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1

WHAT IS (MODERN) LOGIC TAKEN TO BE ABOUT AND WHAT IT IS ABOUT

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Peregrin J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2016
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vol. 23
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issue 2
142 – 161
EN
Since Antiquity, logic has always enjoyed a status of something crucially important, because it shows us how to reason, if we are to reason correctly. Yet the twentieth century fostered an unprecedented boost in logical studies and delivered a wealth of results, most of which are not only understandable by non-specialists, but their very connection with the original agenda of logic is far from clear. In this paper, the author surveys how the achievements of modern logic are construed by non-specialists and subject their construal to critical scrutiny. He argues that logic cannot be taken as a theory of the limits of our world and that its prima facie most plausible construal as a theory of reasoning is too unclear to be taken at face value. He argues that the viable construal of logic takes it to be explicative of the constitutive (rather than strategic) rules of reasoning, not of the rules that tell us how to reason, but rather of rules that make up the tools with which (or in terms of which) we reason.
2

IMPLICITNÍ PRAVIDLA

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Peregrin J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2014
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vol. 21
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issue 3
381 – 398
EN
Michal Ivan scrutinized the author ś notion of implicit rule, concluding that it is flawed in his criticism of the author´s book Člověk a pravidla [Man and rules]. In this contribution, the author defends his approach, explaining the notion in greater detail. He states that his talk about the existence of an implicit rule refers to the social setting in which some kinds of social (especially linguistic) actions are governed by normative attitudes of the members of the society. These normative attitudes institute the propriety which makes instances of actions of the kinds either correct or incorrect; hence people can follow or violate the rule, the rule can come into being, develop, and fade away – without it being explicitly articulated.
3

ODKUD SE BEROU AXIOMY LOGIKY?

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Peregrin J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 2
117 – 139
EN
Systems of axioms for elementary logic we can find in textbooks are usually not very transparent; and the reader might well wonder how did precisely such a set of axioms come into being. In this paper we present a way of constituting one such non-transparent set of axioms, namely the one presented by E. Mendelson in his Introduction to Mathematical Logic, in a transparent way, with the aim of helping the reader to get an insight into the workings of the axioms.
4
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Filosofická logika?

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Peregrin J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2012
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vol. 60
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issue 3
343-360
EN
Since, in the twentieth century, logic has come to essentially rest upon mathematics (just like a lot of other sciences) there began to appear many works which, under the title ´logic´, contained what is basically mathematics. There emerged them term mathematical logic (which was however interpreted in various ways, sometimes precisely to indicate a certain purely mathematical discipline resulting from logic, sometimes as the application of logic to the foundations of mathematics and sometimes also as logic undertaken by mathematical means). Some philosophers interesed in logic, but not specifically in mathematics, therefore began to use the term philosophical logic as a way of reinstating a balance between the philosophical and mathematical aspects of logic. There is a problem however in that this term very quickly acquired a whole range of different meanings which have essentially blurred what should be done under this heading; and, moreover, this situation made the very raison d´etre of logic, which grounds it in reality - viz. examination and critical evaluation of the rules which govern our argumentation nad, in a certain sense, our reasoning -, move to a periphery of logic. This situation should be resolved, I belive, by our revisiting the question of what should be the aim of logic, and by clarifying to what extent that which goes under the title logic can really contribute to this aim.
CS
Poté co se logika ve dvacátém století podstatným způsobem opřela o matematiku (podobě jako některé další vědy), začala se objevovat i celá řada prací, které pod hlavičkou logika obsahují v podstatě matematiku. Začalo se hovořit o matematické logice (což bylo ovšem interpretováno různým způsobem, někdy právě jako označení jisté čistě matematické disciplíny vzešlé z logiky, jindy jako aplikace na základy matematiky a opět jindy jako logika provozovaná matematickými prostředky). Někteří filosofové, které zajímala logika, ale nijak specificky matematika, proto začalil razit termín filosofická logika, který měl znovu nastolit rovnováhu mezi filosofickým a matrmatickým aspektem logiky. Problém je ovšem v tom, že tento termín velice rychle získal celou plejádu různých významů, které zcela zatemňují to, co by se mělo pod jeho hlavičkou dělat; a v této situaci se navíc zcela na okraj logiky dostává to, co dává logice její raison d´etre a co ji stále ukotvuje v realitě - totiž zkoumání a kritické hodnocení pravidel, kterými se řídí naše argumentace a v jistém smyslu i naše usuzování. Domnívám se, že tuto situaci je třeba řešit tak, že si zopakujeme, co má být cílem logiky a uděláme si pořádek v tom, co z toho, co se dnes pod hlavičkou logika provozuje, je k tomuto cíli schopno nějak skutečně přispět.
5
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Podíl TIL na „posvětovění“ české filosofické logiky

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Peregrin J.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2016
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vol. 64
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issue 6
831-848
EN
This contribution is a somewhat personal account of the role played by the transparent intensional logic of Pavel Tichý in the process of the development of Czech philosophical logic, and especially of how that logic over the last decades developed from being practically non-existent into an internationally-renowned discipline. My impression is that the part it played is somewhat ambiguous: on the one hand, there is no doubt that both Tichý himself and his follower contributed to this rise of Czech philosophical logic in a significant way. On the other hand, however, as Tichý (and also his followers after him) in his revolutionary fervour, aroused by the partially justified feeling that his results were not duly appreciated, failed to appreciate some of the basic features of modern logic, and thus their revolution sometimes becomes a tilting at windmills. Moreover, it seems to me that transparent intensional logic has gradually, and largely, become a kind of closed world in which it is, above all, internal problems that are tackled – problems which are often either incomprehensible or uninteresting for those who stand outside its confines.
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