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1

VICE EPISTEMOLOGY OF BELIEVERS IN PSEUDOSCIENCE

100%
Tvrdý F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2021
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vol. 76
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issue 10
735 – 751
EN
The demarcation of pseudoscience has been one of the most important philosophical tasks since the 1960s. During the 1980s, an atmosphere of defeatism started to spread among philosophers of science, some of them claimed the failure of the demarcation project. I defend that the more auspicious approach to the problem might be through the intellectual character of epistemic agents, i.e., from the point of view of vice epistemology. Unfortunately, common lists of undesirable character features are usually based on a priori reasoning, and therefore might be considered artificial or too vague. When we base our position on contemporary behavioural sciences, we can see that the epistemic character of believers in pseudoscience is for the most part determined by two related factors. Firstly, these epistemic agents show a higher level of cognitive laziness. By this I mean an inability or unwillingness to engage in reflective thinking and reluctance to account for counterevidence. Secondly, they yield more easily to metacognitive overconfidence. This can be broadly understood as so-called “knowledge illusion”, the inability to recognize one’s own intellectual limits. The deficiency usually stems from a misunderstanding of the division of cognitive labour and of the agent’s role in epistemic society. I find the proposed epistemological approach to pseudoscience crucial. We can think of normative solutions to it only if we understand the descriptive aspects of the problem.
2

BÍDA RACIONÁLNÍ IRACIONALITY: PŘÍPAD KONSPIRAČNÍCH TEORIÍ

100%
Tvrdý F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2022
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vol. 77
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issue 10
743 – 755
EN
Discussions in contemporary epistemology are burdened with confusions about the terms “rational”, “rationality” and their antonyms. In economy, for an agent to be rational simply means to satisfy the Bayesian probability axioms, but the situation in philosophy is much more complicated. Two kinds of rationality are usually distinguished. Epistemic rationality is an ability to achieve justified and true beliefs, whereas instrumental rationality is a capacity to act in accordance with one’s own interests. This division cleared the way to contemplation about rational irrationality, which is the case when an acceptance of epistemically unwarranted beliefs may increase instrumental profit for an individual. In my article, I will criticize this approach. The proponents of rational irrationality 1) misunderstand the primacy of epistemic rationality over instrumental one; 2) underestimate social nature of normative terms; and 3) misinterpret the evolution of human cognition. I will illustrate my conclusions with an example from applied epistemology – conspiracy theories. It is misleading and disparaging to use the term “rational” in relation to sets of unjustified beliefs that are based on conspiratorial ideation. If philosophers cannot make their ideas on rationality clear, it might be better to leave out rationality completely from the epistemological discourse.
3

MYSTERIÁNSTVÍ A DĚLBA EPISTEMICKÉ PRÁCE

100%
Tvrdý F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2020
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vol. 75
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issue 8
693 – 705
EN
Mysterianism has become a popular stance in philosophy of consciousness and other philosophical sub-disciplines. The aim of this paper is to show that mysterianism is not justified, mainly because its inclination to epistemic defeatism and the misunderstanding of the division of epistemic labour. In the first part, I will present the history of mysterianism in the 19th and 20th century philosophy. Then, in the second part, I will point out how epistemic defeatism is founded in the unwarranted philosophical futurology. The third part will deal with the division of labour in society, language and knowledge. Because of the division of epistemic labour, the understanding is distributed among numerous agents without possibility of individual comprehension. Finally, I will coin the term “ignorance illusion” that plays the central role in the mysterians’ worldview.
4

NESOULAD MEZI MORFOSYNTAXÍ A SÉMANTIKOU PODMÍNKOVÝCH SOUVĚTÍ

100%
Tvrdý F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2024
|
vol. 79
|
issue 2
150 – 167
EN
The semantic analysis of conditional sentences does not entirely align with their morphosyntactic structure. I substantiate this hypothesis with instances from both Czech and English that extend beyond conventional textbook examples. I also highlight that logicians and philosophers often make terminological errors when they disregard the insights from linguistic disciplines. Despite the early analytic philosophy’s emphasis on terminological precision, the practical application falls significantly short of this ideal. I firmly believe that a proper understanding of the morphosyntax and semantics of conditional sentences is a prerequisite for their classification and analysis. In our pursuit of a comprehensive exploration of conditional clauses, we must also grapple with methodological challenges that delve into the very core of the philosophy of language. The primary issue revolves around the fact that two out of the three a priori methods in philosophy rely heavily on the analysis of conditional sentences: thought experiments and modal metaphysics.
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