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O modyfikacji funkcji błędu co do znamion czynu zabronionego

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Giezek J.
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji
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2015
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vol. 100
181-198
EN
The issue of error, for many reasons understated by justice practitioners, seems to be interesting to criminal law dogmatics, particularly for the sake of the constantly prevailing doubts involved with it. These doubts become apparent also in statutory regulations, which were most recently amended on 20 February 2015 in the act changing the Criminal Code, as well as many other acts. As a result of these amendments, the statutory features of the function of error have been modified again. This kind of error — in case it turns out to be justified — results in the culprit not committing an offence. That approach may lead to several questions, the most important of which can be summarised as follows: firstly — what kind of features may become the subject of error and whether the mechanism of error formation for all kinds of features which could possibly lead to error is identical; secondly — what are the criteria — especially in the context of answering the first question — for justifying the error committed by the culprit or deciding not to justify it; thirdly — how to define the function of error from the perspective of the dogmatic structure of offence. The analysis of the aforementioned issues leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to avoid the specific multiplications of the functions of justified error, since it fulfills different purposes, depending on, for example, whether it refers to the features of a prohibited act committed intentionally or unintentionally.
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Formy stadialne popełnienia czynu zabronionego w polskim prawie karnym

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Giezek J.
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio G (Ius)
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2013
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vol. 60
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issue 2
EN
The effect of the criminalisation of inchoate offences – in fact irrespective of how in a givenlegal system (e.g. Polish or Ukrainian) they are regulated – is the moving of the protection of a legalvalue to the foreground of its violation. In case of Polish criminal law, the “depth” of this foregroundis decided by the fact that an important stage of the iter delicti is constituted not only by the attempt,which is almost always connected with criminal liability, but also the preparation preceding it, eventhough it rarely generates such liability. One of the most complex problems therefore is the possiblyprecise delineation of borders between the individual stages of the commission of an offence.The problem appears to be especially complicated when we are looking for the border between thealways punishable attempt and the sometimes and simultaneously – as a rule – less severely punishablepreparation. The decision which of these stages has been executed should be first of all basedon the evaluation whether the perpetrator’s behaviour has reached the stage of advancement whichallows the statement that it is heading directly to commission. The theory of criminal law has longknown attempts of elaborating universal conceptions which could facilitate the interpretation of thefeature of “directness”, though their results – if one takes into account the imprecision of the borderthus delineated – are not thoroughly satisfactory.The prima facie clear question of the subjective side of individual stages of commission ofa forbidden act (only intention is possible) may be the source of some dilemmas when one starts toanalyse its relation to the illegality of these forms, which is best visible in case of inapt attempt andpreparation. One of the most complicated and – in a way – most unsolvable dogmatic problems ofcriminal law then appears i.e. the justification of their punishability. Since an inapt attempt cannotlead to the commission of an offence, then – looking at it objectively – it does not create dangerfor a legally protected value. As a result there also appear significant deficiencies in the objectivecontent of illegality.In the foreground of the violation of a legal value there lie not only the stages preceding thecommission of an offence, but in case of same types of offences also the stage connected with theircommission, if the core of the offence is putting the value in jeopardy. This “occupation” of the foreground by the overlapping forms of a forbidden act results – especially in court practice – in difficultiesin deciding whether the behaviour of the offender constitutes a committed endangering ofa value or can “only” be seen as its attempted violation. The difference lies chiefly in the subjectiveside (actus reus) which is usually difficult to prove.
PL
Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim
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Fakty oraz ich ocena jako przedmiot materialnoprawnych domniemań w procesie karnym

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Giezek J.
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji
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2018
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vol. 114
77-94
EN
The fundamental problem of the article can be expressed in two sequentially asked questions, namely — firstly — whether the subject of substantive presumption may be not only facts, but also assessments formulated on their basis, and — secondly — whether in the case of limiting the essence of presumptions exclusively to facts, it would be possible to include (into the presumptions) these elements of the dogmatic structure of crime, the occurrence of which requires, first and foremost, a series of normative assessments based on normative criteria. It is diffi cult to imagine a situation in which a subject reconstructing reality would make the subject of presumption, and therefore only “guess” that he values its elements. It would have to mean that the court must use a presumption to assess whether the realization of the signs of a prohibited act was socially harmful, unlawful and culpable. A constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence, according to which the accused should be regarded as innocent until his guilt is proved and confi rmed by a valid sentence, does not authorize to conclude that the evidence emerging from successively collected evidence indicates innocence, but it only means that before the fi nal termination of the proceedings, there is no factual and legal basis for verifying the fault and bringing to criminal responsibility.
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Strona podmiotowa czynu zabronionego a formy jego popełnienia — zagadnienia wybrane

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Giezek J.
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji
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2020
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vol. 120
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issue Tom 2
19 36
PL
Zasadnicza teza opracowania sprowadza się do twierdzenia, że znaczenie stanu świadomości sprawcy czynu zabronionego wzrasta wraz z przesuwaniem kryminalizacji zachowania na przedpole naruszenia dobra prawem chronionego, a także wraz z pojawianiem się rozmaitych form przestępnego współdziałania. Każdej ze zmodyfikowanych form popełnienia czynu zabronionego — zarówno stadialnych, jak i wiążących się z przestępnym współdziałaniem — towarzyszy bowiem wzrost znaczenia elementów składających się na stronę podmiotową. Chodzi przy tym nie tylko o stan świadomości, lecz także o płaszczyznę wolicjonalną. Tendencja taka oznacza, że rekonstrukcja strony podmiotowej w procesie karnym powinna koncentrować się przede wszystkim na tym, czego każdy ze współdziałających chciał i do czego zmierzał, gdyż zewnętrzne zachowanie może zasadzać się na aktywności innych osób, a w rezultacie — podlegać dość daleko idącej redukcji. Można by nawet przyjąć, że to nie zewnętrzne zachowanie, ale stan świadomości osoby współdziałającej w popełnieniu czynu zabronionego decyduje o zakresie jej odpowiedzialności. Tendencji takiej — kryminalnopolitycznie zapewne dobrze uzasadnionej — towarzyszą jednak również pewne komplikacje, wynikające z faktu, że nie jest ona realizowana w sposób do końca konsekwentny. Swoista niekonsekwencja daje o sobie znać, gdy ustawodawca decyduje się na kryminalizowanie zachowań wiążących się z nieumyślnym narażeniem dobra prawnego na niebezpieczeństwo. Problem pojawia się także w wypadku form przestępnego współdziałania, a wyraża się w braku pożądanej symetrii między stanem świadomości i woli osób współdziałających. Nasuwa się bowiem pytanie, czy mamy do czynienia z podżeganiem w rozumieniu art. 18 § 2 k.k., jeśli nakłaniający powoduje wykonanie zachowania, które — ze względu na pozostawanie nakłanianego w błędzie — nie może stanowić umyślnego czynu zabronionego, w systemie prawa nie istnieje zaś żaden jego nieumyślny odpowiednik. Przykładem na brak pożądanej symetrii między stanem świadomości i woli osób współdziałających jest również sytuacja, w której mamy do czynienia z udzielaniem w zamiarze ewentualnym pomocy do popełnienia przestępstwa, które przez wykonawcę może zostać popełnione wyłącznie w zamiarze bezpośrednim.
EN
The principal thesis of the study comes down to the contention that meaning of the awareness of the prohibited act perpetrator increases with movement of criminalization of behavior to the foreground of infringement of the interest protected by law and also with appearance of various forms of criminal cooperation. It is for each of the modified forms of commitment of a prohibited act — both staged as well as related to criminal cooperation — is accompanied by the increase of meaning of the elements composing the subjective side. It is not only about the state of awareness, but also about the volitional area. This tendency means that reconstruction of the subjective side in the criminal trial should focus first of all on what each of the cooperating persons wanted and what they headed to, as the extrinsic behavior can be founded on activities of other persons and in the result be subject to a far-reaching reduction. It could be even assumed that it is not the extrinsic behavior, but the state of awareness of the person cooperating in committing a prohibited act that decides about the person’s responsibility. This tendency — probably well justified from the criminal and political point of view — is also accompanied by some complications that result from the fact that it is not strictly performed to the end. A peculiar lack of consequence is demonstrated when law makers decide for criminalization of behaviors related to unintended exposition to hazard of the interest protected by law. A problem also appears in case of criminal cooperation forms and it is demonstrated by lack of desired symmetry between the state of awareness and will of the cooperating persons, for there is a question if we deal with instigation in the sense of Art. 18 § 2 of criminal code, when the instigating person causes performance of the behavior, which — due to suborn person being mistaken — cannot constitute an intentional prohibited act, when in the system of law there is no its unintentional counterpart. An example of lack of the desired symmetry between the state of awareness and the will of the cooperating persons is also the situation in which we deal with participation in conceivable intent of help in committing of a crime, which can be committed by a perpetrator only with direct intent.
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Miejsce i znaczenie teorii prawa we współczesnej literaturze karnistycznej

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Giezek J.
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji
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2015
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vol. 102
167 - 184
EN
For many years legal theory and, in particular, jurisprudence have been important to the criminal law literature. Criminal law scholars tend to eagerly address the concept of primary and secondary norms in their theoretical discourse in an attempt to confront it with a dogmatic construct of a criminal offence. Such studies are typically conducted upon belief that addressing primary andsecondary norms in dogmatic analysis is serving the purpose of systematising and methodologically ordering the discussions belonging to the realm of the study of the concept of criminal offence. A certain fascination of criminal law scholars with primary and secondary norms — which is, by the way, not immediately understandable to the legal theorists themselves — should be treated with some skepticism, emerging from the question of what the dogmatics and the justice system really have to gain from situating the elements of the dogmatic construction of the criminal offence within the structure of primary and secondary norms as precisely as possible. Searching support for the dogmatic analysis in contemporary jurisprudence, the current scholars of criminal law should probably not refrain from building theories of their own entirely.
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Tożsamość czynu jako podstawa różnicowania mechanizmów redukujących odpowiedzialność karną

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Giezek J.
Nowa kodyfikacja prawa karnego
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2017
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vol. 43
107-129
EN
Our starting point is the view, well grounded in the dogmatics of criminal law, that the separation of a criminal off ence as an entity judged from a legal standpoint is based upon both ontic and normative criteria. On the one hand, the basis for an act, anchored in reality, is the behaviour of a subject, on the other hand, what part of it we consider a single object of legal judgement is decided by the legislator. The situation becomes more complicated whenever the judgement of a particular part of a subject’s behaviour is determined by the realisation of the features of at least two prohibited acts. The criteria of unity of an act — apart from full or partial identity of time, in which at least two sets of features of prohibited acts are realised, are highly vague. One could probably refrain from searching for them, has it not been for the fact that the presence of a single act — or multiple acts — is the basis for the currently binding model of reduction mechanisms. If those mechanisms were to rationalise criminal liability, the basis of their use should consist of entirely normative criteria, based, for example, on those that we use for objective ascription of the result. A model of mechanisms of this kind could be determined by the quantity and quality of the violated rules of conduct, or, to use a diff erent phrase, the multiplicity of sources of risk generated by the subject. A positive consequence of such rearrangement could be the possibility of abandoning the concept of an act as an object of legal judgement, selected from the continuum of behaviour, with a precisely determined timeframe.
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Trójstronność przestępstwa wzięcia zakładnika. O niemożności kumulowania roli zakładnika oraz podmiotu szantażowanego

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Giezek J., Lipiński K.
Prawo w Działaniu
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2022
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issue 49
EN
The authors raise the issue of the structure of the offense of taking a hostage, trying to answer the question of whether it is possible to conclude that the offense under Art. 252 CC would be committed in a situation where the subject compelled to behave in a certain manner is the hostage itself. Using linguistic and systemic arguments, they answer the question in the negative way. This is mainly due to the dictionary definition of the term “hostage”, as well as the international legal context which imposed the introduction of Art. 252 (offense of taking a hostage) to the Criminal Code.
PL
Autorzy poruszają kwestię konstrukcji przestępstwa wzięcia zakładnika, próbując udzielić odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy możliwe jest stwierdzenie realizacji znamion typu czynu zabronionego z art. 252 k.k. w sytuacji, w której podmiotem zmuszanym do określonego zachowania się miałby być sam zakładnik. Posługując się argumentami o charakterze językowym oraz systemowym, formułują odpowiedź przeczącą. Wynika ona przede wszystkim ze słownikowej definicji terminu „zakładnik”, jak również z kontekstu prawnomiędzynarodowego, który narzucił wprowadzenie konstrukcji ujętej w art. 252 do Kodeksu karnego.
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