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EN
The article outlines the problematics of methodology of principles of civil law at the time that is by modern philosophy traced as a hypermodern age. The hypermodern age is characterized by an unprecedented boom of technology, and also by an inclination to rational individualism and liberalism. It undoubtedly has an impact on the principles of private law and procedural law. They are seen as orders to methodological optimize production, but also the application and interpretation of civil norms. The author sees the principles as the most basic level of normative axiomatic system. As axioms, they are then transferable to a formalized lambda calculus of first order of predicate logic without identity, what is submitted on several principles in the article. As a basic hermeneutical meta-principle is, pursuant the author, considered rational legislator form which are deducible other principles of creation, but also the application and interpretation of civil law of 21st century.
EN
The article deals with the specific problems stemming from logical inconsistency of legislation regularisation of the elimination of the defects in case of applications for urgent measures. At the first glance, without further interpretation, it seems so called logical inconsistency of normative text of Civil Contentious Code´s provisions norming either general conditions of any submission addressed to the court and either especially in case of submission of the application for the urgent measure. The author after the raise of the problem exploring of the possibility of the interpretative removing of the glance logically contradictory legal regimes of Articles 128, § 129 and § 327 of the Civil Contentious Code. Interpretive meta principle lex specialis derogat legi generali matures to postulate of different legal regimes of applications for urgent measures in the main proceedings, and those who are not administering proceedings. The conclusion and author´s advised wording of so called operative, concretely applicable norm underlines rational interpretation of legal text, in conformity with the parole contained in literary works, e.g. Exupery´s Little Prince, and in in literature of fact by plenty of authors in law branch and also in general methodology of the science.
EN
Philosophers often consider vagueness (a linguistic expressions admits of unclear or borderline cases of application) to be an undesirable phenomenon. The authors of the text reject the existence of ontological vagueness, and, in cooperation with T. Williamson, they find the roots of vagueness in insufficient understanding. Apart from epistemological vagueness, though, they advocate for the existence of semantic vagueness, stemming from the ambiguity and inconsistency of boundaries and ranges of linguistic expressions. While agreeing with the impossibility of complete elimination of semantic vagueness, the authors point to its possible advantage in daily communication and its possible progressiveness in the search for newer, better understanding.
EN
Article responds to post Džačár, L., Foldes, R. Precautionary measures in the new civil trial - selected issues. The article essentially focused on the nature of the Institute’s approach and urgent security measures, with particular emphasis on precautionary measures. Prior to the analysis clarifies the meaning and purpose of recasting, as specific institutes, although well-known civil trial until 30.06.2016 also found in contentious civil right, does not mean that their meaning and function are the same. This stems from the system settings of Civil Procedure within the purview of civil contentious procedure as process modern and dynamic, particularly in contentious proceedings roofed principle of procedural accountability litigants. The essence of this paper is that, among other things, to refute the misconception that urgent measures are provisional measures, and that the precautionary measure is inappropriate institute, incremental and redundant. It is not just a theoretical conclusion, even without a professional basis, cannot access any deeper analysis, and even clues practical issues. Understanding the institute precautionary measure and its meaning so can be themselves (individually), but in the context of the entire recasting whose purpose is not to look back, the team behind what has been, on the contrary adjust account the new Civil Procedure.
EN
The article is a part of a discussion about the meaning of logic in the area of law. The authors treating in a polemic way some common ideas and connotation of the term „legal logic“ – according to them there is a difference between a logic in a formal meaning, dealing with the structure of the nature language and methodology. In a situations, where formal logic seems to be insufficient to provide a solution of problems with the interpretation and/or application, correct methodology is only able to solve such problem. The authors of the outlined purposes briefly explicate core concepts, such as the normative system (as a set of relatively closed binding rules as defined segment of social relations), paying particular attention to the law system, further interpretative rules and methods (with interpretation, in general, is explaining the connection between the facts (actions) or the interpretation or clarification of the meaning of a particular text), logical consistency and inconsistency (a condition where the set of rules may or may not also draw the assertion and also a negation of this assertion). Inconsistency of normative texts can be either a logical inconsistency or methodological inconsistency. In addressing challenging legal matters, it is necessary to pass from the logic to the methodology, which, of course, logic and logical semantics remains necessary armature of reasoning.
EN
When using natural language in a domain of a special discipline, which is fundamentally based on its use (for example, language of law), we are led on the one hand by the need for precision and unambiguity and on the other hand by the need for brevity and efficiency. A specific semantic problem for texts expressing a system of normative rules for the regulation of actions is the question of their efficient applicability in new situations. Herbert Hart came up with a suggestion on how to solve these dilemmas in the field of law and was loosely inspired by the theory of open texture of concepts. He saw the solution in an inevitable defeasibility of a rule, which, in his view, is caused by the open texture of the goal pursued by the rule. However, extensive use of the instrument of open texture of a concept or a rule can be fuel for the fire of subjectivism in semantic practice. It is necessary to distinguish the phenomenon of open texture of concepts from the polysemy of natural language expressions and the phenomenon of so-called privative modification. Applicative flexibility and effectiveness of normative theory is aided by a more appropriate generality of concepts, which is achieved, for example, by recodification of law, rather than by artificially extending the scope of concepts on the basis of their fuzziness.
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