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1

Historical Sources of the Classical Conception of Truth in Thomas Aquinas

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Pawlikowski T.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2007
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vol. 16
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issue 1(61)
95-109
EN
Thomas Aquinas undertook to examine various definitions of truth in 'Quaestiones disputate', 'De veritate', q.1, a.1; 'Scriptum super I Librum Sententiarum', dist.19, q.5, a.1; 'Summa theologiae', I, q.16, a. 1,2. In these writings Thomas relied on four formulations of truth that were used in his time, namely (i) a definition by Isaac Israeli in 'Liber de definitionibus', par.26, and the formula of the principle of the excluded middle found in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics', IV, 7; (ii) a definition by Avicenna in 'Metaphysics', I, 8; (iii) a definition given by Saint Anselm in his 'De veritate', 11; and (iv) a definition proposed by Saint Augustine in 'Soliloquia', II, 5. After analyzing and comparing them all, the Angelic Doctor adopted the well known definition: 'veritas est aqaequatio rei et intellectus'. It is interesting to note that before this formula won common acceptance, no single definition of truth had been universally recognized either in philosophy or theology. Moreover, as some pronouncements of Albert the Great indicate, it had not been common to assume that truth consists in the agreement between an intellectual judgment of a state of affairs and the state of affairs itself. Consequently, it seems right to claim that the classical concept of truth can be traced as far back as Thomas Aquinas.
2

The Principles of Psychology According to Saint Thomas Aquinas

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Pawlikowski T.
Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Mysli Spolecznej (Archives of the History of Philosophy and of Social Thought)
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2007
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vol. 52
33-58
EN
Saint Thomas Aquinas' exposition of the principles of psychology given in his Commentary on Aristotle's 'De Anima' concerns three questions: a) the subjective and objective purpose of a psychological analysis; b) the methods (demonstration of fact, causal demonstration, composition or synthesis of informations to prepare a definition); c) the subject of this science, which the soul is. The subjective purpose is a benefit to a philosopher's intellect, because understanding is an intellectual good. The objective purpose is a benefit to the whole system of sciences, because the science concerning the soul at its consequence makes a metaphysical, ethical and physical cognition develop. The result of his consideration on a subject and methods of psychology (principally consideration on the definition of feeling which is an operation done by soul and body together) is that Aquinas concludes the science about soul is a part of physics. This conclusion allow us to say now a rational psychology is a fundamental part of philosophical antropology which concerns a human being and specific human operations.
3

Stoic and Epicurean Elements in the Theory of Knowledge of Thomas Aquinas

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Pawlikowski T.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2005
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vol. 14
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issue 2(54)
85-102
EN
An interpretation which Thomas Aquinas has offered as a solution of the problem of 'cognitive apprehesions' (conceptiones) of the human intellect bears clear marks of an Epicurean-Stoic understanding of 'prolepseis' and 'ennoiai' insofar as it underscores a specific innate character of 'conceptiones communes' and 'conceptiones universales' as evidenced by their anticipatory function. Some conceptiones are what we call today propositions, very much like Augustine's 'notiones' or Epicurean-Stoic 'prolepseis', or 'katalepseis'. Such concepts cannot be found in Aristotle who, moreover, did not have terms with which he could identify 'cognitive apprehesions'. He discusses concepts as a separate topic in the context of the origin and nature of the universals (katholou), and regards propositions which are not distinguished from sentences (logos) as either affirmations (kataphasis) or negations (apophasis). Aquinas took over from Aristotle the idea that all human knowledge originates in the experience of being, and from Stoics and Epicureans the conception of the anticipatory nature of human cognitive concepts. He merged these two traditions with the help of Augustinian conception of illumination, a theory of 'conceptiones universales' and a theory of transcendental concepts and first principles which he called 'conceptiones communes'.
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