transferred to the Austrian army. However, these burdens have not led to the collapse of the country’s economy. This was partly due to the fact that only the beneficiary of military supplies changed: the Russian army took the place of the Austrian army. The several-month stay of the Russian army in Galicia contributed to the weakening of the economic and military potential of the Habsburg monarchy at the final stage of the war of 1809, as the state was deprived of the inflow of financial and material resources from its north-eastern areas before the Treaty of Schönbrunn.
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Przemyśl czy Jarosław? Kulisy debaty austro-węgierskich władz wojskowych nad lokalizacją twierdzy nad Sanem

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Baczkowski M.
Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy
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2024
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vol. XXV (LXXVI)
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issue 4(290)
77-107
EN
The concept of building Austrian (Austro-Hungarian) fortresses in Galicia in the 19th century was a derivative of the monarchy’s relations with its neighbours: Russia and Prussia. The decision to build a fortress in Krakow in 1850, i.e. 4 years after the annexation of the city, did not cause any controversy. However, the location of another fortress in central Galicia, in Przemyśl on the San River, was discussed from 1810, accepted in 1850, but did not enter the implementation stage. A stormy discussion about the final location of this fortress took place between 1868–1871, which was the result of divergent ideas regarding the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary after its defeat in the war with Prussia (1866). The faction associated with the Minister of War Franz Kuhn and Chancellor Friedrich von Beust promoted war with Prussia and Russia based on Napoleon III’s France. Therefore, it promoted the construction of a fortress in Jarosław which could conduct offensive tasks against Russia. It also took into account the possibility of supporting a possible Polish uprising against Russia. The opposing faction, represented by former Minister of War Franz von John and the Inspector-General of the Army Archduke Albrecht, supported in 1870 by the Prime Minister of Austria, Alfred Potocki, sought to maintain Austria-Hungary’s neutrality. Hence, it opposed provoking Russia and sought to build a fortress in Przemyśl with a clearly defensive character. As a result of France’s defeat in the war with Prussia (1870–1871), the Habsburg monarchy finally abandoned its ambitious political plans. In military terms, this was symbolized by the initiation of the construction of a fortress in Przemyśl and the abandonment of plans for an offensive war with Russia.
DE
Die Konzepte für den Bau österreichischer (österreichisch-ungarischer) Festungen in Galizien im 19. Jahrhundert wurden aus den Beziehungen der Monarchie zu ihren Nachbarn abgeleitet: Russland und Preußen. Die Entscheidung, eine Festung in Krakau zu errichten (1850), d.h. vier Jahre nach der Annexion der Stadt, löste keine Kontroverse aus. Der Standort einer anderen Festung in Mittelgalizien, in Przemyśl am Fluss San, wurde dagegen seit 1810 diskutiert und 1850 angenommen, kam aber nicht zur Ausführung. Über den endgültigen Standort dieser Festung wurde zwischen 1868 und 1871 heftig debattiert, da die Vorstellungen darüber, wie Österreich-Ungarn seine Außenpolitik nach der Niederlage im Krieg mit Preußen (1866) gestalten sollte, auseinandergingen. Die Fraktion um Kriegsminister Franz Kuhn und Kanzler Friedrich von Beust befürwortete einen Krieg gegen Preußen und Russland nach dem Vorbild des Frankreichs von Napoleon III. Sie befürwortete daher die Errichtung einer Festung in Jarosław mit offensiven Aufgaben gegen Russland. Sie zog auch die Möglichkeit in Betracht, einen möglichen polnischen Aufstand gegen Russland zu unterstützen. Die gegnerische Fraktion, vertreten durch den ehemaligen Kriegsminister Franz von John, den Generalinspekteur der Armee von Erzherzog Albrecht, die 1870 vom österreichischen Ministerpräsidenten Alfred Potocki unterstützt wurde, versuchte die Neutralität Österreich-Ungarns zu wahren. Daher wandte er sich gegen die Provokationen Russlands und wollte in Przemyśl eine Festung mit eindeutig defensivem Charakter errichten. Infolge der Niederlage Frankreichs im Krieg gegen Preußen (1870–1871) gab die Habsburgermonarchie schließlich ihre ehrgeizigen politischen Pläne auf. In militärischer Hinsicht wurde dies durch den Beginn des Festungsbaus in Przemyśl und die Aufgabe der Pläne für einen Angriffskrieg gegen Russland symbolisiert.
PL
Koncepcje budowy twierdz austriackich (austro-węgierskich) w Galicji w XIX w. były pochodną stosunków monarchii z jej sąsiadami: Rosją i Prusami. Decyzja o wzniesieniu twierdzy w Krakowie (1850 r.), czyli w cztery lata po aneksji miasta, nie wywołała żadnych kontrowersji. Natomiast ulokowanie kolejnej twierdzy w środkowej Galicji – w Przemyślu nad rzeką Sanem – było omawiane od 1810 r., zaakceptowane w 1850 r., ale nie weszło w stadium realizacji. Burzliwa dyskusja na temat ostatecznej lokalizacji tej twierdzy rozegrała się w latach 1868–1871. Była ona rezultatem rozbieżnych idei prowadzenia polityki zagranicznej przez Austro-Węgry po klęsce w wojnie z Prusami (1866 r.) Frakcja związana z ministrem wojny Franzem Kuhnem oraz kanclerzem Friedrichem von Beustem propagowała wojnę z Prusami i Rosją w oparciu o Francję Napoleona III. Dlatego też lansowała wzniesienie twierdzy w Jarosławiu o zadaniach ofensywnych wobec Rosji. Brała również pod uwagę możliwość wsparcia ewentualnego powstania polskiego przeciw Rosji. Frakcja przeciwna, reprezentowana przez byłego ministra wojny Franza von Johna, generalnego inspektora armii arcyks. Albrechta, wsparta w 1870 przez premiera Austrii Alfreda Potockiego, dążyła do zachowania przez Austro-Węgry neutralności. Stąd też przeciwstawiała się prowokowaniu Rosji i dążyła do wzniesienia twierdzy w Przemyślu o jednoznacznie defensywnym charakterze. Monarchia habsburska w wyniku klęski Francji w wojnie z Prusami (1870–1871) porzuciła ostatecznie ambitne plany polityczne. Na gruncie wojskowym było to symbolizowane przez wszczęcie budowy twierdzy w Przemyślu i porzucenie planów wojny ofensywnej z Rosją.
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Powstanie i działalność prefektury departamentu krakowskiego 1809 (1810)–1815

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Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
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2023
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vol. 150
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issue 3
455-469
EN
The departmental prefecture of Kraków was established in April 1810 on the basis of the Administrative Office of the Kraków Powiat, established by the provisional Polish authorities during the War of the Fifth Coalition (1809). The creation of the prefecture was preceded by a dispute over the scope of powers of this institution and an attempt to grant Kraków a special status outside the departmental structures in the Duchy of Warsaw. In political terms, the prefect of the department presented pro-Napoleonic views until May 1813. After the seizure of Kraków by the Russian army, he switched to pro-Russian positions, seeing Tsar Alexander as the protector of the Polish cause. The Kraków Department was managed efficiently by the prefecture. In some cases (Kraków’s local governance, limitation of Jewish economic activities), the prefect of the Department applied solutions that were inconsistent with the applicable law. For the next two prefects of the Kraków Department (Stanisław Wodzicki and Kasper Wielogłowski) this office was the first stage of their official career, which ended for them with the function of the president of the Senate of the Free City of Kraków.
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Rozbudowa uzdrowiska w Krynicy w latach 1806–1830 w świetle akt Gubernium Lwowskiego

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Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
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2021
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vol. 148
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issue 1
107-122
EN
The Austrian authorities in Galicia sought to use the mineral springs existing in that land. Krynica was one of the few state-owned villages that had mineral springs. The health resort was founded in 1793. But it was only the investments from 1806-1810 that transformed the village into a real health resort. In 1811, further works were stopped, and after a few years they were resumed to a very limited extent. The main reason for the lack of new investments was the financial crisis of the state related to the Napoleonic wars. Hopes for a quick transformation of Krynica into the main health resort of Galicia, to which Poles would also come from abroad (Russia, Prussia, the Duchy of Warsaw – later the Kingdom of Poland), ended in failure. The high number of visitors recorded in the first years of the 19th century soon declined. Krynica lost the competition with other spas in Southern Poland (Krzeszowice, Swoszowice), as well as with resorts in the Kingdom of Bohemia and in Hungary. Only in the second half of the 19th century, Krynica became the largest spa in Galicia, and one of the most important in Austria. However, this took place under completely different socioeconomic circumstances.
14
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Powstanie narodowe czy bunt rekrutów? Rozkład wojsk austriackich w 1809 roku w Galicji

100%
Baczkowski M.
Prace Historyczne
|
2024
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vol. 151
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issue 1
3-15
EN
The Polish-Austrian War of 1809 is usually perceived as a regular military conflict between the Duchy of Warsaw, which was part of the Napoleonic Europe, and the Habsburg Monarchy. However, overthrowing the Austrian government in the lands of the Polish partition (Galicia) was largely related to the independence protests of the local Polish population. Among them, the Galician recruits played an important role. A significant number of conscripts from Galicia were involved in the rebellion against the Austrian army. It involved mass as well as individual desertions, surrender into captivity without a fight, and finally a group defection to the enemy’s side. This way, the Austrian army lost approximately 15,000 men in Galicia. This rebellion had social and anti-militaristic grounds, but also resulted from the sympathy of wider circles of Galician population towards the Napoleonic socio-political system. It was primarily perceived as “freedom” and the abolition of existing feudal relations. For Galician recruits, these were positive values, reinforced by the image of the Napoleonic army as a guarantor of modernization processes. The rebellion of Galician recruits in 1809 in the lands of the Austrian partition can therefore be assessed as a Polish independence movement, but also as a chaotic uprising against the feudal and absolutist Habsburg monarchy. The latter factor was probably more important, but it objectively contributed to Austria losing part of its territory to the Duchy of Warsaw.
15
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Koncepcje ugody austriacko-polskiej w latach 1790–1815. Niezrealizowana szansa porozumienia?

50%
Baczkowski M.
Studia Historyczne
|
2011
|
issue 2
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