Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 10

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Niezbędnik teoretyka i praktyka sztucznej inteligencji

100%
Hohol M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
|
2012
|
issue 50
167-171
PL
Recenzja książki: Mariusz Flasiński, Wstęp do Sztucznej Inteligencji, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2011.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Czy potrzebna nam teoria fundamentalna? Refleksje na temat teorii świadomości Davida Chalmersa

100%
Hohol M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
|
2011
|
issue 49
3-45
PL
The article presents a survey of the fundamental theory of consciousness according to David Chalmers. In order to examine these issues the following actions are taken. In the first part, the philosophical and cognitive-scientific views of David Chalmers are summarized in detail. Particular attention is paid to the following issues: the distinction between the easy and hard problem of consciousness, the nature of qualia, supervenience, as well as the arguments against the reductive accounts of consciousness. The elements of the structure of Chalmers’ fundamental theory: e.g., the principle of structural coherence, the principle of organizational invariance and the principle of double aspects of information are presented. Also, the problems of the relationship between mind and quantum mechanics are analyzed. In the second part, Chalmers’ theory of consciousness is challenged and criticized in three areas: cognitive science, philosophy of science and philosophy of physics. In the summary, the reply to the question in the title of the article is suggested.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Biopsychologiczne podstawy poznania geometrycznego

100%
Hohol M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
|
2018
|
issue 64
137-165
PL
In this review-paper, I focus on biopsychological foundations of geometric cognition. Starting from the Kant’s views on mathematics, I attempt to show that contemporary cognitive scientists, alike the famous philosopher, recognize mutual relationships of visuospatial processing and geometric cognition. What I defend is a claim that Tinbergen’s explanatory questions are the most fruitful tool for explaining our “hardwired,” and thus shared with other animals, Euclidean intuitions, which manifest themselves in spatial navigation and shape recognition. I claim, however, that these “hardwired intuitions” cannot capture full-blooded Euclidean geometry, which demands practice with cultural artifacts in various time-scales.
4
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Darwin jako przebrany za wroga przyjaciel religii

100%
Hohol M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
|
2010
|
issue 47
161-165
PL
Recenzja książki: F.J. Ayala, Dar Karola Darwina dla nauki i religii, przekł. P. Dawidowicz, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2009, ss. XI + 216.
5
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Mózg, społeczeństwo i wolna wola

100%
Hohol M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
|
2013
|
issue 53
271-280
PL
Recenzja książki: Michael S. Gazzaniga, Kto tu rządzi – ja czy mój mózg? Neuronauka a istnienie wolnej woli, przeł. Agnieszka Nowak, Smak Słowa, Sopot 2013, s. 208.
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Umysł: system sprzeczny, ale nie trywialny

100%
Hohol M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
|
2010
|
issue 47
89-108
PL
In this article, the model of an inconsistent mind according to suggestions of Hilary Putnam and Alan Turing is presented from the perspective of the cognitive sciences and the evolutionary psychology. An attempt to reconcile the two versions of the modular model of mind by Jerry Fodor and Steven Pinker is undertaken followed by the discussion of the problem of evolutionary origin of mind. Next, the problem of the central module (interface) is considered which is supposed to integrate the individual and specialized modules of mind. The main thesis of this article states that the ‘global’ inconsistency of mind may result from the inconsistencies among ‘local’ computational modules of mind. Mind may be modeled as an inconsistent formal system which remains non-trivial. Consequently, it seems rational to postulate that the operation of mind is not based on the classical Aristotelian logic and is better described the systems of a paraconsistent logic. Best examples of such logical systems include the discussive logic by Stanisław Jaśkowski, the logic of formal inconsistency (LFI) by Newton da Costa and the many-valued logic by Jan Łukasiewicz and Graham Priest.
7
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

O regułach w nowym świetle

100%
Hohol M.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
|
2013
|
issue 52
223-228
PL
Recenzja książki: Bartosz Brożek, Rule-Following. From Imitation to the Normative Mind, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2013, ss. 234.
8

Language as a Tool. An Insight From Cognitive Science

63%
Brożek B., Hohol M.
Studia Humana
|
2015
|
vol. 4
|
issue 2
16-25
EN
In this paper it has been argued that the theory of conceptual maps developed recently by Paul M. Churchland provides support for Wittgenstein’s claim that language is a tool for acting in the world. The role of language is to coordinate and shape the conceptual maps of the members of the given language community, reducing the cross-individual cognitive idiosyncrasies and paving the way for joint cognitive enterprises. Moreover, Churchland’s theory also explains our tendency to speak of language as consisting of concepts which correspond to things we encounter in the world. The puzzle of common sense reference is no longer a puzzle: while at the fundamental level language remains a tool for orchestrating conceptual maps, the fact that the maps encode some communally shared categorization of experience fuels our talk of concepts capturing the essences of things, natural kinds, prototypes, etc.
9
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Roger Penrose's Quantization of the Mind

63%
Grygiel W. P., Hohol M.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2009
|
vol. 17
|
issue 3
5-31
PL
The modeling of the human mind based on quantum effects has been gaining considerable interest due to the intriguing possibility of applying non-local interactions in the studies of consciousness. Inasmuch as the majority of the pertinent studies are restricted to the exclusive analysis of mental phenomena, the quantum model of mind proposed by Roger Penrose constitutes a part of a much larger scheme of the ultimate unification of physics. Penrose's efforts to find the 'missing science of consciousness' presuppose the non-algorithmic character of human thinking inferred from Gödel's incompleteness theorem. This is supposed to combine with the anticipated non-algorithmic character of the future quantum gravity theory involving the objective reduction of a quantum mechanical state vector. By surveying contemporary achievements of cognitive sciences as well as the development of Penrose's conjectures, presented in his recent work The Road to Reality, we wish to show that his non-algorithmic quantum model of human mind is contingent upon the fundamental philosophical assumption of the mathematicity of the Universe.
10
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

The Einstein’s Theory of Relativity in the Context of Leon Chwistek’s Methodological Considerations

63%
Polak P., Hohol M.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2011
|
vol. 19
|
issue 3
107-125
PL
Leon Chwistek (1884-1944) was a Professor of Mathematical Logic at the Lviv University, but also philosopher, theoretician of modern art and avant-garde painter. The present article deals with the reception of Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity (SR) according to Leon Chwistek. Firstly, Chwistek’s life and philosophical views are presented. Particular attention is paid to the following issues: the theory of the multiplicity of realities, the problem of idealism in the context of philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science, and also positivist background of Chwistek’s philosophy. Secondly, the reception of the theory of relativity according to Chwistek is presented in detail. In order to explain this problem, the following steps are taken: Chwistek’s books and articles are presented. The charge of idealism against Albert Einstein’s and Hermann Minkowski’s theories, as well as alterations to special theory of relativity proposed by Chwistek are reported and analyzed. Finally, Chwistek’s mistakes are pointed out and recapitulated.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.