The opinion presents the subject of the dispute and the judgment in the case C-187/16, the comparison of legal and factual situation related to that case with measures proposed in the governmental Bill as well as assessment on the significance of this judgment for further work on this Bill. The state of law being assessed in the case C-187/16 is comparable to measures included in the governmental Bill. The main difference is that Osterreichische Staatsdruckerei is a private company, whereas the company mentioned in Article 17 of the bill shall be a company wholly owned by the State Treasury. Therefore, in the author’s opinion it is possible to encompass production of given documents by the exemption provided in Article 12 para. 1 of the Directive 2014/24, but under additional conditions. If the Company is not considered an entity covered by this exemption, invoking the need to protect essential security interests of the state would require supplementing the grounds of the Bill by taking into account the position of the Court of Justice in the judgment C-187/16.
The opinion concerns the scope of the requirement to notify draft legislation. In an earlier opinion Bureau of Research of the Chancellery of the Sejm (BAS) said that the bill contained technical regulations within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2015/1535 and is subject to notification to the European Commission. The author indicates the provisions of the draft which must be classified as technical regulations. He claims that, due to the requirement to send to the Commission – in addition to the draft technical regulations – the text of the basic legislative or regulatory provisions principally and directly concerned, it is considered that the entire bill is subject to notification. The notification requirement also covers reasons why the measure is being introduced.
The author of the article observes that the provisions of TEU and TFEU do not envisage any role for national parliaments in the procedure of withdrawing from the European Union. In Poland, such rights can be interpreted from internal legal order of the Republic of Poland, for example from the act on cooperation between the Council of Ministers and Sejm and Senate. Sejm and Senate can request bills concerning the UK leaving the European Union from the Council of Ministers. In case a revision treaty is concluded, the procedure of ratification involving the Polish Parliament will be necessary. Such ratification will be also needed in case a new mixed agreement with the United Kingdom is concluded.
The author, following an analysis of Article 10 of the above‑mentioned Agreement, claims that the requirement of Article 89 (1) (5) of the Constitution has been met, which means that the Agreement should be ratified upon prior consent granted by statute. He concludes that the procedure for its ratification proposed by the Council of Ministers (Article 89(2) is improper.
The document aims at establishing a mechanism enabling the Union to respond when a third country, by measures affecting trade or investment, interferes with the legitimate choices of the Union or of its Member States to adopt or refrain from adopting a particular act. Given the exclusive nature of the EU’s competences in the area of the Common Commercial Policy, as well as the EU’s economic potential and the resulting potentially greater effectiveness of response measures at the EU level, the proposal deserves to be supported by the representative of the Republic of Poland on the EU forum.
The conditions for mechanisms of screening of foreign direct investments employed by EU Member States are set out in Article 3 of EU Regulation 2019/452 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union. The purpose of the article is to assess the consequences of this provision for Polish law, with particular emphasis on the possible need for legislative intervention to ensure its full effectiveness. The following requirements have been taken into consideration: non-discrimination, transparency, appropriate timeframes, protection of confidential information, ensuring the right of recourse, preventing circumvention of the screening mechanism. The analysis leads to a conclusion that the entry into force of Article 3 of Regulation 2019/452 does not require Polish legislation to be amended.
PL
Warunki, jakim mają odpowiadać mechanizmy filtrowania bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych stosowane przez państwa członkowskie UE, zostały określone w art. 3 rozporządzenia UE 2019/452 ustanawiającego ramy monitorowania bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych w Unii. Celem artykułu jest przeanalizowanie konsekwencji tego przepisu dla prawa polskiego ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem ewentualnej konieczności interwencji ustawodawcy w celu zapewnienia pełnej jego skuteczności. Analizie zostały poddane następujące wymogi: zakaz dyskryminacji, przejrzystość, odpowiednie ramy czasowe, ochrona informacji poufnych, zapewnienie prawa do odwołania oraz przeciwdziałanie obchodzeniu mechanizmu monitorowania. Przeprowadzona ocena prowadzi do wniosku, że wejście w życie art. 3 rozporządzenia nie pociąga za sobą konieczności zmian w ustawodawstwie polskim.
The author points out that, in the light of the information contained in the report, negative developments include the fact that a relatively large number of infringement proceedings are initiated and pending against Poland and that Poland has recently lost a relatively large number of cases in the Court of Justice. On the other hand positive aspects include a significant reduction in the number of proceedings for failure to implement directives in a timely manner and the fact that in the reporting period no judgment was issued against Poland for failure to implement the judgment of the Court of Justice.
The FCC took the position that it was bound by the judgments of the CJEU as long as the latter applied certain methods of interpretation and its judgments are not objectively arbitrary. In the case at hand, the FCC found that the CJEU manifestly failed to take into account the meaning and scope of the proportionality principle. Ultimately, the FCC independently assessed the ECB’s decisions in the light of primary EU law, while adjudicating on the consequences of finding them to be defective for the German authorities.
The European Commission has a mostly positive view of the draft EP regulation submitted by the European Parliament and states that many of the proposed changes consolidate current practice or introduce improvements. As regards some specific issues, the Commission made critical comments. Generally, the information of the Council of Ministers is in line with the opinion of the European Commission and deserves approval. The postulate contained in the information of the Council of Ministers to limit the scope of the concept of “maladministration” to violation of the right to good administration within the meaning of Art. 41 Charter of Fundamental Rights should be assessed negatively.
According to the author, in numerous aspects the assessment of the compliance with the Birds Directive can be carried out at the local level, taking into account elements such as habitat characteristics, the nature of the hunt or the degree of actual probability of the error due to the similarity of hunted and protected species. The thesis that pheasants and partridges can be considered as game only after the maturity of their own broods is too far-reaching. According to the author, the use of lead shot in areas of special protection may be considered incompatible with the protection requirements of these areas, and the practice of general exclusion of hunting plans from the requirement to undergo an impact assessment on a given area may be considered incompatible with the Habitats Directive.
Article 2.27 of Trans-Pacific Partnership (PTP) agreement, concerning the trade of products of modern biotechnology, cannot be interpreted in a way which would impose upon any of the Parties an obligation to adopt or amendment of laws, regulations or policies for the control of such products within its territory. This provision defines the behavior in the event of detection of occurrence, in a shipment of plants or plant products, of “low-level presence” of rDNA plant material. It does not apply, however, to a plant or plant products that is a medicine or medical products. This provision do not also apply to animals and products of animal origin.
The article examines the legal consequences of Protocol (No 30) on the application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom. The author notes that the Charter does not merely confirm the fundamental rights previously recognized in EU law, but also introduces new ones. In the light of this statement it is proposed, that – according to article 1(1) of the Protocol – the Charter does not extend the ability of given courts to examine the compliance of laws and practices of Poland and the UK with the Charter, as far as it introduces these new rights. Article 1(2) of the Protocol excludes the possibility of litigation based on provisions of title IV of the Charter. Article 2 of the Protocol aims at preventing the EU from imposing changes of national laws and practices in certain areas. In the light of provisions of the Charter (particularly article 52(6)) it is however doubtful, whether article 2 constitutes any genuine modification of legal obligations. Finally, the author notes, that according to the predominant view it would be theoretically possible for the Court of Justice of the EU to diminish or even deprive the Protocol of actual practical consequences by making use of general principles of EU law. This however might be regarded as a circumvention of primary EU law and as such deserves negative opinion.
The subject of this article is the interpretation of Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. In the analysis, the author specifically focuses on Article 4 para. 4 of the Directive, which relates to how a national competition authority is selected. This provision requires that the procedure for selection or appointment be specified in advance in the legislation, be clear and precise. However, according to the author, this does not exclude the possibility of the political nature of the selection process of the candidate, the determination of his professional competence, involvement in political activities, or the term of the elected body.
The Deputies’ Draft Resolution under consideration calls on the Polish government to withdraw from the Ottawa Treaty and to return to the use of anti-personnel mines as part of the engineering preparation of border areas. The author concludes that although European Union law does not provide for an explicit obligation to accede to the Ottawa Convention, the EU is working towards universal adherence to the Convention and its effective application. Denunciation of the Ottawa Convention would therefore deviate from the standard of conduct of the other Member States that are party to the Convention. Denunciation of the Convention could be seen as a violation of the obligation to strengthen and develop mutual political solidarity, as well as the obligation to refrain from actions that would be contrary to the interests of the European Union.
The communication of the Council of the European Union notifies national parliaments of the European Parliament’s proposals for amendments to the treaties. The proposed changes are numerous and of varying degrees of importance and detail. In terms of institutional and procedural changes, they can be seen as being in line with current trends in the evolution of the EU. The implications of some of the proposals may be questionable from a legal point of view, e.g., the mode of modification of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU by means of a revision treaty, which is unknown to European Union law, or the introduction of the principle that the treaty would enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by the governments of four-fifths of the Member States (and not by the governments of all States).
Zasada neutralności zawarta w art. 345 TFUE pozostawia państwom członkowskim decyzję dotyczącą prywatnej lub publicznej formy własności przedsiębiorstw. Z czasem zaczęto zauważać, że znaczenie tej zasady uległo erozji w praktyce instytucji wspólnotowych. W poniższym artykule zbadano, w jaki sposób Trybunał Sprawiedliwości stosuje tę zasadę w obszarze swobodnego przepływu kapitału, a dokładniej – w jakim stopniu ta swoboda rynku wewnętrznego podważa znaczenie zasady neutralności. W konkluzji stwierdzono, że po wyroku w sprawie Essent znaczenie zasady zostało zredukowane, o ile nie zanegowane, co jest trudne do pogodzenia z dyspozycją art. 345 TFUE.
EN
The principle of neutrality, embodied in Article 345 TFEU, leaves to the Member States the decision concerning private or public form of ownership of enterprises. Over the years it has been argued that the pertinence of the principle has faded in the practice of EU institutions. The following contribution examines how this principle is applied by the Court of Justice in the area of the free movement of capital, and more specifically – to what extent this internal market freedom undermines the principle of neutrality. It has been concluded that after the Essent judgment the status of the principle has been further reduced, if not rendered nugatory, which is difficult to reconcile with Article 345 TFEU.
The draft regulation aims to establish a modernised screening mechanism for foreign investments by repealing and replacing the regulation that currently governs the issue. Among the most important modifications are imposing an obligation on Member States to establish screening mechanisms and define their minimum requirements, as well as extending screening to intra-EU investments subject to foreign control. The draft also sets out rules for cooperation between Member States (and the Commission) on foreign investments that may negatively affect security or public order. In the author’s opinion, the effects of the EU document will be in line with its objectives, so that it will lead to the sealing and, consequently, the increase of the effectiveness of security and public order protection mechanisms through investment screening.
In the aspect of compatibility with the UE law it has been pointed out that to the extent the project aims to exclude certain categories of prints and documents from the regulation of Directive 2014/24, it may be considered incompatible with this directive. It was recommended to suspend work on the bill until the CJEU delivers its judgment concerning case C-187/16. Furthermore in the aspect of compatibility with the rules of criminal procedure it was considered that the advantage of the proposed normative solution of Article 40 para. 3 is the pragmatic linking of access to evidence with the principles of procedural economy, i.e. the guarantee of access to material evidence is conditioned by the objectives of the criminal proceedings.
The Polish Constitution does not provide for the existence of regional parliaments with legislative competences in Poland. The chambers of the Polish Parliament are therefore not obliged to hold consultations under Article 6 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. However, members of self-governing representative bodies are members of the EU’s Committee of the Regions, which can bring an action before the Court of Justice of the EU for violation of the principle of subsidiarity by an EU act and can also take a position on the compliance of EU action with the principle of subsidiarity as an advisory body.
The authors analyse the European Commission’s proposal to activate the so-called ‘money for the rule of law’ mechanism against Hungary. It recommends to the Council of the EU to withhold 65% of EU funds to Hungary for the implementation of three operational programmes under the cohesion policy. As a direct consequence of the proposal, there could be a debate in the EU Council on the merits of imposing EU budget protection measures on Hungary. The proposed EU budget protection measures are considered to contain phrases that are evaluative in nature. They therefore require strict interpretation. The Government of the Republic of Poland expressed a negative position regarding the adoption of the Commission’s proposed implementing decision.
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.