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EN
In this article, the authors show several of the links between the social theory of judgment and choice, which is an integral part of generalized game theory (GGT), and the seminal work of Herbert Simon (1955; 1956; 1967) and Daniel Tversky and Amos Kahneman (1974; 1981). Although Simon and Tversky and Kahneman made occasional references to 'norms' and the social situation, neither of the approaches particularly recognized or stressed the social conditions of judgment and choice. Social institutional and role concepts as well as 'sacrality' and human passions were basically alien ideas (although Simon (1967) wrote an important paper on emotions and choice). Such social science concepts are part and parcel of social choice theory (a core part of GGT). This short paper cannot fully elaborate on all of these matters. The authors limit themselves on a few 'social facts' that play a critical role in human judgment and choice. It presents applications elaborating on the Simon and Tversky and Kahneman conceptualizations, but also identifying important differences. This serves to define in part the generality and scope of GGT. The emphasis in this paper is on different choice models arising under different contextual conditions. The human world is characterized by a pluralism of models (but a pluralism which is finite). The article provides a formulation of several distinct context-dependent choice models - in this sense, it is a generative theory - distinguishable in terms of the properties of elementary judgment and judgment modalities. Some models represent classical determinate decision theory with full quantification and commensurability of evaluative judgments; and the principle of the maximization of expected value (or utility) is applied to choice and decisions. Other models involve judgments which are quantified or non-quantified but not commensurable and integratable and where actors apply special algorithms of multi-criteria decision-making. Still other models involve non-quantification and noncommensurability but partial ordering of value judgments on diverse dimensions with actors using particular algorithms to make judgments and reach choices. In general, this paper applies GGT in the spirit of Simon and Tversky and Kahneman to multi-value (multi-criteria) choice as a part of complex decision-making processes. The paper provides illustrations of several new types of choice models.
EN
Game theory can be viewed as an important contribution to multi-agent modeling, with widespread applications in economics and other social sciences. This paper presents two distinct approaches to extending – sociologizing – classical game theory: firstly, a system/institutional approach – social science game theory (SGT), and secondly, Erving Goffman’s interactionist approach (I-game theory). The two approaches are presented and compared; they are also contrasted with the classical theory. The article ends by concluding that due to the social science game theory, sociologists and social scientists are no longer forced into the classical straightjacket with its hyper-rationality, anomic players, and the absence of any social fabric (institutional and cultural formations). Moreover, the new game theory offers a reliable toolbox of social science concepts and methods for describing, analyzing, and explaining highly diverse interaction phenomena. We claim that those two approaches have already proved themselves useful for investigating and modeling a variety of interaction processes including cooperation, conflict, and negotiation.
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