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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2017
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vol. 72
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issue 4
245 – 258
EN
The paper deals with Newton’s eight definitions from his Principia making them a subject of logical-semantic and epistemological analyses. First, it lists these definitions and then presents two views on the nature of definition, as given in recent scholarly works. These views are applied to Newton’s definitions. Resulting from this application is the conclusion that Transparent Intensional Logic’s approach to definitions, once the latter contain magnitudes, is unable to reconstruct the fact that the magnitude (or magnitudes) in the defining is (are) different from the magnitude in the definiendum. Another result is the recognition that Newton’s eight definitions, regardless of their a priori nature, still yield an increase of knowledge about the world. This conclusion is justified by Newton’s computation of the mass of planets and his reflection on the possibility of space flight.
EN
The paper compares Carnap's and Hempel's Standard Conception of Scientific Theories with Newton's method of theory construction as applied in his Principia. It is shown that the latter is built, contrary to Carnap's and Hempel's views, by a cyclical method.
EN
Chapter II of Borbone’s book addresses Nowak’s innovative views and reconstruction of the methods used in Marx’s economic works, namely, Marx’s delineation of the law of value, as well as Marx’s explanation based on this law as performed by the method of gradual concretization. In Chapter III, Borbone provides a comparison of Nowak’s approach to scientific laws and scientific explanation with that of Hempel. From that comparison Nowak’s approach comes out as superior to that of Hempel due to the former’s ability to reconstruct laws containing equations, the possibility to address the issue of the explanation of a scientific law from other scientific laws, as well as a more fine-grained view on the very nature scientific explanation.
Sociológia (Sociology)
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2017
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vol. 49
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issue 3
243 – 264
EN
The article analyses the methods employed in causal reasoning in sociology, which can be viewed as analytic. As a paradigmatic example of these methods, the Simon-Blalock method is examined. First, those characteristics of a method of science that turn it into an analytic method are delineated. Then the article offers a general characteristic of methods of causal reasoning as employed in sociology and shows why they can be viewed as being analytic by their very nature. Finally, the article shows how Durkheim combined analytic methods applied to egoistic suicide with nonanalytic methods in his causal reasoning about this type of suicide.
EN
The paper, as a continuation of the paper (Hanzel I., Carnap and Newton: Two approaches to the method of theory construction (Part I), ORGANON F, 2, 2009), provides a methodological generalization of Newton's method of theory construction as applied in Book I and Book III of his 'Principia'. It reconstructs also the method of measures applied in those books. Finally, it shows that Book I and Book III of the Principia can be viewed as a hierarchically organized sequence of gradually shifting constructions, and thus that the term 'harmonic law' inside these books changes its meaning.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2019
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vol. 74
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issue 2
126 – 138
EN
In my paper I present a new view on the Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), namely, from the point of view of Carnap’s so-called logic of science understood by him as logic of the language of science and, to be more specific, logic of the language of empirical science. First, I present Carnap’s project of the logic of science and show that it was not realized on the basis of Carnap’s semantics of intension and extension. Next, I show the negative effects of the absence of this realization for the philosophy of empirical science as it became apparent in the dispute between P. K. Feyerabend and C. G. Hempel. Finally, I indicate the set of issues that TIL could solve in the future by realizing Carnap’s (reformed) project.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 9
801-812
EN
The aim of this paper is to show the incompleteness of the exclusively logico-syntactical and logico-semantical approaches to one of the core issues of philosophy of science, namely, scientific laws and scientific explanation in C. G. Hempel works. The author starts with a brief exposition of the main characteristics of Hempel approach (labeled 'the D-N model') to the deductive explanations based on the universal scientific laws and then analyzes the problems and paradoxes inherent in this approach. Next, he traces these characteristics back to the Hempel and Carnap attempts to ground the concepts of scientific law and explanation exclusively on logic (i.e. logical syntax and/or logical semantics), which led to a highly normative approach alienated from the practice of real science.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2009
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vol. 64
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issue 7
646-657
EN
The aim of the paper is to discuss the views, which approach of the qualitative or quantitative methods in social sciences is either separable, or irreconcilable. At first, the author gives an outline of those views and shows, how they deal with various aspects of the qualitative/quantitative divide. Next, he tries to indicate the roots of that divide in the works of Herbert Blumer. Further, his analysis of the categories of quantity, quality, and measure is designed to show that the divide in question is based on a wrong, one-sided understanding of the qualitative as well as quantitative approaches, which in fact can neither be separated nor conceived as contradictory.
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