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Efekt interpelacji

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PL
W drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku, w stwierdzeniu, że podmiot jest efektem gier władzy, użycia perswazyjnych form językowych, zabiegów ideologicznych, internalizacji stosunków dominacji etc. nie ma już nic zaskakującego. Jesteśmy dość zblazowani, aby przyjąć taką nowinę z godnością i bez mrugnięcia okiem. Teoria aparatów ideologicznych Louisa Althussera, archeologia wiedzy Michela Foucaulta, a potem rozplenienie się pasożytniczych teorii dyskursu we wszystkich jej odmianach – tej ściśle politycznej w ujęciu rozumu populistycznego Ernesto Laclaua i tej bardziej kognitywistycznej, tj. krytycznej analizy dyskursu, w ujęciu Teuna Adrianusa van Dijka, pozwala nam dziś pojmować podmiot jako zaledwie pozycję lub zbiór pozycji zajętych w sieci dyskursywnej. Mówimy sobie „tak, owszem, jesteśmy zaledwie i tylko miejscem lub zbiorem miejsc w złożonej i wielokrotnie nas przekraczającej sieci relacji znaczeń i relacji sił”. Więcej, bylibyśmy pewnie bardziej zdziwieni, gdyby komuś przyszło do głowy podważyć tę oficjalną doktrynę, której jawną intencją jest zamazanie rozróżnienia na działanie i mówienie, wiedzę o świecie (encyklopedię) oraz wiedzę o języku (leksykon), wreszcie zamazanie dystynkcji, kiedyś świętej, tj. kompetencji i wykonania, oraz – w rezultacie – teorii kompetencji czyli idealnego mówcy/słuchacza oraz teorii wykonania czyli ograniczonego i niejednorodnego językowo, zdeformowanego, spontanicznego, jąkającego się wykonawcy.
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EN
The point of departures of the paper is the theory of populist reason of Ernesto Laclau and some ideas from Mourning and Melancholia of Sigmund Freud. Author questions two established theses: (1) populism is a hollow and non-specified term as long as it is without reference to given postulates or political claims; (2) populism can be considered only on a rhetorical, not ideological level. Instead, author postulates that: (1) the difficulty of determining the populist discourse is not a transient ailment, only occasionally related to that phenomenon, but a quality built in social reality, permanent and irremovable; (2) the populist rhetoric is not solely an epiphenomenon that can be neglected in any serious analysis. On the contrary, there is a direct link between the two layers: the rhetorical and the conceptual. The reconfiguration of thinking about populism that author would like to advance should allow him to expect answers to a number of questions: (i) What are the relations between politics and populist politics? (ii) How and to what extent does populist logic alter the mechanisms governing politics? (iii) Is the depoliticisation of liberal democracy (the prevalence of administration over politics) a direct cause of the return of populism? In order to substantiate the thesis that populism is today’s way of doing politics, author reconstruct the recent post-communist history of Poland above all the situation after Smoleńsk tragedy, when a Tupolev-154M aircraft of the Polish Air Force crashed near the city of Smoleńsk in Russia, killing all 96 people on board. Thismoment marks opening of a new stage of development of populism that author will refer in the paper as “mourning populism.”
PL
Z pewnością czasy współczesne sprzyjają poszukiwaniu nowych uzasadnień moralnych, a nawet samych projektów etycznych. Równocześnie poczucie, że refleksja filozoficzna nad sferą etyczną znajduje się w sferze kryzysu nie wydaje się być szczególnie ekscentryczne i zawężone do pewnego tylko rodzaju dyskursów, a liczba „nowych etyk”
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Biopolitics is often understood as a form of power that is exercised over a population, not over people. Within this paradigm, a population is understood objectively as wealth, manpower, labour capacity, but also demographically as the object of statistical analysis. If biocommunism is to gain any political significance, if it is to become not only the result of the birth of biopower but also an active and actual agent of new political devices, then it must face the problem of “population empowerment.” In this process of empowerment, “power over life” is to be transformed into “the power of life itself.” In this article, the author tries to develop the idea of biocommunism according to which life is nothing but the fold of being onto itself. Up to now, we have thought of politics as what subsists, thanks to the division and articulation of life, as a separation of life from itself that qualifies it on different occasions as human, animal, or vegetal. For biocommunism, life is a form generated by a multitude of living forms
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Luciano Floridi and Nick Srnicek claims that with a decline in manufacturing profitability, capitalism has turned to data as one way to maintain economic growth in the face of a slow production sector. In the twenty-first century data have become central to firms and their relations with workers and customers (Floridi, 2013; Srnicek 2017). The platform has emerged as a new model, capable of extracting and controlling immense amounts of data, and with this shift we have seen the rise of monopolistic firms. We are told that today we are living in an age of massive transformation. Platforms, big data, additive manufacturing, advanced robotics, machine learning, and the internet of things – create our current living environment. In the presented text I am going to ask what is the place of the university in such a new digital constellation? What are universities for in the time of platform capitalism? My main line of reasoning follows to idea of “entrepreneurial state”. An innovative university is understood as an analogue of an “entrepreneurial state”. Mariana Mazzucato has convincingly demonstrated that developments like railways, the internet, computing, supersonic flight, space travel, satellites, pharmaceuticals, voice-recognition software, nanotechnology, touchscreensand clean energy have all been nurtured and guided by states, not corporations. During the golden postwar era of research and development, two-thirds of research and development was publicly funded. High-risk inventions and new technologies are too risky for private capitalists to invest in (Mazzucato, 2014; Srnicek, Williams, 2015). Socializing of the risk and privatization of profits – this is the main climate of “non-innovative capitalism”.
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If we reject the idea of chronological suc-cession of liberal democracy and totalitarian systemsand acclaim the genealogical perspective instead, wewill notice another structural division or rift. Here it isnot at stake the vertical di_erentiation between totali-tarianism and liberal democracy but the horizontal one:democracy and communism (as a radicalisation ofegalitarianism) vs. biopolitics (consisting of two anti-thetical, but complementary forms: Nazism and liber-alism, state and individual biopolitics). In Nazismhuman being is its own body, for liberalism (from Lockeahead), human owns his/her body, so is able to use it,change it and even sell it. In this light Nazism in itsbasic categories reverses the liberal perspective and grantthe possession of the body to the state instead of indi-vidual, not leaving behind the very conditions of bio-political thinking.I argue, that biopolitical character of liberalism dif-ferentiates it from democracy and communism mostly.Essay attempts to analyse above mentioned oppositionin vertical, as well as horizontal dimension, in order tohave a more in-depth insight in the roots of totalitariansystems and to put under scrutiny the liberal sourcesof contemporary biopolitical regimes.
PL
Jeśli odrzucimy ideę chronologicznego następstwa systemów liberalno-demokratycznych i totalitarnych na rzecz wizji genealogicznej, szybko zauważymy, że prawdziwa cezura, strukturalny podział, nie przebiega pionowo między totalitaryzmem a demokracją liberalną, lecz poziomo między demokracją i komunizmem (jako paroksyzmem demokratycznego egalitaryzmu) z jednej strony a, z drugiej, biopolityką, na którą składają się dwie antytetyczne, lecz powiązane z sobą formy: nazizm i liberalizm, biopolityka państwowa i biopolityka indywidualna. Jeśli dla nazizmu człowiek jest własnym ciałem, dla liberalizmu, począwszy od Locke’a, człowiek posiada własne ciało, a zatem może go używać, zmieniać je, a nawet wymieniać na inne dobra. W tym sensie nazizm w swoich podstawowych kategoriach odwraca perspektywę liberalną, przyznając posiadanie ciała nie jednostce, lecz państwu, pozostając jednak w granicach tego samego biopolitycznego leksykonu. Twierdzę, że biopolityczny charakter liberalizmu odróżnia go właśnie od demokracji i komunizmu. Esej podejmuje analizę powyższej opozycji tak w wymiarze wertykalnym – liberalizm/nazizm, demokracja/komunizm, jak i horyzontalnym – liberalizm/demokracja, komunizm/nazizm, w celu uzyskania lepszego wglądu w korzenie systemów totalitarnych oraz zdiagnozowania liberalnych źródeł współczesnych reżymów biopolitycznych.
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The author presents the figure of Zygmunt Bauman as a public intellectual and a translator. Following Walter Benjamin and his essay “The Task of the Translator” and Jacques Derrida and his text “What Is a ’Relevant’ Translation,” the author concludes that a public intellectual as a translator is persistently confronted with the task of translating statements and postulates from the “language of politics” into “language of practice” and “individual experience,” from the “language of science” into the “language of collective action,” and from the “language of sociology” into the “language of the media.” The author claims that the key category in Bauman’s thinking was neither “liquidity” nor “modernity,” but “socialism as active utopia.” For Bauman, socialism is impossible without a socialist culture, but culture is a practice, i.e. it is an attempt to attune our collective goals aimed at improving the social world. This alignment comes without resorting to the idea of a collective conductor (a program), but by means of resorting to the idea of a translator.
EN
In the paper author refers to the passage from The Prince of Niccolò Machiavelli, in which the famous Florentine says that there are two kinds of combat: one with laws, the other with force. Author defend the claim that by writing this, Machiavelli opened up a new and still unused way of thinking about nature-culture relationship. A follower of this way of thinking withdraws from saying that nature is surpassed by culture, or that nature is nothing else but a subject of an on-going human speculation, and rebuts the sole hypothesis that what there is, is nothing but nature. Modern Western culture entrusted its key opposition to the nature-culture relationship. By and large, political philosophy is a story about surpassing the nature in order to establish a state under the rule of law. According to Machiavelli, the juxtaposition of nature and culture, the narrative on surpassing by politics the laws of nature, just as well as the narrative on us being stuck in it, are all utterly wrong. Accepting the ambiguity of the opposition between nature and culture and assuming that the social contract is indeed fictitious, author would like to question Machiavelli about his vision of subjectivity and politics in a world where “natural objects” appear to be socialized, and “cultural subjects” appear to be dissocial. In the way author puts the question: does Machiavelli recommend monstrosity by writing stories in praise of monstrosity as it may well seem?
EN
The main task of the present paper is to rethink the very idea of community, in comparison with other terms that describe the human collectivity such as-people, society, population, free association, group, collective or aggregate. After analyzing three basic ways of thinking about community-the liberal one, communitarianist and the biopolitical paradigm, the author reconstructs the contemporary concepts of community, such as the “unavowable community” (Maurice Blanchot), “the inoperative community” (Jean-Luc Nancy), “community in question” (Jacques Derrida), “the coming community” (Giorgio Agamben), “a collective” (Bruno Latour), and communitas (Roberto Esposito). As the result of his analyzes the author infers the general conclusion, that what is at stake in philosophical discourse about communities is “conjuring up” or “designing” alternative ways of being, alternative ontologies of the social world.
EN
Robert Pilałat’s book is an attempt to confront with the list of self-knowledge’s aporias and variations of possible developments of it. But the book does not promise that it will provide consistently carried out the remedy of these problems (anomalies). The author does not promote the definitive paradigm of self-knowledge and he does not try to convince us to a new phenomenological study of self-consciousness, which would be able to solve all the problem of reflective cogito.
EN
The main purpose of this paper is to reflect upon the question to what extent contemporary politics is only the “eristic technique” skilled at introducing pathos and instrumentally appealing to logos and ethos. Aristotle’s rhetorical triad-logos, ethos, pathos-makes rhetoric the art of persuasive or honest communication. Applying methods developed by psychoanalysis and in reference to the work of Freud, Lacan, Searle, Laclau, Ranciere and Foucault author reflect on the premises, the shape and the consequences of contemporary sophistic politics. Author is tempted to test the intuition according to which the prototype of a method of communication is catachresis, a figure of speech in which a word or phrase has vastly departed from its traditional, paradigmatic usage.
EN
The title of the essay refers to the famous statement in Foucaults introduction to his History of Madness where he writes that “we have to do justice to Freud“. The problem, however, is that Foucault’s philosophy does not seem to do justice to Freud. Foucault’s use of Freud is ambiguous: sometimes he uses him for purely instrumental purposes (when reconstructing the history of madness and sexuality), but sometimes-for anthropological purposes signaling Freud’s role in redefining our common humanity and particularly our relation to language, life and work. The author confronts Foucault’s ambiguous reading of Freud with the equally ambiguous reading of Foucault by Derrida. Derrida discusses Foucault twice. Once in the essay Cogito and The History of Madness in which Derrida takes on Foucault’s understanding of Descartes and his role in the exclusion of madness from the realm of reason. The second time-in his essay To Do Justice to Freud. Here Derrida disagrees with Foucault whether Freud managed to reestablish the body’s communication with reason which Descartes destroyed.
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