Search results

1

The Propedeutic of the Theory of Judgment in Ancient Philosophy from the Sophists to Plato’s Theaetetus

100%

Gajda-Krynicka J.

Folia Philosophica

|

2019

|

vol. 42

|

issue 2

21-45

EN

In the ancient epistemology, precisely stated definition of judgment (axioma) appears only in the 3rd century B.C. It was formulated by Chrysippus of Soli, the founder of the Stoic logic. However, on the other hand, the analysis of the extant utterances in which the knowledge had been objectified since the first Greek thinkers, allows us to state that the evolution of the theory of judgment was a long process. In this development, Greek epistemology had to deal with a number of problems connected with the object of the judgment –– knowledge, with the form of its objectification –– predication, and also with the predicates of the true and false judgment –– categories of “truth” (aletheia) and “falsehood” (pseudos). The first definition of the false judgement (logos pseudes) and the true judgment (logos alethes) can be found only in the late dialogue of Plato, Sophist, which delivers precisely established terminology of the theorem. Yet, such a definition could be formulated only when Greek epistemology re-defined the scope of the meaning of the key terms-concepts, aletheia and pseudos. The term-concept aletheia was identified with the term-concept being, functioning in the ontological-axiological sphere. On the other hand, pseudos did not mean false in the sense of negating the truth, but something, which is different than truth, is its imperfect copy. Thus, the pre-Platonic philosophy has not yet formulated the terminology in which predication of something inconsistent with the actual state of being, with the truth, could be verbalized. Often to express such a form of predication, a phrase “to utter things, which are not” was used. The other problem was connected with –– characteristic ofthe Greek language –– dual function of the verb to be/einai, which included both existential and truthful function. Accordingly, every utterance, in which the predicate was the verb einai or its derivates, was ex definitione a true predication –– “it spoke beings (things, which are).” In such a situation, there was noneed in epistemology to precisely define judgment as such, and to state the conditions which the true judgment hadto meet. The problem is definitely solved by Plato in his dialogue Theaetetus, in which the philosopher defines the object of the judgment, which is knowledge (however, its object is not stated yet) and introduces the project of verification of the utterances/opinion, thanks to which an opinion ––doxa can reach the status of judgment ––logos. An opinion needs to be verified with the dialectical procedures.

2

Droga do Transcendencji w filozofii starożytnej. Doświadczenie mistyczne czy dialektyka?

100%

Gajda-Krynicka J.

Filozofia Chrześcijańska

|

2016

|

vol. 13

7-36

PL

Zadaniem tego artykułu jest określenie, czy jest możliwe odnalezienie w starożytnej filozofii takich form mistycznego doświadczenia, w których człowiek, prowadzony przez Boga, jest w stanie dostąpić wglądu w Jego istotę i kontemplować najwyższego Boga. Punktem wyjścia analiz jest definicja doświadczenia mistycznego sformułowana przez M. Gogacza, a następnie uzupełniana przez prace I. Andrzejuka. Definicja ta mówi o wiedzy zdobytej per raptum, jak to wyraża Tomasz z Akwinu. To z tej perspektywy są badane fenomeny, takie jak grecka religia, ryty misteryjne oraz pogańskie rozumienie boga/boskości/transcendencji. Analiza prowadzi do wniosku, że grecka filozoficzna wizja transcendencji nie stwarza miejsca na zaistnienie możliwości otrzymania wiedzy na temat Pierwszego Bytu w ramach mistycznego doświadczenia. Staje się to możliwe jedynie w filozofii chrześcijańskiej.

3

Początek filozofii. Od logosu do mitu

100%

Gajda-Krynicka J.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

|

2012

|

vol. 7

|

issue 3

29-43

EN

The beginning of Greek rational thought is usually rendered as „transition from myth to logos”. This immediate conclusion was popularized by W. Nestle’s work (W. Nestle’ Vom Mythos zum Logos. Die Selbstenfaltung des griechischen Denkens, Stuttgart 1940) although its sources can be tracked down to Aristotle’s Metaphysics I, and may be understood in two ways: 1. As a breakdown by rational thought a thinking through „images”, natural in the first stories of „carriers of primitive mentality”, which in Plato’s metaphor of a cave equals leaving by a philosopher the world of images-shadows. 2. As development of a sensu stricto rational thought already present in the myth, which can be rendered as its objectification in a “technical” language, natural for philosophy. Myth can be treated then as thinking via images and logos as discourse, or argument. Both can be rendered as oppositions or, remembering of a presence, function and role of myth in philosophical texts – following W. Jaeger – it can be argued that “myth contains in principle the whole Greek philosophy”. In the vast literature we can a variety of arguments advocating one or the other position. The major problem of relationship: myth-logos cannot be unanimously and finally resolved also because of the state of the extant texts of the first philosophers. However, this problem may be also analyzed from a different perspective, posing an important question about the genesis of myth. Myth “tells images”, transferring perceptions of which the subject is the reality surrounding human beings in its order and cause-effect consequences plus conclusions from these observations into a language of a story, which — in turn — will be translated into logos language by philosophy. It is then possible to formulate a thesis that thinking rationally sensu stricto is prior to thinking through images: in the order of being, general concepts, rules, axioms precede images. This thesis is substantiated explicitly for the first time by Plato the concept of anamnesis (Meno, Phaedrus, Pheado). If we reject the metaphorical aspect of Plato’s argument, we will be left with the notion that human being is born with a priori qualities which Descartes will later call innate ideas and Kant will develop into a priori qualities of human sensuality, reason and intellect. If we accept, following certain philosophical currents, the existence of such pre-cognitive models, enabling orderly and synoptic perception of first that, what appears to human being in the aspect of reality, which is accessible through sensual observation, and then transfer to the unknown sphere and unravel it, verified by logical-dialectical procedures, we would have to conclude that logos is prior in order of being to myth. Thanks to these models, human being — we will never know where and when he/she lived — in the first acts of perception of reality sees both its order, its rules and its structures, regardless of the fact whether he/she perceived them in qualitative or quantitative aspect. These models shape character and forms of sensual perception, and also determine, articulated in various ways, questions about the beginning, questions: why?, i.e. questions about the cause, but also enable him/her to see necessary cause-effect relationships. One can risk a statement that these models take forms of axioms, which — as most general statements, not required proofs — constitute unquestionable basis of every philosophical discourse. It can also be stated that, beginning with the questions of the first philosophers, the beginning and cause-effect relationships determines every philosophical system. These pre-cognitive models are then prior to “storytelling” in a diachronic aspect. However, even if logos precedes myth, first objectifications of logos take form of a myth — a story. Regardless declared the above equality of judgments about diachronic relationship myth-logos, I accept that certain philosophical concepts may confirm that myth comes from logos. Such a confirmation may be found in a few extant fragments and doxographic testimonies inherited after Xenocrates from Chalcedon, who both ontological spheres and rules (archai) consciously names after gods of myth. Also the Stoic allegoric and allegorical method may serve as a confirmation of the above interpretation of the treatise About Gods by Xenocrates from Chalcedon and the general thesis that myth-“story” comes from logos: from pre-cognitive models characteristic to reason, objectified in myth, which in turn rationalizes philosophical discourse. Later tracts of Iamblichus advocating numbers of hypostases of the Absolute, and theology of one of the latest Neo-platonic philosophers — Proclus confirm this truth.

4

Droga do sklakflakfka

75%

Gajda-Krynicka J.

Filozofia Chrześcijańska

|

2014

|

vol. 11

7-36

PL

qwdkaskkasdklaskdaskdasd

Refine search results

2 Filozofia Chrześcijańska

1 Folia Philosophica

1 Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

4 Gajda-Krynicka J.

1 2019

1 2016

1 2014

1 2012

The Propedeutic of the Theory of Judgment in Ancient Philosophy from the Sophists to Plato’s Theaetetus

Droga do Transcendencji w filozofii starożytnej. Doświadczenie mistyczne czy dialektyka?

Początek filozofii. Od logosu do mitu

Droga do sklakflakfka