Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

O teorii kulturowego doboru grupowego na przykładzie analizy rozwoju chrześcijaństwa w cesarstwie rzymskim

100%
Załuski W.
Logos i Ethos
|
2012
|
issue 1(32)
63–79
EN
The goal of the paper is to evaluate a theory of cultural group selection, i.e. a theory which purports to explain an evolution of cultural artefacts (e.g. religious beliefs or ethical ideas). In order to realize this aim, the concept of the explanatory power of a theory T is introduced in the paper. The concept allows for two parameters: the extent of a theory, i.e., a quantity of phenomena explained by this theory, and a quantity of alternative theories explaining in an at least prima facie plausible way phenomena that belong to the extent of theory T. The argumentation pursued in the paper is supposed to justify three main claims: that the extent of the theory cultural group selection is not universal (because it does not embrace, e.g., scientific ideas); that there are other theories which explain plausibly the evolution of cultural artefacts; and that the two first claims do not undermine the value of the theory of cultural group selection. The last part of the paper is connected with the third claim: it is a case-study of the spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire; the study is based on the theory of cultural group selection and is to serve as an exemplification of a more general thesis which says that it is the competition of religious beliefs that can be especially fruitfully modeled by means of the theory of cultural group selection.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

On Social Rights from an Analytical and Philosophical Perspective

100%
Załuski W.
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
|
2016
|
vol. 2(13)
76-84
EN
The paper examines the concept of social rights from both the analytical and philosophical perspective. In the first part of the paper a distinction is made between social rights in the strict sense (called in the paper “Type 1 social rights”), which can be decomposed into the Hohfeldian incidents, and social rights which resemble norm-goals and therefore cannot be decomposed into the Hohfeldian incidents (these rights are called in the paper “Type 2 social rights”). It is argued that even though Type 1 social rights are rights in the strict sense, they exhibit certain idiosyncrasies distinguishing them from “classical” rights, among which the most striking idiosyncrasy is their double correlation to duties. The second, philosophical part presents various ways in which social rights can be justified. A special emphasis is laid on the justification appealing to the concept of autonomy. Some standard criticisms of social rights are also evaluated.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Why Moral Norms Cannot be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is”

100%
Załuski W.
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
|
2019
|
vol. 2(20)
63-74
EN
The paper aims at formulating a certain trilemma that applies to justifying moral norms. The trilemma can be succinctly stated as follows: any attempt to derive a “moral-ought-statement” from an “is-statement” with a justificatory goal (i.e. to justify the “moral-ought-statement”), even if it were successful in its “derivation” part (i.e. logically correct), would be unsuccessful in its “justificatory” part for one of the following three reasons: (1) it would consider each human action of which a factual statement can be made as morally obligatory, thus “justifying” a large number of implausible moral norms; or (2) it would presuppose a moral norm not derivable from facts; or (3) it would not explain why the distinction – made based on extra-moral criteria – between those factual statements about human actions from which moral norms can be derived and those from which they cannot be derived should count as morally relevant. The trilemma is illustrated in the paper by an analysis of Searle’s well-known attempt at deriving “ought” from “is”. Some further implications of the trilemma regarding the proper way of justifying moral norms are also examined.
PL
Celem artykułu jest sformułowanie pewnego trylematu dotyczącego uzasadniania norm moralnych. Trylemat ten można ująć zwięźle w następujący sposób: każda próba logicznego wywiedzenia zdania moralnego (formułującego nakaz lub zakaz określonego działania), ze zdania lub zdań faktualnych, nawet jeśli byłaby poprawna w swojej części logicznej, nie mogłaby stanowić jego uzasadnienia z jednego z trzech powodów: albo (1) prowadziłaby do uznania każdego typu czynu za moralnie nakazany lub zakazany, nie pozostawiając tym samym miejscu dla czynów moralnie obojętnych; albo (2) zakładałaby istnienie normy moralnej nie dającej się wyprowadzić ze zdań faktualnych; albo (3) nie tłumaczyłaby, dlaczego dokonana na podstawie poza-moralnych kryteriów dystynkcja między zdaniami faktualnymi mogącymi stanowić podstawę dla derywacji norm moralnych i zdaniami faktualnymi nie mogącymi stanowić takiej podstawy, miałaby zostać uznana za moralnie istotną. Trylemat ten zostaje w artykule zilustrowany w kontekście analizy znanej próby Searle’a wyprowadzenia norm z faktów. Artykuł kończą refleksje na temat implikacji trylematu dla sporu o właściwy sposób uzasadniania norm moralnych.
4
Content available remote

Solidarity: Its Levels of Operation, Relationship to Justice, and Social Causes

100%
Załuski W.
Diametros
|
2015
|
issue Diametros 43
96-102
EN
The paper provides an analysis of the relationship between the concepts of justice and solidarity. The point of departure of the analysis is Ruud ter Meulen’s claim that these concepts are different but mutually complementary, i.e. are two sides of the same coin. In the paper two alternative accounts of the relationship are proposed. According to the first one, solidarity can be defined in terms of justice, i.e. is a special variety of liberal justice, viz. social liberal justice, which, apart from the value of liberty, also stresses the importance of the value of equality. An example of such a theory is Rawls’s theory of justice, within which the value of equality is ‘encoded’ in the principle of fair equality of opportunity and in the difference principle. According to the second account, solidarity is an expression of a special type of social relationships – the so-called ‘thick relationships’, which (as opposed to ‘thin relationships’) are non-superficial, positive, their paradigmatic examples being family and friendship; in other words, the rules of solidarity are rules that are built into ‘thick relationships’. On the first account, justice and solidarity are not different, while on the second account they are different but mutually exclusive rather than mutually complementary. In the last part of the paper some remarks on the social causes of solidarity are made.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.