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1

Epistemological Foundationalism

100%

Chrudzimski A.

Filozofia Nauki

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1998

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vol. 6

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issue 2

77-94

PL

Chisholm’s theory of knowledge is a classical formulation of the contemporary epistemological foundationalism. The theory consists of the formal part, where the hierarchy of the basic epistemic values is formulated and of the material part, containing the material rules that allow to correlate the epistemic values with the particular mental states.In the paper Chisholm’s hierarchy of the epistemic values and his material rules are discussed. Chisholm’s thesis of the priviledged access to the private mental states and the so called adverbial theory of sense data which is a characteristic feature of Chisholm’s approach are analyzed. His foundationalism proves to be an iterative foundationalism in Alston’s sense and his adverbial theory of the sense data allows toavoid some philosophical misconceptions.

2

The Semantics of the Priviledged Access

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Chrudzimski A.

Filozofia Nauki

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1999

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vol. 7

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issue 3-4

85-102

PL

In the paper we present some interesting aspects of the traditional account of the theory of intentionality that after Sellars is commonly called „the myth of the given”. The most characteristic aspect of this doctrine is the essential interrelation betwen the theory of intentionality and the idea of the Cartesian sphere of epistemically priviledged access. This interrelation allows in turn to link very naturally the theory of intentionality to the doctrine of epistemological foundationalism. The theory of intentionality of this kind assumes that every intentionality is of the descriptive, „Russellian” nature. Consequently, all the contexts de re pose a very serious problem for this theory. On the ground of Chisholm's theory we show how the partisan of „the myth of the given” could manage these problems.

3

Neutralność światopoglądowa

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Chrudzimski A.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2016

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vol. 34

45-69

EN

In this paper I focus on the concept of neutrality taken in the meaning typical for political discussions concerning e.g. the religious neutrality of the state. I take it for granted that the huge majority of educated people belonging to the so called “western culture” would agree that the most important institutions of our social life – such as schools, courts, and parliaments – should be neutral in this sense. But on the other hand it is extremely difficult to formulate a set of precise and reliable criteria allowing us to exclude particular statements, arguments or kinds of discourse as violating this principle of neutrality. The sad truth is that the term “neutrality”, even if restricted to the meaning that is relevant to this paper, is rather vague. Nevertheless I want to propose three types of criteria that can be helpful in attaining this goal. They will be termed: (i) content criterion, (ii) epistemic criterion, and (iii) pragmatic criterion. It seems that if we apply all these criteria together, we will be able to secure a reasonable degree of neutrality in our public debates.

4

Deskrypcje określone i przedmioty nieistniejące

100%

Chrudzimski A.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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2022

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issue 4

191-211

EN

According to the usual, simplified picture of the Meinong‑Russell controversy, Meinong’s semantics is structurally amazingly simple but ontologically very expensive, while Russell’s theory contains some counter‑intuitive syntactic complications, but to make up for this expense it releases us from almost all ontological troubles. Now the reality is much more complex. On the one hand it appears that the alleged ontological innocence of Russell’s solution has been highly exaggerated. In particular it assumes a Platonic ontology of universal properties. At the same time, if we look a bit closer, also Meinong’s theory turns out to be much more complicated than it looks at the first sight. It involves a hierarchy of objects exhibiting different degrees of completeness and in the later period of Meinong’s thought the structure of intentional reference takes a form very similar to that which has been proposed by Russell in his On Denoting.

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1 Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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Epistemological Foundationalism

The Semantics of the Priviledged Access

Neutralność światopoglądowa

Deskrypcje określone i przedmioty nieistniejące