The article covers the peculiarities of the role of the Federal Republic of Germany in implementing the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership Program of the European Union towards Ukraine during 2004-2019. It is stated that the development and implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy has become a real reintroduction of the concept of “Europe of concentric circles”. With the aim of organizing cooperation in many strategically important for the EU areas, this initiative did not provide for membership prospects for countries outside the EU's 2004 enlargement. The Eastern Partnership became a reflection of the European Neighbourhood Policy framework. From the very beginning Kyiv had no political will to join this program, since the proclaimed goal of foreign policy of our state was to gain full membership in the European Union. The Revolution of Dignity demonstrated the will of Ukrainian society to continue integration to Europe despite the plans of the pro-Russian political forces, which at that time were in power in our state. However, further actions proved the fact that nowadays the status of non-aligned state cannot be considered as the guarantee of security. The annexation of the Crimea, which contradicted to international law, and then proclamation of so-called Donetsk People`s Republic and Luhansk People`s Republic, immediately attracted attention of the world community. In these circumstances the inertial foreign policy strategies of the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union proved to be incapable to confront the threats posed by the development of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The lack of a clear foreign policy strategy of the European Union in general and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, and underestimation of Ukraine as a stable eastern border of the European Union, continue to prevent the successful implementation of the Eastern Partnership Program. The Ukrainian-German relations in the context of the EU`s Eastern policy require reconceptualization and qualitatively new content. First of all, it requires Germany`s support for reforms and eradication of corruption in Ukraine. The development of relations with our state should become the central task of the Eastern European policy of the Federal Republic of Germany in general and within the framework of the implementation of the EU`s Eastern Partnership Program in particular.
The article is devoted to the study of the peculiarities of the socio-political discourse of the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the countries of the “New Eastern Europe”, which turned out to be beyond the borders of the enlarged European Union in 2004–2017. The term “New Eastern Europe” is used in relation to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine taking into account the differentiation between the political and geographical understanding of the concept of the “Eastern Partnership”. Taking into account the level of internal democratic transformations and the level of rapprochement to the European Union, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are at different stages. Russian hybrid aggression has negative affect on the process of European integration of Ukraine. Territorial problems with Transnistria will also prevent Moldova from the full membership in the European Union in the near future. Instead, Belarus managed to improve political relations with the European Union, and offer Minsk as a place for diplomatic efforts to resolve the Donbas conflict. The conclusions indicate that the events of 2013–2017 have shown the fallacy of the inertial foreign policy strategy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the East European direction, and also demonstrated a lack of fundamental knowledge about the East European region in Germany. No single federal government has been able to develop a clear program of interaction with the Eastern European powers. The European Neighbourhood Policy, and soon the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, supported by the Federal Republic of Germany, included an in-depth dialogue between EU institutions and the countries of the “New Eastern Europe” without guarantees of their membership in the community. This aspect has complicated the adaptation of the “Eastern Partnership” to the current situation created by the Russian hybrid aggression against Ukraine.
The article researches conceptual approaches of the German political parties regarding the prospects of interaction with the Eastern European states in 2005-2017. Positions of political forces of the Federal Republic of Germany are characterized by the degree of impact of one or another party to the course of political life. The priorities in the Eastern European policy of the six main parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, “Alliance 90/The Greens”, “Left”, “Alternative for Germany”) during the reign of the second “grand” Christian-liberal coalition, and the third “grand” coalition led by Federal Chancellor A. Merkel are analysed. Almost all political forces stood for Germany's active participation in the process of European integration. Instead, there were significant differences in the issue of relations between Germany and the Eastern European states and prospects of their joining the European Union. The CDU/CSU position was based on solving traditional problems of maximum security in Europe. The SPD strategy was based on the fact that Russia, as well as during the confrontation between blocks in the Cold War, should be the nucleus of the East European policy of the FRG. The views of the FDP in general are in line with the positions of the CDU / CSU. The “Alliance 90/The Greens” stressed the need for a pan-European security system and the further implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The rhetoric of the “Left” and the representatives of the “Alternative for Germany” party was plainly pro-Russian. The author concludes that the Revolution of Dignity, the signing of the Association Agreement, the annexation of Crimea and the war in the East of Ukraine have shown the need for a revision of orientations in the Eastern European politics and the development of fundamentally new forms of interaction between Germany and the Eastern European states. To a certain extent, this trend has been reflected in the program documents and polemics on the eve of the Bundestag 2017 elections.