The task of Soviet indoctrination was clearly assigned to local intellectuals members of cultural elite and intelligentsia circles. The process of destalinization initiated after 1956 and the increased variety of ways of idea expression make it possible to discuss the relationship between cultural elites (intellectuals) and the Soviet system, as well as to reveal the interests and possibilities to manoeuvre within the structure of the establishment. The ambiguity of the said relations is revealed through the following aspects: firstly, their potential to influence processes within the society became more evident and secondly, there was explicit disappointment in the Soviet values at the ideological sphere which created room for different ideas and values. From this perspective the article attempts to evaluate the level of autonomy (at least partial) which could have been detected at the centre or in the margins of the Soviet establishment and conceptualize the relationship between intellectuals and the system defined by the autonomy. The analysis revealed the model of “weakening of structures and strengthening of social relations” which is characterized by articulation and dissemination of the ideas in private circles of scientists, artists, musicians, etc. and which also facilitated the creation of the informal sphere for more overt speeches and debates as well as affected the institutional processes providing more dynamism and changes in the content of cultural activities as compared with the dominance of planning tasks and formal rules. The milieu and the circles of cultural elites varied based on profession, generation and proximity to the Communist Party, i.e. some of them functioned at the official level (cultural nomenklatura circles), others focused on underground activities or were balancing between the official and unofficial spheres. However, during the Khrushchev Thaw and especially following the Prague Spring in 1968 most of them got increasingly disillusioned with the Communist ideology and the dogmatism of the party line. This had an impact on the significant shift of values to those of ethno-nostalgia and exaltation of the “native land” among others. Although these projections often overlapped with Leninist national policy defined by the idea of blossoming of nations, they also attempted to extend the boundaries of this line, mobilizing national identity at a larger scale within the local society. It is noteworthy that this seminational line characterized by certain level of idea dynamism not only found its place in the official processes, but also started to dominate over other ideas and expressions, which could be accused of western cosmopolitism, formalism or abstractionism. The mainstream of cultural elites and intellectuals remained the participants of the system yet influenced the erosion and/or shift of official-ideological discourse from pure indoctrination to more routinized (but empty) practices of declaration of Communist values during late Socialism.
The article analyses the concept of late Socialism from the perspective of the Soviet cultural elite (or intellectuals), focusing on structural changes following Stalin’s epoch and posing the question what concrete event or fact could qualify as the beginning of late Socialism (the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Khrushchev’s speech, Prague Spring, etc.). The author suggests that the era of late Socialism could be identified as overlapping with the post-Stalinist period and lasting until Gorbachev’s perestroika. The epoch of late Socialism also includes several internal periods, the distinction of which is based on the Soviet leaders in power (Khrushchev, Brezhnev, etc.). These sub-periods of late Socialism were characterized by attempts to renew the course of political, cultural and economic development which would normally end in failure leading to the decline in the mobilization of ideology and regulation. Despite certain differences between these subperiods they manifested more common features as compared to Stalin’s era. They also illustrate the fact that Soviet cultural elite and Soviet intellectuals were not fully absorbed by the system as they did not become part of the proletarian structure retaining a certain level of personal or group autonomy. The analysis of Stalin’s era revealed that in the sphere of culture and ideology the intellectuals were actively involved into the practices of indoctrination. In Lithuania they quickly adapted to the new institutions, mastered the rituals of indoctrination as well as the practices of participating in official processes and felt the impact of the so-called zhdanovschina. However, the research of the later period of the Soviet era, which started immediately after de-Stalinization, requires more than mere analysis of the role the consolidation of the Soviet order played in the country leaving aside the definite dynamism of ideas and the increasing interest in the “national question.” The period after Khrushchev’s Thaw can be characterized as the epoch of late Socialism revealing not only dogmatism but also the dynamics of informal practices. Late Socialism started with the optimism of the Thaw but as a separate socio-cultural epoch it mainly reflected the norms, everyday life and standards of the so-called real Socialism declared during the Brezhnev period. In his famous study anthropologist Alexei Yurchak described the same period as the epoch of the last Soviet generation, in which a lack of belief in ideology was combined with ideological ritualization of everyday life. Brezhnev’s ruling style embodied the dogmatisms of ideology and official establishments, yet at the same time it ignored the growing number of informal and illegal practices. During real Socialism personal ties were stronger than official structures. As a result, power relations and socio-cultural and economical dynamics were concentrated in interpersonal relationships within various social networks. These supplemented official institutions and formal processes with informal everyday routines and the practical mind, in order to solve the shortages caused by ideology and the planned economy. Here, the concept of “social network” could be applied to illustrate how the structure of relationships around a person or group affected beliefs or behaviours. Several scholars have paid attention to the role of informal social relations as one of the most important tools to achieve not only better consumption (blat relations), but also as an informal space to share varying cultural-normative attitudes and values, mainly ones that differed from the dominated discourse of communist ideology. In doing so, they have demonstrated that all aspects of individual or group life were not controlled by totalitarian mechanisms.
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