In the public and academic discourse, pluralism is recognized as one of the main features of the contemporary Western world, which is culturally, religiously and ideologically diversified. According to its supporters and promotors, pluralism is a significant value which constitutes a virtue of the modern world. However, pluralism is also associated with various problems, dilemmas and difficulties. Contemporary cultural pluralism has a substantial impact on shaping the religious identity and causes significant changes within it. In the 1970s and 1980s, sociologists indicated some pluralization processes which modified religious identity. In 1983, while examining the determinants of the Church activities in the industrial society, Janusz Mariański – a sociologist of religion, agreed with the observation that “what is eliminated in the pluralistic society is the situation of the monopoly of church institutions in interpreting human reality in the consciousness of the contemporary man. Religious values are not the only which give sense to fundamental values institutionalized in the society”. Thus, religion ceases to have the earlier potentialities of the monopoly in the sphere of fundamental values. The issue of pluralism, widely discussed today and raising a lot of dispute, can be viewed from the perspective of the analysis of broadly understood learning processes and outcomes (the analysis of educational and self‑ educational activities). Pluralism can be perceived as a process and a result of mutual and constant learning in the (educationally potent and dynamic) relationship with individuals who show more or less different attitudes and beliefs – a process of learning those who, by entering relationships with each other, preserve and at the same time shape their different identities. If a person enhances the inner will to learn constantly, to multiply the cognitively valuable knowledge, to improve intellectual skills, this willingness should lead to the recognition of important intrinsic and educational values of other attitudes and beliefs. By meeting what is to some extent different, it is possible to learn further and, with growing accuracy, to recognize the fields of one’s own ignorance. Modern pluralism poses serious challenges to religion. The statement used in sociological discourse that “pluralistic tendencies are destructive to religion” can be read by those for whom religion – confessing religious faith – is close and important as a challenge to oppose pluralism for the sake of the defense of traditionally perceived religious faith, the defense of its world view and its institution. Such a deeply engaged interpretation imposes formulating an alternative: either the pluralistic tendencies which are destructive to religion get intensified or religion gets more power, counteracting the dangerous tendencies of pluralism which pose threat to religion. Two different ways of the inner diagnosis of religion are outlined here. The first is a fundamentalist one and consists in “strengthening its own positions”, as it recognizes that the overemphasized (in religion) elements of openness and dialogue weaken religion from inside, making it more sensitive to destructive influence of pluralism (openness and dialogue are a “Trojan horse” of hostile pluralism, let into the inside of religion). The second way, of the in‑depth and self‑critical reflection upon the current situation of religion, may lead to recognizing (among the elements so far belonging to religious identity) those which – in the context of pluralism and in spite of their presence for many centuries – are of doubtful value or even become the causes of the destructive crisis of religion in spite of their being situated inside it. Therefore, the situation of pluralism allows for cleaning religion, which is confronted with pluralism and was earlier closed within its homogeneous world. At the same time, the religious crisis in the pluralistic world can be viewed as a crisis of inner maturation and growth of religion. Undertaking ideological discussion with the conviction that common and binding arrangements should be reached is not an easy matter. What is more, in the opinion of people who believe in the necessity of confrontation, this discussion is not even needed. It can be assumed that, in the diversified social life, the persistent conducting of difficult negotiations is indispensable, instead of the state of embittered confrontation. Referring to the standpoint of Jerzy Nikitorowicz, who promotes learning pluralism and intercultural dialogue, the dialogical concept of pluralism can be applied: “In the pluralistic society, the process is taking place of reaching commonly shared values by individuals and groups through unceasing negotiations of values and interests, the process of shaping the sensitivity to others and the need for mutual respect and recognition, without the division to upper and lower cultures”.
What was a characteristic feature of Kazimierz Denek’s attitude as an educator was the belief in the validity of discovering, elaborating and fulfilling the sense of life. This was also expressed in the title of his book Filozofia życia /Philosophy of Life/ (Poznań 2012). Directing the thought towards the ancient understanding of philosophy as the art of life and spiritual exercise, the title aptly reflected Denek’s attitude of integral commitment of an educator to intellectually deepened scientific work and diverse educational and didactic activity. He promoted and fulfilled the vision of pedagogy practiced with a similar passion to the one with which mountainous territories are crossed – for K. Denek, this was an important dimension of the philosophy of life. In this study, several (problem-wise arranged) approximations are presented of pedagogical passion as the philosophy of life in K. Denek’s approach. What is comprised in the beginning is the juxtaposition and comparison of pedagogical passion to roaming the mountains, then K. Denek’s pedagogical passion is considered along with his concern for good education. This includes the care for the quality of academic didactics and university ethos as well as the focus on the axiological dimension of education and pedagogical care for leisure time, tourism and sightseeing as an expression of pedagogical passion. It is an introductory sketch on pedagogical philosophy of life according to K. Denek which is presented here.
PL
Przekonanie o zasadności odkrywania, wypracowania i urzeczywistniania sensu życia cechowało postawę Kazimierza Denka jako pedagoga. Dał temu także wyraz tytułując jedną ze swych książek „Filozofia życia” (Poznań 2012), a tytuł ten – kierujący myśl w stronę starożytnego rozumienia filozofii jako sztuki życia i ćwiczenia duchowego – trafnie oddawał bliską mu postawę integralnego zaangażowania pedagoga w pogłębioną intelektualnie pracę naukową i zarazem w wieloraką aktywność wychowawczo-dydaktyczną. Roztaczał i realizował wizję pedagogiki uprawianej z pasją podobną do tej, którą jest przemierzanie górskich przestrzeni, będące – w szczególności dla K. Denka – jednym z istotnych wymiarów filozofii życia. W tekście przestawiam kilka – problemowo określonych – przybliżeń pedagogicznej pasji jako filozofii życia w ujęciu K. Denka. Na początku zestawienie i porównanie pedagogicznej pasji z doświadczeniem przemierzania górskiej przestrzeni, następnie rozpatrzona będzie wyrażana przez K. Denka pedagogiczna pasja i troska o dobrą edukację, włącznie z troską o jakość dydaktyki akademickiej i etos uniwersytecki oraz zwróceniem bacznej uwagi na aksjologiczny wymiar edukacji, a także pedagogiczna troska o czas wolny oraz turystyka i krajoznawstwo jako wyraz pedagogicznej pasji. Zaprezentowany jest tu wstępny szkic o pedagogicznej filozofii życia według K. Denka.
W Polsce dokonuje się obecnie istotnych zmian w zakresie nauk pedagogicznych i pośrednio w zakresie praktyki edukacyjnej. Te zmiany mogą przynieść destrukcyjne skutki, zwłaszcza w rozumieniu natury człowieka i działań wychowawczych. Otóż, pedagogikę jako naukę przesuwa się – administracyjnym dekretem – z dziedziny nauk humanistycznych w dziedzinę nauk społecznych, bez pogłębionych konsultacji z przedstawicielami pedagogiki. O tych niepokojących zmianach wielokrotnie pisze w internetowym blogu Bogusław Śliwerski (http://sliwerskipedagog.blogspot.com). We wpisie Pedagogika jest w pierwszej kolejności nauką humanistyczną (16 kwietnia 2012) stwierdza on, że „bez uzgodnienia z środowiskiem naukowym polskiej pedagogiki, decyzją administracyjną, minister wpisała pedagogikę do dziedziny i obszaru nauk społecznych, wyłączając ją tym samym […] z dziedziny nauk humanistycznych. Także naukowcy […] powinni prowadzić badania […] w sposób zgodny przede wszystkim z metodologią nauk społecznych, a nie humanistycznych”. Są to rewolucyjne i dalekosiężne zmiany. Jeśli zna się tradycję pedagogiki europejskiej, w której sens greckiego pojęcia paideia w łacinie wyrażano także pojęciem humanitas, to narzuca się, iż pedagogika, ze względu na swą podstawową problematykę badawczą, wpisuje się przede wszystkim w obszar nauk humanistycznych. Wychowanie (edukacja) pojęte zgodnie z ideałem humanitas powinno być kształtowaniem konkretnej osoby w odpowiednich relacjach międzyosobowych, w których kompetentny wychowawca czyni z podopiecznego wychowanka, czyli osobę zmierzającą do ukształtowania w sobie określonych przekonań i postaw oraz sprawności służących samowychowaniu. Pomocniczo nauki pedagogiczne korzystają z nauk społecznych, gdyż wychowanie (edukacja) wtórnie staje się zorganizowaną społecznie działalnością i ulega instytucjonalizacji, która ma służyć relacjom międzyosobowym. Spór o ulokowanie pedagogiki wśród dziedzin wiedzy rozstrzyga się w ujęciu klasycznym na korzyść osadzenia jej w naukach humanistycznych z uwzględnieniem pomocniczej funkcji nauk społecznych.
EN
What is taking place currently in Poland are some significant changes in pedagogical sciences and indirectly in educational practice. These changes can bring about destructive results, especially in the understanding of human nature and educational activities. This occurs due to transferring – by an administrative decree – pedagogy as a science from the field of humanities to the field of social sciences, without deeper consultations with representatives of pedagogy. These worrying transformations are frequently commented in Bogusław Śliwerski’s internet blog (http://sliwerski-pedagog.blogspot.com). In the post Pedagogy Is First of All a Humanity (April 16, 2012), he states that “without agreement of the scientific environment of Polish pedagogy, by an administrative decision, the minister situated pedagogy in the field and area of social sciences, excluding it…from the field of humanities. Researchers also … should conduct their studies … in the way conforming to the methodology of social, not humanistic, sciences”. These are revolutionary and far-reaching changes. If the tradition of European pedagogy is known, in which the sense of the Greek notion paideia was in Latin also expressed by the notion humanitas, it seems obvious that pedagogy, due to its basic research problems, is situated mostly in the field of humanities. Moral education perceived according to the ideal of humanitas should consist in shaping a particular person in appropriate interpersonal relations, in which a complete tutor makes his pupil a disciple – a person aiming to shape in himself/herself particular beliefs and attitudes as well as abilities enhancing self-education. Pedagogical sciences draw from social sciences as a support because it is education which secondarily becomes a socially organized activity and undergoes institutionalization that should facilitate interpersonal relations. In the classical approach, the dispute over placing pedagogy among scientific disciplines is settled in favour of situating it in humanities with due regard for the supplementary function of social sciences.
The problems of hope, if viewed from many sides and from different stand- points, appear as one of the fundamental “key issues” of human existence. The experience of hope merges with the experience of time, chance and change (the possibility of beneficial change). The merging and permeating of these experiences can be particularly visible in the broadly understood sphere of pedagogical activ- ity. Aiming at a positively assessed change, a better status, is the foundation of the process of education and self-education – this is a basic feature of pedagogical activities. To a large extent, the experience of hope is an apophatic experience – it is hard to articulate and does not comply with the resources of the language which describes the world of sensual cognition. However, hope needs – or even requires – an appropriate wording which will support and enhance it a lot. The perspectives of hope and pedagogy of hope should consistently remain open perspectives, the current description of which cannot be reduced only to what is seen from the own (narrow and often distorted) point of view. Hope also needs some open space of intellectual debate so that different ways of human experienc- ing of hope could become visible – none of these human experiences is the ultimate experience of perfect and the only hope. Owing to this truly human imperfection, hope itself can mature by going beyond (transcending) its existing forms and the future - if it is not only the implementation of a project coming from the past (e.g. an ideological project of fulfilling an utopian perfection) - may become the open future. In this openness, people can cope with their own imperfection and can – with hope – shape their own selves in order to contribute in this modest way to shaping a better world.
While discussing the issues indicated in the title, it has been assumed that intensive use of information technologies by philosophers and the presence of philosophy in the Internet resources make the presence of contemporary philosophy and philosophers’ activeness in the e-environment also an object of historical-philosophical studies. These studies, especially when dealing with modern times, should not disregard the Internet. What may appear is a questionable belief that such historical-philosophical research can be done by anyone (with elementary knowledge of philosophy) who can insert into the search engine the philosopher’s name and keywords which indicate the problem area they focus on. What is more, if the whole output of philosophy is placed in internet resources, there will not be a need for practicing “book” history of philosophy any longer. This history used to familiarize with the contents of source texts and comprised (monographically arranged) knowledge of philosophers’ views and their life. Yet at websites, everyone will be able to find the philosophical issues they are interested in. By doing this, everyone will “create” their own (authorial?) selection or set of information on a particular philosopher and his/her works. Before the processes of digital democratization in science and philosophy radicalize (as some researchers predict), it is already now worth to make attempts at tracing and presenting (with due foundation in the tradition of historical-philosophical studies) the “virtual image” of the contemporary philosopher, who in reality, is active in his/her broadly understood profession. The figure of Professor Jan Woleński was chosen here – a philosopher with a significant output, whose activity in the e-environment is rather intensive and multisided. What is also taken into account are the transformations which take place in practicing philosophy and in the philosopher’s identity in the context of global communication network. Changes in research methodology of historical-philosophical studies were also considered as, with growing frequency, this methodology makes use of digital techniques of processing information – e.g. the power engine, which reveals the virtual face of philosophers and philosophy itself.
The present paper is an attempt to understand tolerance in meta-philosophical reflection (hence the question posed in the title: Should a philosopher be tolerant?). By doing so the author links a contemporary debate on the nature of philosophy and philosopher’s profession. The opposing views are being considered here – on the one hand those according to which tolerance is a much desired feature of a philosopher, and on the other hand those according to which the value of tolerance in philosophy is questioned. Our attention is focused on the answer to the following question: How is it possible to reconcile the requirement to seek the truth (with its methodological and axiological rigours) with the postulate 0that we should be tolerant of different views and treat the plurality of views and statements as a positive value. It has been shown that it is possible to accept the value of tolerance within the field of philosophy while remaining neutral with regard to disputes concerning the acceptance or refusal of post-modern ideas and statements. A postulate of tolerance can be formulated even if one is a conscious and consequent representative of meta-philosophical options of classical philosophy or analytical philosophy. The statements in which the concepts of tolerance and plurality are used come mainly from the representatives of the Lviv-Warsaw School. The author analysed and compared them. The opinions under study treat tolerance as a positive value. It is contrasted with aggression and compared with humbleness which a philosopher needs. It is also treated as a moral virtue which a philosopher needs. From such a point of view it is possible to adjust it to a clear presentation of one’s opinions and defence of one’s own views. The following suggestion of Tadeusz Kotarbiński was quoted: “whenever you deal with someone else, always try to put yourself in his position, look upon the problem from his point of view. It gives understanding of someone’s opinion, raises the spirit of tolerance, weakens the intensity of conflicts”.
Religion and religiousness seem to constantly stimulate human reflection which moves forward in different currents, they seem to encourage reasoning focused on them. This concerns the whole array of human matters, including fundamental existential situations and moral choices. Such reasoning is often subordinated to religion when arguments for religious beliefs are considered. Frequently, this is also critical and uninhibited reflection, which aims at unmasking religious illusions. The dispute is whether this can be neutral reflection only for cognitive analysis of religious phenomena or whether this reflection always enhances or weakens reli gious beliefs. It is currently accepted to talk about “religious thinking”, which is developing in the modern pluralistic world. The subject of religious thinking should be the contents of one or more religions and their anthropological consequences (the vision of the sense of human life) as well as axiological ones (the vision of values) which co-shape culture and society. Religious thinking is broader than reasoning on religion practiced within a particular religion. Religious thinking can be also developed by people who declare being agnostics or atheists. Religious thinking develops and forms in the environment of contemporary religious and ideological pluralism. Moreover, it is a manifestation of this pluralism, which functions in the sphere of religion and transforms this sphere. What is explored in religious think ing is the issue of transcendence (“transgressing”, “going beyond”) and the “trails of transcendence” which come from outside of religious faith and seem to lead to its inside. The trails come out from the position of those who keep distance and are critical towards religious faith. According to someone’s judgement, a particular trace can be viewed as transcendence trail, even such which leads to religiously un derstood (written with capital “T”) transcendence. Still, someone with a different attitude will not recognize any transcendence trail in this trace and can consider such a view as unjustified overinterpretation of this trace. Trails do not have the power of obviousness which an undisputed proof has. However, they open a space of interpretation, in which some approaches can appear typical of traditional religious visions as well as of indefinite religious searching in the spiritual sphere (called “new spirituality”)