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1

Cancellability and Saying Something Indirectly

100%

Puczyłowski T. A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2020

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vol. 28

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issue 3

73-98

PL

The aim of this article is to defend the thesis that every conversational implication is cancellable. To this end, I propose a precising definition of cancellability and, based on an analysis of examples proposed by Bach (2006) and Carston (2002), introduce the category of indirectly saying that p. I stipulate that person X said indirectly that p iff (i) X did not say (directly) that p, (ii) from what X said and the analytical truths of the language, it follows that p, and (iii) X meant that p. I definecancellability as follows: if the use of sentence S in context C implies proposition P then P is a cancellable part of this act iff there is a sentence S* and a context C* such that (i) S is a proper part of S*, (ii) S follows from S*, and (iii) P is not implied by S* in C*, but assertion of S* is admissible in C*.

2

A Remark on Luminosity

100%

Puczyłowski T. A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2014

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vol. 22

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issue 4

5-16

PL

Timothy Williamson defines a property of luminosity in the following manner: a condition (or a mental state of a given subject) is luminous if and only if “whenever it obtains (and one is in a position to wonder whether it does), one is in a position to know that it obtains”. Williamson claims that “for virtually no mental state S is the condition that one is in S luminous”. But Wai-hung Wong observes that Williamson’s argumentation for non-luminosity of mental states is dangerously similar in its form to the reasoning underlying the sorites paradox. The observation lead him to the question: is it possible to prove the non-luminosity of some mental states without appeal to a reasoning analogous to the one underlying the sorites paradox? In the paper I present an argument in favour of the claim that Wong’s problem expressed in the question can be resolved. I present a method of determining whether a given state is luminous. However, the proposed test is fragmentary in the sense that it allows us to identify non-luminous states only within the set of propositional attitudes that fulfil certain conditions specified in the paper.

3

The Gettier Problem and the Problem of Justification

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Puczyłowski T. A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2007

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vol. 15

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issue 2

131-138

PL

The Gettier problem concerns the definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In the paper I argue that Gettier's cases are not cases of justified true belief because Gettier's examples rely on some problematic assumptions. The first is rather elementary definition of justification and the other is that justification is preserved by entailment, that is, (A) for all agents X, if X is justified in believing that p, and X realizes that the truth of p entails the truth of q, then X would also be justified in believing that q. For the simplistic conception of justification has some alarming consequences we pursue more adequate definition of justification which would satisfy the idea that a necessary condition of justification is to entail or to be entailed by a true proposition. We also show that the (A) is not necessary to provide an elegant counter-example to the definition of knowledge if the elementary definition of justification is adopted.

4

Changing Beliefs as a Function of Implicature Expression

75%

Puczyłowski T. A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2001

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vol. 9

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issue 3

113-131

PL

5

More on the Definition of Justification

63%

Puczyłowski T. A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2007

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vol. 15

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issue 2

143-144

PL

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5 Puczyłowski T. A.

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Cancellability and Saying Something Indirectly

A Remark on Luminosity

The Gettier Problem and the Problem of Justification

Changing Beliefs as a Function of Implicature Expression

More on the Definition of Justification