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EN
The paper deals with the issue of price discrimination in the theory of economics. Although price discrimination is a heterogenous notion, Mokrogulski says, its different types can be presented in an integrated model with respect to the quantity and quality of a product as well as commodity bundling. Price discrimination is not the same as price differentiation, the author says. In particular, price discrimination does not occur when the differences in prices fully reflect the differences in production costs. If the seller is unable to make a consumer buy a specific version of the offered product, then a self-selection mechanism is applied. The goods and their prices are differentiated in such a manner that consumers choose versions somewhat pre-planned for them. In the empirical part of the paper, Mokrogulski checks a hypothesis about the existence of price discrimination on the Polish market for new automobiles. Cars are increasingly offered as a package transaction that includes transport services and various extras such as air-conditioning and electric windows. As it is impossible to separate the two parts of the package, Mokrogulski says, price arbitrage cannot be applied, while demand arbitrage is possible. To check if price discrimination indeed took place, differences between the listed prices of two versions of the same car model were calculated. Then they were compared with the differences in the actual prices. “The results predominately confirm that car dealers use a further segmentation of customers, who usually have to pay for certain luxury extras,” Mokrogulski writes. Further empirical research is needed, the author concludes, to analyze the problem of price discrimination in other markets with a different level of competition and a different stage of development.
EN
The article delves into what the author terms a deposit war in the Polish banking sector, a process that has been under way since 2008, according to Mokrogulski. The author analyzes the causes and outcomes of the process. The research is mainly quantitative and incorporates a single­‑equation econometric model. However, the analysis is also comparative in nature, Mokrogulski says, because the Polish banking sector is evaluated against its counterparts in other EU member states. The analysis is supplemented with institutional issues related to financial supervision in Poland. The author’s calculations show that the “deposit war” mostly applies to deposits with maturities ranging from one to six months. Due to interest rate rises, banks reported a significant increase in their short­‑term deposit volumes, the author says. His models show that an increase in interest on deposits by 1 percentage point led to an average growth of the deposit volume by 2.7 % on a monthly basis. In the case of deposits with original maturities of over 1M up to 3M the growth was 5.4 %, the author says. Moreover, despite higher interest costs at the time of the deposit war, the financial condition of Polish banks did not deteriorate compared with their counterparts in other countries in Europe, according to Mokrogulski. Liquidity measures introduced by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF) additionally encouraged banks to maintain liquid assets and funds at sufficiently high levels. In the future, providing long­‑term funding to banks could help prevent further deposit wars, the author concludes.
PL
Celem artykułu jest ukazanie zjawiska wojny depozytowej w polskim sektorze bankowym od roku 2008 wraz z podaniem genezy zjawiska oraz próbą oceny skutków. Badanie koncentruje się na ilościowym opisie zachodzących procesów i zawiera jednorównaniowy model ekonometryczny. W pracy dokonano również oceny sektora bankowego w Polsce na tle innych krajów Unii Europejskiej. Analiza ma zatem również charakter porównawczy. Całość uzupełniono o wątek instytucjonalny związany z działalnością nadzoru nad rynkiem finansowym w Polsce. Z przeprowadzonych obliczeń wynika, że wojna depozytowa dotyczyła przede wszystkim terminów pierwotnych powyżej 1 miesiąca do 3 miesięcy oraz powyżej 3 miesięcy do 6 miesięcy. W związku z podwyżką oprocentowania, banki zanotowały znaczący wzrost wolumenu lokat dla ww. tenorów. Wyniki modelowania pokazały, że wzrost oprocentowania depozytów o 1 pp. implikował zwiększenie wolumenu depozytów przeciętnie o 2,7 % w skali miesiąca. W przypadku depozytów o terminie pierwotnym (1M; 3M> ów wzrost wynosił 5,4 %. Ponadto, pomimo zwiększenia kosztów odsetkowych w okresie wojny depozytowej, banki w Polsce nie odnotowały spadku wyników finansowych na tle banków europejskich. Dodatkowym czynnikiem zachęcającym banki do utrzymywania odpowiednio wysokiego poziomu płynnych środków są normy płynnościowe Komisji Nadzoru Finansowego (KNF), wprowadzone w 2008 r. W przyszłości powstawaniu wojen depozytowych może zapobiegać pozyskanie przez banki finansowania długoterminowego.
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