Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 3

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF LOGIC

100%
Čana T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
|
vol. 68
|
issue 4
309 – 318
EN
The problem of the epistemological status of logic is the core of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic. There are two known solutions to this problem: apriorism and aposteriorism. It appears that one solution or the other must be true. Scholars believe that the early Wittgenstein’s approach to the epistemological status of logic is a radical version of apriorism. The aim of the paper is to provide an adequate reconstruction of the later Wittgenstein’s solution. The main question is: Provided that there is a disagreement between the two Wittgenstein’s views of the epistemological status of logic, do we need to consider his later position as an example of aposteriorism? Our answer is: No. The later Wittgenstein’s position questions the conceptual framework of the whole philosophical discussion. His remarks on the epistemology of logic are directed against both apriorism and aposteriorism in the philosophy of logic.
2

BOGHOSSIAN O NEZDÔVODNITEĽNOSTI EPISTEMOLOGICKÝCH NÁROKOV LOGIKY

100%
Čana T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 8
620 – 632
EN
This paper deals with the epistemological claims of logic. Scepticism is a position in the philosophy of logic, according to which the „fundamental logical truths“ such as „Modus ponens is a valid rule of inference“, are unjustifiable. In his quest for a „plausible epistemology for logic“, Paul Boghossian subjected this position to an original criticism. He argues that the unique status of fundamental logical truths should also be justified. Otherwise, nothing can be really justified. He tries to demonstrate that, under such circumstances, the sceptical position does not represent „the stable platform to stand on“, either. The aim of this paper is to critically reconsider Boghossian’s attack on this position.
3
Content available remote

Koťátko o chrobákovi vo Wittgensteinovej škatuľke

100%
Čana T.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
|
2015
|
vol. 63
|
issue 2
267-278
EN
Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the beetle in the box in the Philosophical Investigations has been the object of a robust critique by Petr Koťátko. In the book Interpretace a subjektivita (Interpretation and Subjectivity) he resolutely opposes the view that mental experiences do not figure in our vocabularies of the mental, which he associates with the metaphor in question. The aim of this article is to show that the critique in question is founded on a misunderstanding of the real sense of the metaphor. Its motivation is quite different. In addition, the aim is to show that, in reality, there is agreement between Koťátko’s critical thoughts and the motivation of Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the beetle in the box.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.