The study aims to analyse the issue of cloud computing in the light of the provisions of the Civil Code, in particular the legal qualification of an agreement on the provision of services in a cloud computing environment. The second aim of the text is to determine whether the agreement has the nature of an unnamed agreement (including a mixed agreement) or a named agreement. In the author's opinion, this issue has not yet been subject to any in-depth theoretical and legal analysis, although it is also of great practical value. It should be mentioned that a great number of cloud computing service contracts are concluded daily, i.e. from those related to e- mail, through contracts concerning office packages, or those enabling the use of social networking sites. It may be assumed in limine that the extensive casuistry of the contracts in question makes it difficult, if not impossible, to translate the conclusions of the analysis in question in an 'automatic' manner, both as far as the legal nature of the contract in question and the findings concerning its legal regime are concerned, It will be shown, however, that analogies can be found about how these contracts are concluded, their specific features or the categories of provisions they contain. Hence, this paper will first discuss the issue of the practice of entering into cloud computing contracts, and its conclusions will be used to assess the legal nature of the contracts in question and their legal regime
The digitisation of the art world and international markets has thrust lawyers into a paradox. They find themselves navigating the uncharted territory of non-fungible tokens (NFTs), cryptocurrencies and blockchains with tools designed in the twentieth century for a nineteenth-century model of the art trade. This paradox begs the question: can we sustain this model, or do we need to update our legal rules relating to export, import, trade restrictions and restitution to match the digital era? The principal question to be answered is whether EU law is, in this respect, fit for purpose? The import and export regulations and the cultural goods return directive were created with tangible objects in mind. As such, their applicability to objects that do not have a physical domicile is at least problematic. What is also important is that EU art trade laws serve two different purposes: the protection of the Member States’ national treasures and the protection of the EU market from illicit activities ranging from money laundering to terrorism financing. The prima facie answer to the principal question will differ in each of these two cases: it seems that the EU fails to grant adequate protection to intangible national treasures while at the same time dealing reasonably well with the security dimension.
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