This study challenges some interpretative strategies comparing Leibniz’s, or even Newton’s metaphysics of space to a Cartesian one. Not only did both Newton and Leibniz explicitly oppose Cartesian metaphysics as such, but neither of them had even the slightest intention of separating space from God, although they did not agree on the exact nature of such a space-God relationship. Moreover, it was just a conceptual disagreement, since the identification of space with an attribute of God is to be found not only by Leibniz but also by Newton, as well as by his defender Samuel Clarke. Neither diverge the reasons why Leibniz no more than Clarke eventually argued for the category of modification rather than an attribute.
The study provides an analysis of Comenius’ concept of both heat and cold, as developed especially in his writings Physicae ad lumen divinu reformandae synopsis and Disquisitiones de caloris et frigoris natura. Because of its programmatically mosaic approach, Comenius’ physics is compared directly to that of his later admirer G. W. Leibniz, and, via Leibniz’ concept, sets it into the context of later thermodynamics. Comenius’ methodology is compared not only to that of Leibniz himself, but also to that of Newton and other commonly accepted proponents of exact science. Last but not least, Comenius’ “kinetic theory of cold” is placed in opposition to the ‘privative’ concept of Aristotle, against which, however, Comenius intentionally set himself apart with his mosaic approach. Despite its several shortcomings, Comenius’ peculiar attempt to merge physics with theology is evaluated as being cientifically useful.
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