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EN
A presentation of the growing conflict between King Stanislaw August and his long–term favourite and zealous collaborator, F. K. Branicki, a royal protege who in 1774 was appointed the grand hetman of the Crown. The career pursued by Branicki was also affected by the protection of the court in St. Petersburg. From 1774 in particular Branicki enjoyed the protection and friendship of Grigorii Potemkin, an influential favourite of Catherine II, thanks to whom he increased the prerogatives of his office.The first misunderstandings between Stanislaw August and Branicki went back to his mission to France, where he was dispatched by the king (November 1772) but did not adhere to the royal instructions. Nonetheless, in the course of the next two years the king and Branicki continued to cooperate, with the latter becoming a member of a full fledged parliamentary Delegation in which he fulfilled the function of the head of the regalists. In 1774 Branicki travelled to St. Petersburg upon the request of the king, and in the latter's interests; the objectives of the trip included preventing the establishment of the Permanent Council which could limit the king's prerogatives. Ultimately, Stanislaw August came to terms with the Council, established in April 1775, and even perceived in it a core of future executive power in the state; Branicki, however, became its fervent opponent and envisaged the Council as a factor limiting the license of the ministers. He also joined the so–called magnate opposition which remained hostile towards the Council and the monarch. In time, he befriended two leaders of the magnate opposition: Adam Kazimierz Czatoryski and Ignacy Potocki. The fact that the protector of the Council was Otto Stackelberg, the Russian ambassador to Warsaw, produced growing antagonism between him and Branicki. Stackelberg could not bear the fact that Branicki was boasting of his relations in St. Petersburg. In the middle of 1775, Branicki heeded a request made by Potemkin and set off for Moscow. Upon his return, he made it obvious that he enjoyed the great support of the Russian ruler. Stackelberg decided to tackle Branicki in St. Petersburg where he arrived in January 1776. A month later he was followed by Branicki, together with I. Potocki, who intended to counter the campaign conducted by the ambassador. The latter, however, proved capable of winning the support of Catherine II. Once in Poland, they announced, however, that Russia would not intervene in domestic Polish questions by resorting to force, and thus encouraged the magnate opposition to actively participate at the deputy dietines in July 1776. The conflict between Branicki and Stackelberg influenced the ambassador's decision to draw closer to Stanislaw August as regards the question of the future Seym. The discord between Branicki and the king grew, with the latter determined to considerably limit the authority enjoyed by the hetman. This policy was carried out at the confederate Parliament of 1776, when the magnate opposition, i. a. due to Russian pressure, was overcome and the hetmans lost their rights in favour of the Military Department of the Permanent Council.
EN
By benefiting from Polish helplessness, Austria and Prussia annexed more territory than was foreseen in the partition treaty of St. Petersburg (5 August 1772) and the cession treaties, which Poland was compelled to sign in September 1773. Only Russia adhered to the treaty frontiers and refused to recognise Austrian and Prussian usurpation. In practice, Russia left the determination of the frontiers between Poland, Austria and Prussia to negotiations between those states, and limited her role to unofficially urging the Poles towards compromise. The pro-Prussian Panin also moderated the stand represented by Catherine II, who felt offended by the Austrian and Prussian rejection of her suggestions, and explained to her that Frederick II had carried out his usurpation only for the sake of maintaining an equilibrium between the acquisitions of all three partitioning powers. Upon the basis of Prussian, Russian, Austrian, Polish and French diplomatic correspondence preserved in archives or published, the author presented the course of events in the years 1775-1776. The point of departure is composed of fears and rumours relating to a further expansion of Prussian and Austrian usurpation; the negotiations impasse lasted throughout almost the whole of 1775, when Frederick the Great grew convinced that both German powers would retain their acquisitions. The breakthrough took place in the middle of November 1775, when upon the initiative of Chancellor Kaunitz Austria, striving towards improved relations with Russia, decided to propose returning certain terrains. The latter were sufficiently large for the Polish negotiators, whom Stackelberg persuaded to agree (5 January 1776). Poland regained the town of Kazimierz and 120 sq. m. between the Vistula and the Bug. Frederick the Great who declared that he would return his supra-treaty acquisitions as long as Austria would do the same now had to follow the Austrian example. Nonetheless, he tried to return as a little as possible. He also counted on the fact that his brother, Henry, already on his way to St. Petersburg, would be capable of gaining favourable conditions, and thus for a long time refused to commence negotiations with Poland. The mission conducted by Prince Henry succeeded owing to the fact that both he and Frederick the Great had become indispensable for Catherine II in her quest for finding a wife for her recently widowed son. Hence the proposals devised by Panin and addressed to Prince Henry were only slightly beneficial for Poland, while in the course of the negotiations conducted in Warsaw since the end of April, the Prussian side reduced her concessions even further. Austria did not come to Poland's assistance, and Stackelberg, hampered by the attitude of his superiors, demonstrated only weak support for the Polish negotiators whom he persuaded to agree to the Prussian conditions. The Polish negotiators resisted for long, but ultimately, on 22 August 1776, they were forced to sign a convention which restored to Poland only one-fifth of the Prussian usurped acquisition.
EN
The article focuses attention on an analysis of the concepts of peasant 'freedom' and 'ownership', used at the time. Both those terms are frequently encountered, particularly in statements criticising the status of the 'servile' peasants deprived of protected 'ownership'. 'Servitude' was comprehended not as serfdom, but as its most acute symptoms, i. e. unlimited subjection vis a vis the lords, including the ascription of the peasants and their offspring to the land, the absence of protection by the public authorities, and the lack of access to the state court system. On the other hand, 'freedom' was comprehended not necessarily as the abolition of the aforementioned ascription, but as a partial loosening of the bonds and as the unhampered right of the peasant sons to decide about their fate, restrictions of the patrimonial court system, particularly as regards the gravest penal cases, the expansion of the rural self-government, and state protection for the peasants. The postulate of 'freedom' never signified even the least political rights. 'Freedom' was also conceived as a permanent regulation of peasant obligations towards the lords proportionately to the owned land. Regulation was also envisaged as a protection of 'freedom', offering the peasants the certainty that part of their produce would remain in their possession and not be approximated due to the lord's arbitrary decisions. The heart of the matter concerned the immunity of peasant revenues obtained from their plots. Moreover, the process of granting the peasants 'freedom' was perceived as a guarantee of a permanent lease of their plots with the right of bequeathing them to their heirs, as well as the right to alienation, albeit only with the consent of the lords. Only a few statements made at the time of the Four Years' Seym include fragments which may be interpreted as postulates calling for full ownership. The reformers basically represented a stand claiming that land was the property of the lords. Despite its rather limited contents the reform programme was sometimes depicted in a highly exaggerated form. The rather constrained changes in the position of the peasants were frequently portrayed as steps which opened up perspectives of great prosperity for the peasantry, the lords and the whole country. Overwhelming gentry opinion treated all postulates of such changes as a threat of liberty for the peasants, which would topple the existing socioeconomic system and facilitate the introduction of royal absolutum dominium. At the time of the Duchy of Warsaw and the constitutional Kingdom of Poland the programme of peasant reforms never exceeded the framework delineated in the preceding century. There were no calls for enfranchisement, and the abolition of the ascription of the peasantry to the land, introduced by Napoleon, was sharply criticised.
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