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EN
The right to education, recognised by Article 14 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be analysed and interpreted in the light of the previous evolution of EU law in this domain, as well as of the preceding jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. In the present state of EU law there is no doubt that access to higher education as well as access to student grants or loans falls within the scope of EU law. Therefore the article contains the overview of where EU law stands at present in the domain of mobility of students. The main two fields of interest are: access to education of migrant students, when they move from their home Member State to a host Member State in order to undertake studies, as well as access to social benefits, namely student grants or loans, which enable or make easier the mobility of students. The second field of interest concerning student grants or loans is divided into two parts: the first concerns access to grants or loans accorded by the host Member State to migrant student; the second concerns access to grants or loans accorded by the home Member State to its own citizens in order to encourage them to study abroad. The analysis, on the one hand, reveals that the scope of application of EU law to the situation of migrant students, due to the jurisprudence of the CJEU, is very wide, which means the wide scope of rights accorded to students and the narrow scope of freedom left to the Member States. On the other hand, the analysis leads to a conclusion that the case of migrant students is an exemplification of the challenges faced by the Union in the field of free movement, in particular the pressure to limit the social benefi ts for EU citizens exercising their right to free movement.
PL
The article focuses on the recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the context of the national criminal laws of the Member States, concerning the scope of application of the Charter. Drawing conclusions from this jurisprudence the Author answers the question when the Member State is 'implementing Union law' in the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter in the criminal law context. It is considered that Member States implement Union law when interpreting framework decisions (Lanigan, JZ, Vilkas), when assessing the conformity of the national measures with framework decisions (Jeremy F., Radu), when executing judgements in the framework of the mutual recognition (Aranyosi and Caldararu) and when assuring the effectiveness of EU law by enacting criminal sanctions (Tarrico). In addition, in some situations Member States may be considered to be implementing Union law while enacting national measures which may affect the rights derived from Union law (Delvigne). It is assumed in the article that CJEU is often called to strike the fair balance between the different (and sometimes diverging) interests of three categories of actors: interests of individuals (to have their fundamental rights protected), interests of Member States (to exercise ius puniendi) and interests of the European Union as a whole (to ensure effectivess of EU law).
EN
The article undertakes the current and important issue of balancing between the Member States’ obligations to ensure effectiveness of EU law and to respect fundamental rights, taking as an example the ne bis in idem principle, enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The recent case law of the CJEU in Di Puma, Garlsson and others and Menci is analysed. These rulings exemplify the growing importance of the issue of how to balance the two obligations in a situation when the repression undertaken by a Member State in order to ensure the full effect of EU law may infringe a fundamental right provided for in the Charter. The main objective is thus to formulate proposals on how to balance these interests, as well as to define their consequences for national courts.
EN
The article analyses EU law regulating the freedom to provide services in a sharing economy model, from the perspective of the rights and obligations of providers of online and underlying services. Three groups of actors are engaged in providing services in the internal market of this business model: providers of underlying services, recipients of those underlying services and online platforms (with smartphone applications) which connect providers and recipients of underlying services. Although this business model is no longer of specific interest to the EU institutions or academia, it is still present in the Member States. Therefore, it seems useful to present two aspects of the freedom to provide these services from the perspective of providers of online and underlying services: rights that providers of services derive from EU law in relations with the Member States and obligations incumbent on providers of services according to EU law.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono wyniki analizy przepisów prawa UE regulujących swobodę świadczenia usług w modelu gospodarki dzielenia się, mającej na celu zidentyfikowanie uprawnień i obowiązków dostawców usług pośrednich i usług offline. W świadczeniu usług na rynku wewnętrznym w modelu gospodarki dzielenia się zaangażowane są trzy kategorie podmiotów: po pierwsze, dostawcy usług offline, czyli takich, które realizowane są w świecie materialnym; po drugie, odbiorcy usług offline i, po trzecie, operator platformy internetowej, który udostępnia aplikację umożliwiającą łączenie dostawców usług offline i odbiorców takich usług. Z uwagi na fakt, że ten model prowadzenia działalności gospodarczej na rynku wewnętrznym jest ciągle obecny, zasadne jest przedstawienie regulacji swobody świadczenia usług na rynku wewnętrznym z perspektywy dostawców usług pośrednich (online) i usług offline w dwóch wymiarach: uprawnień, jakie dostawcy ci wywodzą z prawa UE w relacjach z państwami członkowskimi, oraz obowiązków, jakie na takich dostawców nakładają przepisy prawa UE w relacji z odbiorcami ich usług.
EN
The Court of Justice of the European Union operates on a case-by-case basis. This means that its decisions normally relate to specific problems occurring in a specific Member State. Consequently it is often hard to ‘translate’ this case law into the national legal system of a different Member State. Nevertheless the case law of the Court of Justice has consequences not only for the individual Member States. It also has harmonising effects. In this sense, the principles of primacy and of direct effect of EU provisions, as well as the obligation to interpret domestic law in conformity with EU law, operate as the minimum requirements which the legal systems of Member States must fulfil. Poland joined the European Union in May 2004. At that time the number of Member States increased to 25. The existence of avenues of judicial protection in the EU raised a number of questions from the very beginning. Now, after 15 years of experience it is time to consider the standard of application of EU law by Polish courts.
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