Philosophical theories of emotions have problems in explaining emotional reactions to fictitious events. We demonstrate the problem of all propositional theories and suggest a solution that is based on a perceptual account. We illustrate the problems of propositional theories by pointing out logical inconsistencies, as well as unclarities with the immediacy of emotional reactions to fiction. We explain how perceptual account, enriched by a specific form of intentionality, offers an elegant solution to the basic problem of coordination between an occurrence of emotion and belief about its fictitious origin. By the way of concluding we point it as still unresolved issues.
We present the embodied appraisal theory of emotions and show how it handles a variety of intuitions we hold about affective states. While appreciating its integrative potential, we point out possible difficulties that it might face from further investigation of embodied non-emotional states. Following Darwin and his work on the expression of emotions, we suggest that some obviously non-emotional mental states comply with the criteria set by Prinz's theory. Therefore it is doubtful whether his definition of emotions is correct and whether perceptual approaches are useful in explicating the nature of emotion types.