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1

From Realism to Arealism (II). Epistemological Realism Through Linguistic Peephole

100%

Oleksy M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2003

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vol. 11

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issue 1

75-88

PL

In this article I demonstrate that philosophy illuminated by the Linguistic Turn is no better suited to solve the epistemological problem of realism than was transcendental epistemology. The bulk of this paper concerns a polemic with Hintikka's vision of the relation between model-theoretic semantics and the epistemological problem of realism. In this polemic I argue for three points: (1) Hintikka's assumption that there is a fundamental opposition between two visions of language, the view of language as a medium of communication and the view of it as a calculus, is mistaken. I demonstrate that the latter vision of language presupposes the former one, (2) Hintikka's argument for the thesis that the view of language as a medium of communication constitutes the common source of the troublesome thesis of ineffability of semantics and semantic universalism is faulty. I demonstrate that the source of both beliefs lies in the unwarranted assumption that logical semantics against Hintikka is that logical semantics should not be interpreted as a new tool for solving the old epistemological problem.

2

From Realism to Arealism (III). Deflationary Dissolution of the Problem of Realism in Post-Wittgensteinian Philosophy

100%

Oleksy M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2003

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vol. 11

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issue 2

25-37

PL

The purpose of this article is to distinguish the position which I call „arealism” from both semantic realism and semantic anti-realism. Arealism is based on the deflationary critique of the logico-semantic debate on realism, i.e., on the argument which undermines the foundationist presuppositions of this debate. I attempt to draw carefully the distinction between arealist, deflationist approach to the problem of realism and the position of semantic anti-realism, which is usually framed in terms of the assertability-conditions semantics. Moreover, I argue that linguistic antirealism faces problems similar to those which haunted transcendental idealism. In the second part of the paper I demonstrate in a dialectical manner that arealism (1) is holistic in a particular Wittgensteinian sense, (2) does not support nor assume linguistic relativism, (3) should not be confused with meta-theoretical thesis of inexhaustibility of semantics, (4) involves a particular strategy of deflationary criticism, and (5) does not lead to semantic nihilism or eliminationism.

3

From Realism towards Arealism (I)

50%

Oleksy M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2002

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vol. 10

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issue 3-4

41-52

PL

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From Realism to Arealism (II). Epistemological Realism Through Linguistic Peephole

From Realism to Arealism (III). Deflationary Dissolution of the Problem of Realism in Post-Wittgensteinian Philosophy

From Realism towards Arealism (I)