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Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec zabiegów Rosji o wyłączne wpływy w Mandżurii (październik 1901 r. – sierpień 1903 r.)

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Damski P. P.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
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2012
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issue 89
23-52
EN
After the collapse of the ‘Boxer Rebellion’, Russia wanted to take an advantage of the fact that hers troops occupied Manchuria and to obtain the exclusive influence in this country. This was contrary to the Open Door policy which had been declared by the United States, Japan, Great Britain and other European Powers, including the Russian Empire, since 1899. These had made London to rethink his own policy in the Far East. British hadn’t much interests in Manchuria. However, in their point of view rise of Russian power in China would destabilize situ¬ation in the Celestial Empire and encourage other Powers to ‘curving a Chinese pie’. It would affect British interests in Qing’s State which were larger than any other Power. Russian railway businesses and her ambition in North-East China were also a danger to similar British investments. This was one of the reasons to abandon a policy of so called ‘splendid isolation’. First visible effect of this decision was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 30th, 1902. The treaty was a defensive one but clearly anti-Russian. Simultaneously Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Marquess of Lansdowne, raised that Russian policy was contrary to the Open Door policy. In fact Britain was concerned on defending her own interests instead of Open Door which was only a slogan for her. During February and March of 1902 London wasn’t able to develop a common policy with his ally – Japan, and also with the United States which appeal for the ‘open door’ once again (February 1st, 1902). St Petersburg took the opportunity and published with Paris the Franco-Russian Declaration of March 16th, 1902. Foreign Office was ready to deal with Russian Government, but the tenacity of the latter convinced Whitehall that Britain should act in accord with Tokyo and Washington. This made Russia to sign an agreement with China on April 8th, 1902. Between April 8th, 1902 and April 8th, 1903 British were waiting and observing the results of Russian evacuation from Manchuria. At this time they weren’t especially concerned about the situation in North-East China as far as Russians were accomplishing the terms of the agreement. They only singed a commercial treaty with the Celestial Empire of September 5th, 1902. This was changed by St Petersburg announcement about new terms of evacuation of Russian soldiers (April 8th, 1903). This time London, as well as Washington, didn’t force Russia to fulfil her treaty obligations. Only Tokyo whose interests were most endangered strongly opposed Russia’s plans. Lansdowne who was planning an agreement with France was also thinking about rapprochement with Russia. Lack of strong reaction from Washington on St Petersburg’s demands convinced Whitehall of rightness of his own policy. British abandoned the phrase of Open Door and de facto recognized Russian influences in Manchuria in the Lansdowne’s proposition of July 29th, of 1903. Russia answered with formation of the Far Eastern Viceroyalty. This had ended the first attempt of British-Russian rapprochement but didn’t stop Franco-British talks which leaded to so called Entente Cordiale of April 8th, 1904. It proves that Britain hadn’t been committed to the Open Door policy which was only an in¬strument securing her interests in Qing’s Empire. The alliance with Japan had the same task. When British politicians had realized that both instruments hadn’t brought expected results they started to search a better way to secure British interests. The only reasonable step for Whitehall, who wanted to avoid a war, was an agreement with Russia.
2
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Klio czuje. Refleksje nad historią międzynarodową na przykładzie problemu emocji

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Damski P. P.
Historyka Studia Metodologiczne
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2022
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vol. 52
409-434
EN
The article presents the issue of researching emotions in international history. It has been noticed that the development of the research on emotions within other sub‑disciplines of history, humanities, social sciences and neuroscience, provides an international historian with many outcomes enabling further research opportunities. At the same time, it was indicated that the tools traditionally used by historians (i.e., internal and external critique of the sources, and the intuitive approach) may be useful in conducting such research. A historian who decides to deal with the problem of emotions, is, however, forced to pay special attention to the context in which the people whose lives he examines functioned. Therefore, the research on emotions, also in the international context, requires greater awareness of the achievements of other academic disciplines from the historian. This task is difficult and perhaps demands from the historian that they be more sensitive and intuitive than in case of other studies. Nevertheless, by approaching the issue of emotions, international historians have a chance to obtain a more credible image of the past.
3
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Konsekwencje "rajdu Jamesona" dla stosunków brytyjsko-burskich (styczeń-kwiecień 1896 r.)

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Damski P. P.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Historica
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2010
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issue 85
147-162
EN
Period between January and April 1896 in Boer-British relations was more specific than other ones. Great Britain stood in face of difficult situation because of “Jameson raid". British South African Company troops had invaded formally friendly state, which had serious economic bonds with German Empire and even developed friendly relations with it. In such case Britain’s most significant issue was to calm down the situation and to stress that South Africa was still area British of influence. That’s why secretary of state for the colonies - Joseph Chamberlain, was very careful relating to Transvaal and stressed that British Empire dissociated itself from the action of BSAC, and it would help in any way. On the other hand he aggressively react on Kruger Telegram. In 17th January 1896, some of British subjects inhabitants of Witwatersrand came up an idea in which president should visit to London to explain all misunderstandings, that had gathered long before the raid. Both sides were positive to this idea, but Chamberlain wanted only to explain all difficulties between Empire and its protectorate. Kruger had other vision. He demanded an invitation and promise that Article IV of London Convention 1884 would be changed. Secretary Chamberlain sent the invitation but he could not agree at president’s conditions as far as Convention was concerned. Finally at 27th April Kruger refused visit to London and Cabinet withdrew the invitation. The discussion over Article IV did not finish after Kruger’s withdrawal from the idea of presidential visit. Transvaal came out with its new interpretation. British rightly saw, that it might threat their interests, and they even might lose their suzerainty over South African Republic. Because of that they opposed the idea. Dispute was partly solved in 1898 by settlement which gave Transvaal more freedom in its international politics. The attitude of both sides was more and more uncompromising, and the zenith of it took place at Bloemfontein Conference at 1899.
PL
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza relacji brytyjsko-burskich po „rajdzie Jamesona” - od stycznia do kwietnia 1896 r. - krótkim, ale istotnym okresie działań politycznych rządu JKM i prezydenta Transwalu Paulusa Krügera. Podjęta wtedy przez każdą ze stron próba zmiany statusu stosunków wzajemnych ujawniła pogłębiającą się sprzeczność interesów.
4
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Obecność emocji w polityce zagranicznej państwa. Studium komparatystyczne wilhelmińskich Niemiec oraz Stanów Zjednoczonych w okresie prezydentury Donalda J. Trumpa

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Damski P. P.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2024
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vol. 56
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issue 2
179-201
EN
The article aims to draw attention to the fact that the presence of emotions in a state’s foreign policy is not a new phenomenon but has also occurred in the past. It is pointed out that emotions accompanied the creation of foreign policy in Wilhelmine Germany and the USA during the era of Donald J. Trump’s presidency at the intra-governmental and international levels. They were a manifestation of individual human preferences as well as a conscious political tool. Emotional expression, however, remained dependent on the cultural framework of the time and place in which they operated.
PL
Artykuł zwraca uwagę, iż obecność emocji w polityce zagranicznej państwa nie jest zjawiskiem nowym, lecz miała miejsce także w przeszłości. Wskazano, iż emocje towarzyszyły kreowaniu polityki zagranicznej wilhelmińskich Niemiec i USA doby prezydentury Donalda J. Trumpa na płaszczyźnie wewnątrzrządowej i międzynarodowej. Były one przejawem indywidualnych ludzkich preferencji, jak i świadomym narzędziem politycznym. Ekspresja emocjonalna pozostawała jednak zależna od ram kulturowych czasu i miejsca, w których funkcjonowały.
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